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Abstract
In this study, a new risk management approach was applied to mitigate fatal incidents through
the utilization of critical controls. The aim of this study was to create a scalable, minimally invasive
proof-of-concept for AngloGold Ashanti that can successfully be implemented at any of the company’s
mining operations.
The system was designed by adhering to organizational requirements, and ensuring that it
is suitable to any mining environment. The designed Critical Control Management System was
subsequently implemented at Sunrise Dam, one of AngloGold Ashanti’s Australian mining oper-
ations. To ensure that critical controls were also assessed at the operational level, a workplace
inspection process was modified to generate control data. All sources of data subsequently were fed
into a Business Intelligence environment enabling insight into critical control performance to all
company stakeholders. Doing so informs decision-making on safety priorities company-wide, based
on real-time data generated on the operational level.
Two case studies were performed to assess two of the most significant hazards at Sunrise
Dam. The studies showed that the effectiveness of reactive controls changes irrespective of their
compliance and performance. Furthermore, the influence of human factors within risk management
remains difficult to quantify. Finally, it demonstrates the potential for integration of incident data
into the Critical Control Management System, thus creating both leading and lagging indicators for
safety performance.
The conclusion of this study is that an effective and scalable Critical Control Management
System can be successfully implemented in a mining operation if the right conditions are generated.
The approach of integration in existing processes demonstrates that companies can achieve greater
control over fatality prevention without the need for an additional safety management system.
On this basis, it is recommended that other operations are supported in creating an environment
suitable for adaptation before Critical Control Management is implemented.
Keywords critical controls, mining, safety, business intelligence, risk management
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Introduction
Eliminating fatalities remains one of the biggest challenges in the mining industry today. Partly
driven by regulatory requirements, professional culture and significant incidents, obtaining a
sufficient occupational health and safety standard has changed the operational priorities of mining
companies. Changes in societal norms mean it is simply no longer acceptable to have fatalities
during work (Galvin, 2016). Carrying the reputation of a dangerous, polluting industry, mining
companies often struggle to gain positive public perception. In order to change this view, "Zero
Harm" has been one of the core goals for major mining companies seeking to gain and maintain
the social license to operate (AngloGold Ashanti, 2015, Glencore, 2016). Even with the objective of
’Zero Harm’ in mind, mining companies have fallen short of the mark.
This is corroborated by benchmarking studies across the industry by the International Council
Minerals and Mines (ICMM), fatality rates per 1,000,000 hours worked have only gone down
marginally from 0.033 in 2012 to 0.032 in 2016 (ICMM, 2015, 2016). As ore grades decline and
deposits run out, mining companies must dig deeper to reach viable deposits, only compounding
the high-potential safety issues already encountered (Lane et al., 2015, Prior et al., 2012).
1.1. Changing Safety Management in Mining
Traditional safety approaches focus on a multitude of systems, hazard management plans and
safety procedures. This comprehensive framework can hinder employees in emergency situations
due to the presence of too many prevention systems, causing uncertainty as to what is the optimal
reaction strategy (Makin and Winder, 2008). Additionally, studies show that fatal accidents are
both foreseeable and preventable but keep occuring in the same ways (Pillay and Tuck, 2017).
This suggests that contemporary safety management approaches have not been successful (Pillay
et al., 2010). The apparent lack of progress has caused a paradigm shift toward alternative
methods among mining companies looking to reduce risks in the work space. One of the ways in
which solutions are sought is through the establishment of common interest platforms like the
International Council of Minerals and Mines (ICMM, 2015a).
Within the domain of fatality prevention, the ICMM is currently committing significant effort
into Critical Control Management (CCM). This method focuses on low-likelihood, high-impact
events that most often cause fatalities and serious injuries in the work place. It concentrates on
a relatively small amount of identified controls that are simultaneously monitored, reported and
improved. What makes these controls "critical" is typified by being the first or last line of defence,
preventing multiple possible incidents or by working independently to mitigate events endangering
the lives of employees (AngloGold Ashanti, 2015).
Within the industry, AngloGold Ashanti is one of the companies in the mining industry currently
driving the approach of critical control management to prevent fatal accidents, also called Material
Unwanted Events (MUE’s). The company has been doing so since 2014, identifying those hazards
in the workplace causing fatalities and establishing controls in place to mitigate MUE’s (AngloGold
Ashanti, 2014). While software had been purchased for identifying critical controls, no single
system had yet been implemented to assess control performance. When built, such a system could
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support employees company-wide in identifying hazardous areas, prioritizing maintenance and
informing safety management decisions. To understand why AngloGold Ashanti is interested in
such a system, one only needs to look at the nature of its business.
1.2. Challenges at AngloGold Ashanti
AngloGold Ashanti operates mines which, by nature, are highly dynamic working environments.
Some of the company’s assets in South Africa operate at depths exceeding four kilometres depth
from the surface. In such conditions the pressure of native rock on mine openings leaves very little
room for error, both literally and figuratively. Compounding the issue is the fact that employees
across the three continents in which AGA operates widely differ in terms of culture, levels of
education, and economic development (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2007, Hajkowicz et al.,
2011, Kitula, 2006).
Due to the semi-autonomous status of the different business units within AngloGold Ashanti,
a multitude of measures and systems have been implemented to mitigate fatal incidents within
the mines. While existing systems correspond with local challenges and culture, in some cases
these have failed to adequately respond to emergent risks. Investigations into fatal incidents
often identify a common factor, which is that the controls needed to prevent incidents were known
and available, but not in place or properly maintained (ICMM, 2015a). Furthermore, a myriad of
systems can lead to a false sense of security as it conceals operational issues (Bakolas and Saleh,
2011).
1.3. Motivation
The pattern of complicated safety approaches as discussed in the previous paragraph led to
identification of the need for a simple, robust system that focuses on those critical controls that
prevent fatalities. By directly influencing these controls, a more transparent safety management
approach can be applied, to the benefit of the public, the regulators and naturally the employees
themselves.
With this goal in mind, senior management officials at AngloGold Ashanti authorized this
study. Using a scientific approach, contemporary knowledge on relevant fields of study was to
be combined to deliver a state-of-the-art system. As the entire development of such a product
was estimated to exceed the limits of a thesis study, a scalable proof-of-concept was set as main
deliverable for the company. Other deliverables included a literature study on contemporary
best-practices, identification of potential additions to the proof-of-concept and a roadmap indicating
further development for a short to medium time horizon. The proof-of-concept was implemented at
AngloGold Ashanti’s gold mining operation Sunrise Dam in Western Australia during a field work
study conducted from April 2017 to August 2017.
1.4. Proposed Method
Critical Control Management has been identified as a potential method for mitigating MUE’s at
AngloGold Operations. By developing a simple, robust system that monitors the performance of
these controls, safety decision-making of stakeholders can be supported. This enables AngloGold
Ashanti to have greater control of safety within its operations.
In order to develop a system that adequately responds to company requirements and operational
constraints, contemporary safety and risk management thinking was combined with Business
Intelligence. This was used as the foundation for further design and implementation of the proof-
of-concept Critical Control Management System. The focus here was on proof-of-control, as the
influence of stakeholders on design and implementation could not be asserted during the scoping
stage of the study.
1.5. Research Questions and Objectives
In this section, the research questions and objectives of this study will be discussed. First, the
purpose of the study is given. Subsequently, the research questions are presented. Finally, Several
objectives are elaborated upon to indicate what elements are required to answer the research
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questions.
Purpose:
Support employee decision-making on fatality prevention through management of critical controls
with the creation of a simple, robust and scalable system that can be used by stakeholders in the
company.
Research question:
How can an effective Critical Control Management System be implemented in AngloGold Ashanti
operations to mitigate fatal incidents?
The research question can be divided into several sub-questions that guide the research to its
intended purpose. The sub-questions are:
1. What are the key elements for successful implementation in an AngloGold Ashanti operation?
2. How can design of the system incorporate scalability to other AngloGold Ashanti operations?
3. In what ways can critical control monitoring be introduced into a mining operation?
4. How can indicators for the performance of critical controls be introduced and measured?
Based on the sub-questions, several objectives were set out for development of the Critical Control
Management System. Objective 1 relates to sub-question 1, objective 2 to sub-questions 2 & 3 and
objective 3 to sub-question 4.
Objective 1: Assessment of Organizational Requirements andOperational Contraints
The proposed system functions in a multi-faceted environment with a plurality of stakeholders.
Defining the framework in which the Critical Control Management System should operate requires
determination of two components:
1.1 Develop a comprehensive understanding of contemporary literature with regards to operational
safety, risk management and best-practices.
1.2 Create a framework of current practices, practicable applications and organizational require-
ments which supports the implementation of a Critical Control Management System.
Objective 2: Design and Implementation of a Critical ControlManagement System
After the required framework is established, a design is created that adheres to set requirements
while allowing for possible expansion to other operations. This includes accounting for the working
environment as well as incorporation of company standards into the proposed methods of data
acquisition. Subsequently a strategy for implementation of the proposed system is developed.
Using that methodology, an existing business process is targeted for critical control integration.
The data generated can then be fed into the Business Intelligence part of the greater systems
design to allow application of data analytics. Measures generated in this part can then be delivered
to stakeholders based on the data that is applicable to them. This objective is specified using the
following components:
2.1 Consideration of all relevant features, applications and the required flow necessary for design
of the Critical Control Management System.
2.2 Assessment of the critical control process set forth in the company standards for alignment to
data acquisition processes.
2.3 Development of a Critical Control Management System’s architecture adhering to all identified
requirements, contraints and priorities.
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2.4 Creation of a strategy that allows rapid implementation of critical control monitoring in an
operational environment.
2.5 Selection of a business process applicable for critical control integration and data aqcuisition.
The selected process is conducted by operators on a pre-defined frequency and integration
accomplishes several things: awareness of critical controls by operators and implementation of
a technical assessment of critical controls on the work floor.
2.6 Integration of critical controls into the selected business process, allowing for performance data
to be generated.
2.7 Develop a feed from critical control performance data into a reporting suite, which allows
stakeholders to make decisions relevant to them on operational safety.
Objective 3: Validation of Critical Control and Systems Performance
Two case studies are executed to demonstrate potential effectiveness of the Critical Control Man-
agement System. Secondly, the relevance of incident data to critical control monitoring is shown.
Finally, the nature of the data is examined to assess underlying issues that could be present in an
operational environment. The following components are applicable to this objective:
3.1 Assess the potential effectiveness of the Critical Control Management System based on histori-
cal incident data.
3.1 Demonstrate the viability of the inclusion of incident data into the greater Critical Control
Management System. This in turn provides a lagging indicator for operational safety.
3.2 Review incident data to assess the possibility of systemic, significant safety issues in an
operational environment.
1.6. Project Scope
The scope of work described in Section 1.5, Research Questions and Objectives, is substantial both
in size and ambition. To mitigate potential negative consequences of scope creep, a framework was
set up to define what is included and what is excluded in scope for the study.
A successful outcome of this project could be used as the foundation for critical control manage-
ment at AngloGold Ashanti in the years to come. This means that besides from scientific merit,
practicality for AngloGold Ashanti is a key element to assure a positive outcome. After conducting
an extensive literature study, the knowledge gained is applied with and within the systems avail-
able at AngloGold Ashanti. This means that any outcome is optimized for the company and its
current systems. To give a clear indication of what is included and exluded in the scope of the study,
Table 1.1 has been drawn up do indicate all items in-scope and those classified as out of scope.
1.7. Project Approach - Agile
To enable flexible (re-)scoping during the project should requirements change, a research setup
based on Agile software design was utilized. This methodology is suitable for situations in which
quick adaptation to changing requirements is required (Hoda et al., 2017). Instead of high-
frequency, two week intervals, common for an Agile project approach, four to six week periods were
used to deliver intermittent results to (company) stakeholders based on their availability and on
the nature of the deliverables. Different stages identified in the Agile approach can be viewed in
Figure 1.1.
All steps identified in yellow were conducted as operational phases for AngloGold Ashanti, with
phases two to four being conducted at corporate headquarters in Johannesburg in South Africa,
regional headquarters in Perth, Australia and Sunrise Dam Gold Mine, Australia. The phases
correspond to the following chapters:
• Phase 1: Chapter 1 and 2
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Table 1.1: Table in which the scope for relevant sections of the project is given
• Phase 2: Chapter 3 and 4
• Phase 3: Chapter 5 and 6
• Phase 4: Chapter 7
• Phase 5: Chapter 8 through 10
Benefits of returning to project scoping will be discussed in Section 8.7, to demonstrate the potential
of this approach. The value generated after each step was presented as a deliverable to company
officials.
1.8. Thesis Outline
2. Literature Review Builds a comprehensive framework for further research
that discusses safety science, risk management, risk
quantification and current industry best practices. Safety
science is examined to build understanding of contempo-
rary ways approaches of managening operational safety.
Risk management discusses the incorporation of uncer-
tainty within the scope of operational safety. To de-
termine what acceptable risk is, possible quantification
methods are discussed. Finally, some of the industry’s
leading mining companies and a collaboration platform
are examined to look into state-of-the-art approaches.
3. Methodology firstly, proposes interview structures to be used in gath-
ering qualitative data on organizational requirements.
Secondly, it demonstrates Business Intelligence as a do-
main that has the potential to support the building of a
system to manage operational safety risk.
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Figure 1.1: The Agile-based process used to allow fast re-scoping of research as required
4. The organizational environment Assesses the needs within AngloGold Ashanti that serve
as the framework for further design and implementation.
First, it goes into detail as to what the current company
safety management practices are. Secondly, potentially
fatal hazards relevant to the operations are examined.
It builds on this knowledge by discussing critical con-
trols, the systems in place to mitigate fatal incidents.
Furthermore, company standards and site selection for
implementation of the system are discussed. Finally, the
organizational requirements are set out in five broad
tenets.
5. Systems Design Outlines the systems design applied to manage critical
controls business-wide. General considerations for the
design are discussed first. Next, company standards that
govern the verification of critical controls are examined.
Consequently the required working environment is elabo-
rated upon after which all design implications are sum-
marized. Finally, the architecture of the system is demon-
strated along with remarks on potential expansion and
room for improvement.
6. Implementation Exhibits the process of implementing the aforementioned
design in the selected operational environment. First,
the overall strategy for implementation is discussed, fol-
lowed by adoption of necessary company standards. Sub-
sequently operational processes are assessed for critical
control integration, after which integration is carried out.
Next, the roll-out of the greater system is showcased. Fi-
nally, notes on differences in implementation at other
sites are discussed.
7. Case Studies Demonstrates a quantification of the risk profiles of two
of the most significant hazards faced in any underground
mining environment. First, incidents related to under-
ground fire are examined in order to assess the validity
of reactive mitigation measures implemented. The focus
within this case study is on the effectiveness of Aqueous
Film Forming Foam, an engineering critical control. Next,
underground fall of ground incidents are discussed in or-
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der to validate the effectiveness of preventative critical
controls in place. Finally, results of the case study are
discussed in order to give recommendations for further
improvement of the system implemented.
8. Discussion Puts the outcomes of this study in a broader perspective
and relates its implications to avenues for continued re-
search. First, the aspects relevant to systems design are
discussed. Subsequently, ways to expand current progress
are examined. As the main deliverable was to implement
an effective proof-of-concept, methods for achieving more
mature systems and reporting are proposed. Next, poten-
tial implementation issues at other sites are discussed.
Finally, an indication is given on what would be required
to work towards predictive risk in a mining environment.
9. Conclusions Summarizes the results set forth in this research. It
places the outcomes in a larger context and relates back
to the goal and objectives set forth in the introduction to
assess if all deliverables have been achieved.

2
Literature Review
The current safety management practices at AngloGold Ashanti have been shaped by little less
than a century of development. Since the 1930’s, safety management has gone through major
development stages, each shifting the focus of the problem to a different area (Borys et al., 2009,
Hale and Hovden, 1998, Pillay et al., 2010). The evolution of these approaches forms the basis
for this chapter, in which the development of operational safety practices and industrial risk
management will be discussed. Subsequently, that knowledge will be built upon to shape the next
generation of tools with which to manage operational safety in mining.
First, a brief overview of safety management through the 20th and 21st century will be given.
Next, the evolution of barrier-based modelling within the broader context of risk management
will be discussed. Finally, industry best practices will be examined. This will set the stage for the
design strategy of such a process for fatality prevention in chapter 5.
2.1. Brief history of Safety Science
The basis for modern-day safety thinking was developed in the 1930’s, when the first era of safety
thinking came into its own. This era brought forth the well-known work by Herbert Heinrich in
1931, in which he proposed his Domino theory. A brief overview of safety eras in the last century
can be seen in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: The five era’s of safety as adapted from (Pillay et al., 2010)
Heinrich’s work moved the onus of incidents away from technological failures to the idea that these
issues were caused by a series of events, triggering one another and subsequently leading to an
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incident. The first domino stone in that sequence was then always attributed to a technological
failures such as mechanical faults (Heinrich and Petersen, 1980). Subsequent domino’s falling
would then relate to operator error, substandard working conditions, incident causation and finally
damage to people or property (Pillay et al., 2010). Each metaphorical domino stone triggering
failure of the next. By withdrawing one stone from the sequence, incidents could be prevented.
This era of safety thinking lasted to well in the 1950’s. After and during the Second World War,
the development of both military and other equipment was accelerated immensely. Examples of
this development are the invention of the atom bomb, jet engines, rocket science and the broad-
scale application of radar through microwave technology. The interface of humans with these
new applications in high-pressure environments subsequently led to causation of incidents as
technology was changing faster than the people applying it could handle (Swuste et al., 2014).
This led to the development of the Human Factors theory, which represents systems with human
interaction as information flow models. When a person within the system is not able to understand
or transfer information in a timely manner, the flow within the model would be disrupted. After
such a disruption, errors would be made and (significant) incidents could occur.
When Reason presented his now well-known Swiss Cheese Model to try and explain incidents it
resulted in the next paradigm shift within operational safety thinking (Reason, 2000). This theory
moved away from technological failures triggering human mistakes as stated by Heinrich’s Domino
Theory. Instead, it imagined certain vulnerabilities within the organization to line up in the wrong
place and the wrong time. These vulnerabilities could be imagined as temporary and/or permanent
holes in layers of the eponymous cheese, all lining up to allow an incident to occur. Something
that the Swiss Cheese Model was able to explain well was that humans were rarely the sole cause
of an incident. This gave rise to a new era of safety thinking, in which organizational aspects
were also slowly adapted as a factor in incident causation. Moving away from the individual,
reflection centred more significantly on ways the organization could have prevented the incident.
Aspects such as (hazard) training, appropriate working times and procedures came to the forefront
as necessary aspects of a sound safety approach (Pillay et al., 2010). To successfully mitigate
incidents, safety management systems were developed that incorporated all these aspects into a
single framework.
2.1.1. Understanding the Safety of a System
Simultaneous to development of the human factors theory, safety analysis techniques were devel-
oped. Based on the Domino system, these understood an incident to be a sequence of events leading
to eventual failure. Among these techniques is Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis
(FMECA), which is still widely in use to develop maintenance strategy for complex industrial
systems. Other methods of analysis to come from the domino system were Hazard and Operability
study (HAZOP) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) (Swuste et al., 2014).
FTA was developed in 1961 at Bell laboratories to visualize a system and its failure mechanisms
in a diagram (Ericson, 1999). The moment the system suffers a loss of control event, which is also
called a top event, is characterized by a tree of failure paths using Boolean logic (de Ruijter and
Guldenmund, 2016). Through Boolean logic, the probability of single events within the tree can be
determined with which the probability of the top event can be calculated. An example of a fault
tree can be viewed in Figure 2.2, demonstrating its Boolean logic leading to a loss of control, a so
called top event.
While Fault Tree Analysis focuses on the path towards a loss of control event, Event Tree Analysis
(ETA) explores the range of possible outcomes through event paths leading away from the top event
to their eventual outcomes. Using similar Boolean logic, a tree is drawn up from the top event
towards possible consequences. By understanding how an event can eventually lead to an incident,
intermediary steps can be taken to avoid such an outcome. A simple diagram for an event tree
analysis can be viewed in Figure 2.3.
The example of an Event Tree Analysis shown in Figure 2.3 was developed during the course of this
study and displays one of the main fire suppression systems used in underground mines (Hansen,
2017). Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) smothers fires that are caused by inflammable solids
and liquids. When a fire is detected, the AFFF is released to mitigate further damage to a
vehicle. If the AFFF is not set off, or if it fails to activate, it will lead to an unmitigated fire if
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Figure 2.2: Simplified Fault Tree Analysis diagram showing intermediate and underlying causes as adapted from (Mishra
et al., 2017)
Figure 2.3: An Event Tree Analysis displaying several subsystems of the fire protection system Aqueous Film Forming
Foam (AFFF).
no other firefighting methods are applied. For simplicities sake, these are out of scope for this
example. In reality, fires will often be put out using a combination of AFFF and other handheld fire
extinguishers (Hansen, 2017).
One of the first actions taken by the operator is shutting down the engine to disrupt additional
fuel being added to the fire. For the AFFF to operate, the emergency back-up pump should run in
order to supply electricity to the system. If none is produced, the system will not operate. While the
AFFF might work as intended, the design of target areas will often not include every part of the
vehicle. If fire originates elsewhere than the AFFF is applied, the system will fail at least partially
by design. Should the AFFF be damaged before or during fire fighting, its effectiveness will be
limited. Only if all subsystems work and the fire is in the right place will the AFFF actually work.
By modelling these discrepancies, the limits of prevention and mitigation methods can be assessed.
This analysis can be done for both FTA and ETA, thus giving a comprehensive view of causes and
consequences and their effects. The first model to include both FTA and ETA was developed by
Nielsen in 1971 (Swuste et al., 2016).
2.1.2. Introduction of Barrier Thinking
In 1963, Haddon proposed his Hazard-Barrier-Target model (Haddon, 1963). This model empha-
sized potential sources of risk (hazards) and the barriers in place to prevent those hazards from
harming vulnerable objects. By ranking the hazards on a four-point scale from 0 (no hazard) to
4 (serious), parts of a plant could be rated in terms of potential hazard. This model was later
expanded by Haddon to include mitigation techniques. Depending on the rating, ten prevention
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techniques could be applied to mitigate harm on the work floor (Haddon, 1968).
This barrier thinking was adopted by Reason (2000) when adopting his theory of the Swiss
Cheese Model. This model moved away from a series of sequential failures or mistakes. Instead,
a set of particular issues pertaining to the individuals involved, the work floor and the broader
organization allowed a failure to continue. This concept is akin to layers of cheese with all the holes
lining up, until eventual consequence is brought to bear. Not only did this model shift the focus
away from human interface with systems, it also brought barrier thinking to the forefront of safety
thinking (de Ruijter and Guldenmund, 2016). If any one of the holes in the cheese is prevented
from lining up, incidents can be mitigated.
2.2. The High Reliability Organization
The shift away from human interface also led to the recognition of organizational and cultural
factors as indicators for safety performance. One of the organizational concepts developed was
that of High Reliability Organizations (HRO’s). These organizations and their systems, such as
the operation of nuclear installations, require extraordinary measures to maintain acceptable risk
levels (Saunders, 2015). The basis for an HRO is centred on five main concepts (Weick and Sutcliffe,
2007):
• Problem Anticipation
• Containment of Unexpected Events
• Just Culture
• Learning Orientation
• Mindful Leadership
In the next five paragraphs, each of the trademarks High Reliability Organizations will be discussed,
as well as the implications that these have for the mining operation in which the project was set
up.
2.2.1. Problem Anticipation
Problem anticipation within the organization relates to preoccupation with failure, reluctance to
simplify and sensitivity to operations. Preoccupation with failure can best be described as a chronic
unease about potential failures. As such, near misses and incidents are used as an indicator for
the overall performance or health of the system (Lekka and Sugden, 2011). This principle is also
applied at AngloGold Ashanti’s operation Sunrise Dam, where all incidents are to be reported,
whether they are near misses or actual incidents. Reluctance to simplify refers to the capacity of
organizations to systematically collect, analyse and prioritize warnings from its systems. Although
information is systemically collected, the potential for translating that data to real-time and using
it often remains neglected. In order to truly transform to a high reliability organization, it is
necessary to make the information about incidents and related safety data available and digestible
for relevant stakeholders. The sensitivity to operations then refers to the capacity of operations
and managers to continually communicate with “front line” staff to ascertain the bigger picture
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). That sensibility can only be achieved if personnel that are not directly
on the work floor, understand what is going on at the work floor.
2.2.2. Containment of Unexpected Events
When an unexpected event occurs, HRO’s have the capacity to contain unexpected events through
an inherent resilience within the organization (Schulz et al., 2017). This containment is achieved
through multiple processes. In an emergency, the traditional hierarchical structure is dissolved,
instead deferring to individual’s expertise for the problem at hand (Porte and Consolini, 1998).
One of the concepts that is applied in HRO’s with regards to operational safety is the application
of defence in depth. If one back-up fails, another might still prevent an incident from further
escalation (Roberts, 1990).
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Understanding of the systems in place thus becomes critical in ensuring the defence in depth is
maintained at all times. A mine is a dynamic environment where production areas are opened and
closed, air flow and water inflow changes with new development and ground conditions can vary
per meter of drift. These factors make that the risk profile of the mine can change significantly
over time. Only continual re-assessment of this profile can provide any assurance that the defenses
in place will function as required when needed.
2.2.3. Just Culture
Furthermore, the culture at an HRO is geared towards separating unacceptable actions that
require disciplinary measures, and actions taken without malice or attributable cause that result
in a hazardous situation. An example of this is the inadvertent use of inadequate equipment
(Reason, 2000). Instead of dealing out punishments, the goal of incident recording is to improve
working conditions of all personnel. This assures that even when someone makes a mistake, they
feel inclined to share it with the organization. This subsequently leads to an open culture of
reporting incidents and near misses. This can then help the organization understand what the
problems are it is facing, whether they are endemic to the operation or for instance caused by a
lack of training, which builds on having a good problem anticipation.
2.2.4. Learning Orientation
Subsequently, the findings from incidents are continually used to facilitate learning within the
organization, in combination with extensive training and re-training of personnel. Defining what
gaps there are with regards to operator capacities within specific departments can further the
effectiveness of (re-)training programs immensely. Within any industrial scenario, major hazards
can differ significantly in shape or size. Examples of this are hazards related to working at heights
and confined space entry. Both have a significant likelihood of resulting in severe injuries, one or
even potentially multiple fatalities if risks are not managed properly. Having the data available
to ascertain what part of the organization needs what kind of training related to these hazards
not only makes the program more effective, it simultaneously reduces cost and the amount of risk
faced on a daily basis.
2.2.5. Mindful Leadership
Finally, management in HRO’s pro-actively look at fixing weaknesses within the system (Hopkins,
2009). It becomes central for senior management functioning that “bad news” is encouraged to
be transmitted from the shop floor, allowing early warning and pro-active response. Additionally,
senior management should commit to safe operation, allocate resources to improve safety and truly
believe that it is as important as any other business objective (Costella et al., 2009). In order to
help personnel in a leadership position make the decisions necessary for assuring a safe working
environment, information is needed to inform that decision.
Because every decision-maker works within his own sphere of influence, the information needed
might differ significantly from person to person. An example of this is a comparison of the decisions
a maintenance manager makes versus those of the underground manager, both working at the
same underground mine. While the overall working environment is the same and both function on
the same level in the organizational hierarchy, their decisions are based on generally unrelated
data. In order to help both with their decision-making, the information needs to be tailored to their
needs. As a result, the application of mindful leadership is enabled as higher level personnel is
aware of the problems on the operational level and can therefore react swiftly and adequately.
2.3. Bow-tie modelling
In order to better understand the safety systems in place within an organization, bow-tie modelling
has been in use as a tool to map hazardous processes for some time. One of the earliest uses was
the version developed for Shell after the Piper Alpha disaster in 1990 (de Ruijter and Guldenmund,
2016, Pasman and Rogers, 2013). By employing concepts of defence in depth, early warning and
complex systems, bow-tie modelling evolved out of FTA and ETA merging a Cause-Consequence
model into one diagram. Due to its excellent visualization properties and ease of use it however
quickly spread into other fields such as the chemical process industry, health care, and mining
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(de Ruijter and Guldenmund, 2016, Galvin, 2017). It allows rapid identification of causes and
consequences of unwanted events and incidents. Consequently barriers or so-called controls can be
introduced on the pathways to mitigate both likelihood and consequences of risks. It accounts for
barriers along possible failure pathways, leading to a top event or loss of control and subsequently
consequences. An example of a generic bow-tie Model can be seen in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Simple Bow-tie model displaying two causes and consequences for an open pit operations scenario with regards
to pit wall failure
Central to the model is a top event signalling loss of control over a hazardous situation. In the
example in Figure 2.4, the top event is called "Pit Wall Instability". What makes a good top event
is uncertain. Authors de Ruijter and Guldenmund (2016) point out that some top events resonate
more with certain audiences, based on the nature of their description. This suggests they should be
tailored the stakeholders involved in the risk assessment process in order to be successful. One
example of the need for tailoring is the level of granularity applied to the top event, that will differ
when discussing issues with operators or board members of a company. Like the example given
in Figure 2.4, all top events signify a moment where the potential for consequence has gone up
significantly, although prompt reaction might still mitigate worse outcomes.
As well as a top event, any bow-tie model has causes or threats and consequences. Both ends of
the spectrum contain more than one cause and consequence, thus leading to the bow-tie shape as
can sbe viewed in Figure 2.4. Through addition of more causes and/or consequences, all possible
scenarios to a hazard can be included in a model, at the price of added complexity. This concept
aligns with problem anticipation, with which an HRO can be established. In the bow-tie model in
Figure 2.4, the two causes for pit wall instability are specified as inadequate ground control, and
excess in-flow of water. The potential consequences of pit wall instability are given as fatalities and
loss of assets.
Another concept that reflects HRO strategy is the use of defence in depth. In the bow-tie model,
this is achieved through the addition of barriers to failure pathways. By adding more barriers to
vulnerable or dominant pathways, risk relating to a specific incident cause or consequence can be
reduced. A barrier to mitigate the consequence "Loss of Assets", the second one listed in Figure
2.4, could very well be an extensive emergency evacuation plan. Withdrawing all machinery from
the pit operation in time would not prevent the wall from collapsing, however machinery integrity
would be maintained. Note that collapse of the pit wall could itself be seen as a loss of assets,
as significant effort would have to be undertaken to restore the pit operation to working order.
The model also allows a barrier to be utilized for multiple pathways. Take the aforementioned
emergency evacuation plan. Successful execution of this plan would mean that the outcome of
possible fatalities could possibly be mitigated as well.
2.3.1. Hierarchy of Controls
With the emergency evacuation plan in the previous Section, an indication was already given
that some barriers might be more effective or critical than others. With regards to the emergency
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evacuation plan, this was due to its functioning as a reactive barrier, also called control, on multiple
pathways to listed consequences. This multi-purpose functioning is only one of ways in which a
control can be defined as more critical than other systems in place.
Another method, is applying the so-called "hierarchy of controls". This concepts ranks controls
based on the way risks and hazards are mitigated. The way in which the hierarchy of controls is
defined depends on the organization and its according needs. The hierarchy of controls used by
AngloGold Ashanti can be viewed in Figure 2.5
Figure 2.5: Hierarchy of Controls as applied in AngloGold Ashanti operations to determine potential criticality to controls.
As is shown in Figure 2.5, the most effective form of controls is elimination of the hazard itself. An
example of such a control simply stopping with certain aspects of an operation when the risks are
deemed unacceptable. Being the most potent of controls, these often also result in secondary effects
such as severe financial consequences if and when a site stops operations. As one moves down the
hierarchy of controls, the potential effectiveness of each category is reduced. As such, wearing PPE
is deemed the least effective protection to mitigate both minor and severe incidents.
Lower order controls
That PPE is categorized so low is due to the environment in which an operator works. When
working with industrial smelting operations for example, a hard hat will do nothing to prevent
contact with molten metal. Administrative and PPE controls are often referred to as lower order
controls, and their effectiveness to stop severe incidents is often very limited (Floyd and Floyd,
2017). Being the least effective, they are also most easily implemented. Part of this is also due to
the adaptation of control hierarchy after operations or plants have already been built. Redesigning
processes, replacing certain materials or isolating hazards effectively will often have significant
financial impact on an organization. Implementing re-training programmes in such a situation can
be just as effective as redesigning a process, at a considerable lower cost. While the effect might
be the same, applying an administrative control like retraining does not give business owners a
guarantee that the process will be carried out safely.
2.4. Risk Management
Identification of uncertain scenarios is one of the main reasons companies employ bow-tie modelling
(Galvin, 2017). That uncertainty, left unchecked, could have a significant, unforeseen, negative
impact on the organization or company. To demonstrate this effect, the re-training programme
example in the previous paragraph can be utilized. The control could very well eliminate incidents
related to a certain hazard for any period of time. An operator involved with the hazardous task
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at hand might still be fatigued, preoccupied with other things and forget to apply what he or she
learned in the re-training program. In that moment, the control fails. This uncertainty is part of
what makes some controls more effective than others. A redesign in the work process cannot forget
its training, it simply is. That redesign might not be financially feasible however. Substituting the
redesign with a re-training program might be more cost-effective, reduce possible impact as well
as the chance that an incident occurs. It is more effective than doing nothing, yet less effective
than a redesign. Is that change then an adequate solution to make sure that operators work safely
and are protected from harm? That is uncertain. That uncertainty, a product of probability and
consequences, is called risk.
2.4.1. Definition of Risk
Risk is one of the central concepts within this research. Although a familiar term, risk is presented
in many shapes or forms depending on its use or field of practice. Aven (2012) suggests there is
no single agreed definition of the concept of risk. In addition, the most widely used standard to
adress risk management, the ISO standard 31000, refers to risk as the “effect of uncertainty on
objectives” (International Organization for Standardization, 2009). The use of such an ambiguous
term reflects the ISO standard’s intention of referring to positive risk as well as negative risk. An
example of positive risk is discovery and recovery of higher than expected ore grades as based on
the geological modelling for a section of a mining operation. Negative risk is what is generally used
in the context of occupational health and safety. Here, uncertainty propagates events that have a
negative effect on employees.
When referring to risk in the context of this thesis, it will concern negative risk unless otherwise
specified. Furthermore, it deals with the potential for severe injury or fatalities. This means that
some Lost Time Injuries (LTI’s), which are a significant incident by themselves, might not even
qualify based on the premise that an injured employee can resume work the next day.
2.4.2. Quantification of Risk
When quantifying risk, oftentimes a probability function is utilized to calculate an expected value
for uncertainty (Aven, 2009). In that sense, it is the combination of the probability of an event or
series of events and the estimated consequence of those events. The way that risk is defined as a
metric depends on the situation. Some examples of risk metrics are (Aven, 2016):
• Combination of probability and severity of consequences
• Expected consequences (loss or damage), as calculated through for instance:
– Expected damage to assets
– Expected fatalities
– Expected loss of production
• A probability distribution for damage to assets or people
Which metric is the most suitable for risk assessment all depends on the situation in which the
assessment is applied. Furthermore, one should consider that risk by itself is only the measure
of uncertainty for a single scenario. An accurate risk assessment helps a decision maker answer
the question: How can I do business profitably and sustainably, given the current configuration
of business assets and employees? What the weight of these elements is in making a business
decision depend on the maker of that decision. If we look back at the company’s referred to in the
introduction with their goal of ’Zero Harm’, it would seem their inclination would be to business
sustainably first, profitably second.
2.4.3. Assessing Uncertainty in Risk
In the previous paragraph, several possible metrics for assessing risks were demonstrated. These
revolve around a probability figure, be it a distribution or an expected value. Among these,
probability analysis is the foremost method for risk quantification. When conducting risk studies,
two types of parameter uncertainty are applied (Abdo et al., 2017):
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• Stochastic or aleatory uncertainty
• Epistemic uncertainty
Stochastic or aleatory uncertainty describes the variation in possible outcomes which is due to
randomness in the process or some sort of natural variability. An example of a random process
with aleatory uncertainty is that of flipping a coin. Sometimes it is heads while other times the
outcome is tails. Natural variability can be observed in discharge of a river. At t = 0 it may be 10
m3/s, while at t = t + dt it may be 12 m3/s. To assess aleatory risk, limit frequency assessments are
used to define a probability distribution given infinite outcomes. This method can only be reliably
applied if the underlying process generating aleatory risk is stochastic in nature.
Epistemic risk refers to a lack of knowledge, imprecision or measurement error. This could for
instance be due to a lack of understanding with respect to the issue at hand (Abdo et al., 2017).
One way to deal with epistemic risk is to gather a second opinion by experts in a certain field.
However, there might still be a lack of knowledge unbeknownst to the experts consulted, which is
also a measure of epistemic uncertainty.
Oftentimes companies classify both types of uncertainty using a risk matrix. In such as diagram,
several categories of probability are categorized on one axis, while a similar amount of categories
of consequence is assessed on another axis. This approach therefore assumes that both forms of
uncertainty can be quantified in the same way. An example of a risk matrix can be viewed in Figure
2.6
Figure 2.6: Example risk matrix used by companies to assess criticality of hazards
Instead of using an exact probability, a confidence interval is taken to classify uncertainty.
Similarly, a linear or exponential set of outcomes as is the case in Figure 2.6 can be assigned.
When this is applied to all hazards or uncertainties, a measure of their criticality for the company
can be specified. Whatever make up of the risk matrix is used depends on the risk appetite and
priorities of the respective organization. How this is established will discussed in detail in Section
2.5. Depending on what category hazards can be assigned to, several methods of risk mitigation
might be applied:
• Tolerate: accepting the likelihood and consequences of a risk
• Transfer: using insurance or third parties to take risk on behalf of the company
• Treatment: controlling the amount of risk through actions reducing likelihood or minimizing
impact
• Terminate: altering processes or simply removing the necessity for carrying out business a
certain way
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Whatever method is applicable has to be determined through comprehensive risk assessments
of the business. In some cases, it might not be feasible or practicable to mitigate both axes to an
acceptable level. In such cases, further determination by the company is needed to assess whether
business can be continued.
2.4.4. Layer of Protection Analysis
Combining the ideas of barrier-based risk management and probability-based risk analysis is Layer
of Protection Analysis (LOPA) (Pasman and Rogers, 2013). This method seeks to quantify the
probability of consequences after unwanted events through attributing probabilities to both causes
and controls in the model. An example of a LOPA quantified model developed during this study is
shown in Figure 2.7, which is a modified version of the Event Tree Analysis diagram presented in
Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.7: LOPA Analysis diagram categorizing risk and potential damage suffered
The probabilities that are attributed to causes of incidents are probability figures indicating their
estimated frequency of occurrence. These can be based on historical data or through probability
analysis of controls.
Within LOPA, controls are attributed a probability of failure on demand (PFD). This measure
specifies how often a control fails when depended on. The PFD combines availability, interval
between demands, failure detection and adequacy for a scenario. A simple example of PFD can be
seen in Figure 2.7, where the PFD for the AFFF system failing is set as p = 0.05. By combining all
PFD’s with their damage category, a measure for the estimated cost of an incident can be made.
The benefit of a LOPA model is that dominant pathways to more prone consequences are easily
identified. Additionally, an estimation can be given for the total risk profile given a specific hazard.
While LOPA is seemingly powerful, it is limited by the amount of scenario’s a LOPA analysis
effectively can cover (Pasman and Rogers, 2013). What will become clear in Chapter 7 is that when
presented with multiple scenario’s with different levels of complexity, getting accurate figures for
PFD is practical nor attainable, even within the scope of a thesis study.
2.5. What is acceptable risk?
After all possible outcomes and probabilities are estimated, what is ultimately an acceptable level
of risk to face in an operation? Setting a level for risk tolerance is often found difficult, much more
so when decisions potentially have a long term impact (Berner and Flage, 2017). Factors that apply
in determining what is acceptable are for instance:
• The type of organization
• The (local) social and cultural norms applied
• The hazards faced by an organization and the understanding thereof
• Background knowledge
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• Models, data or expert statements
Depending on the nature of an organization, the tolerance for risks can be much higher. Compare
an administrative job in an ordinary office to being an operator in an underground mine. In the
second instance, solely being underground means one is exposed to a multitude of hazards that
could be potentially fatal to the individual. Some of these hazards are for instance vehicle-vehicle
or train-person collisions, inundation of the underground workings or inhalation of toxic fumes.
Even so, some of these hazards might not even exist in another mine, simply due to the fact no
trains are utilized in that specific mine or toxic gasses do not permeate from within a certain
deposit.
Differences in social norms across continents are very visible in mining as injury rates differ not
only from mine to mine, what is acceptable also very much depends on the local culture. Because
mining companies tend to work globally, what is applied in the company as acceptable often shapes
safety performance across the board.
Defining what level of risk tolerance is acceptable often relies on incomplete understanding of
hazards or dated background knowledge. To make up for these gaps, models are made, data is
gathered and experts consulted. When dealing with low-frequency, high-consequence events such
additional knowledge might not fully represent the "true" risk (Aven, 2014).
2.5.1. "As Low As Reasonably Practical" or ALARP
One way to account for all of the aforementioned discrepancies is applying the principle of "As
Low As Reasonably Practical", otherwise known as ALARP. This process is hazard-based and looks
to diminish risks faced in an organization (Robinson and Francis, 2014). ALARP works through
applying a simple process to map out hazards and risks, after which countermeasures can be
applied if deemed necessary. In Figure 2.8, a flow chart is shown that shows the steps taken to
reduce risk to an ALARP level.
Figure 2.8: The process applied to mitigate risks based on the ALARP principle. Underneath the steps the main questions
or actions per process item are outlined, as adapted from Robinson and Francis (2014).
Within the environment of a generic underground mine, a hazard can be assessed using the ALARP
process. In this example, the case for fall of ground incidents will be examined. More hazards
ought to be determined in the first step of the ALARP process, but for the example a single hazard
will suffice. The second step of the process is determining what the level of risk for a fall of ground
incident is. Depending on the prevailing conditions at the start of underground operations, an
assessment can be made as to what the implied strength or integrity of the surrounding rock is.
For this, methods such as RQD or Q-classification can be applied.
Based on such an assessment, dimensions for drifts and stopes may be calculated in which a
safety factor is used in accordance with conventional mining theory. This safety factor is partially
based on the amount of support that is implemented in the underground workings, be it through
rock bolts, shotcrete, or meshing. Even so, there is some measure of likelihood that ground control
incidents will occur. Like the example FTA in Figure 2.2, several categories of failures may occur
through primary causes. For each of these, a probability density function may be quantified to
estimate the potential of all foreseeable consequences. Then the risk of all of these outcomes is
compared to risk criteria, functioning as a would-be target for the organization. Possible criteria in
the case of fall of ground might be figures for:
• amount of fatalities per year
• amount of production loss
• reputational impact
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• damage to assets
Even if no one is harmed, damage is sustained or production losses occur, a fall of ground might still
lead to damage in the form of reputational repercussions. Comparing fall of ground incidents to
the risk criteria, a target probability for a fall of ground incidents can be specified. If the frequency
of such events instances is higher than is specified as acceptable, countermeasures ought to be
applied until the target frequency is achieved. A generic outcome for the example is then: the
probability that a fall of ground incident occurs is estimated to be once every twenty years after
countermeasures are implemented. If a mine has an estimated lifetime of five years, such an
outcome could be viewed as an acceptable level of risk.
2.5.2. "So Far As Is Reasonably Practical" or SFAIRP
Recent developments however have pointed out that an approach like ALARP leaves a company
vulnerable in an aspect outside of its operations: a court room (Dixon, 2011, Robinson and Francis,
2014). The very nature of legal institutions within a country can define whether an ALARP
based approach suffices as substantial due-diligence when faced with a lawsuit after a (significant)
incident.
2.5.2.1 Common Law
It is not uncommon for Western countries in which mining has a significant presence to have a
common law system. Examples of such countries are the United States, Canada and Australia.
Furthermore, countries such as South Africa have a mixed system that is partially based on common
law. The systems for code of law in these countries was inherited through English colonization and
the concept itself dates back to 12th century England. In that period of time, judges would hear
cases on the king’s behalf and base their judgement on instinct, sometimes Roman law, customs or
traditions. The notions for their verdict would be recorded and in time, other judges felt the need
to adjust their verdicts to those decreed by their predecessors, forming the concept of precedent law.
(Robinson and Francis, 2014).
By itself, that is not a bad thing. It does however have a very big implication. In deciding over a
case, judges will base their verdict on the precedents set by their forebears. In their 2014 paper,
Robinson & Francis set out several conditions that apply in adversarial courts, i.e. those in which
lawsuits about safety are decided. These are:
• the courts are always right, even if they are wrong
• courts are not about dispensing justice, they are about winning actions
• courts deal in opinions, not facts
When a judge therefore decides a verdict in an adversarial court, the laws of man take precedent
over the laws of nature. Furthermore judges preside over the instances in which something went
wrong, not how often it went right. In all of these cases, the outcome is already certain. In a judge’s
eyes, that means any calculations done beforehand to assess risks must have been flawed. By
itself, that provides reasonable proof that insufficient due diligence was carried out, thus proving
negligence. Mitigating a risk to having a once every hundred years probability might seem like
a perfectly acceptable standard for a ten year operation. Even if the calculation is completely
accurate, the process can thus be assessed as flawed. If a judge deems it unsatisfactory based on
precedents set, one can still be held liable for damages. How that can affect a court case is reflected
well in the following exchange, as reported in an Australian court as the result of a significant
railroad incident (Robinson and Francis, 2014):
Judge: "What do you mean you did not think it could happen? There are seven dead."
Using a hazard based approach such as ALARP is thus intrinsically flawed. It assumes some
probability to be acceptable, when if an incident occurs, no due diligence can be attributed to the
risk assessment process. That by itself proves negligence and thus liability beyond reasonable
doubt. In order to avoid this issue, the way in which a judge makes up his or her verdict has to be
examined closely. Instead of working precautionary, hindsight dictates the decision-making of a
judge. After all, every outcome is already known. Thus a precautionary approach is needed that
deals with this potential liability.
2.6. Current Industry Best Practices 21
2.5.2.2 The precautionary approach
Instead of looking at what hazards can and should be mitigated, another methodology focusses on
preventing critical hazards from leading to significant outcomes. The central questions applied
within this approach are:
1. What could possibly happen?
2. What could reasonably be expected by the courts to assure due diligence?
Answering these two questions is central to SFAIRP ("So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable").
Although the abbreviation does not necessary roll off the tongue, it does have an interesting
proposition. Instead of dictating an artificial acceptable risk level, it assesses all possible coun-
termeasures and implements those as are presumed reasonable by a court of law. It is therefore
inherently an outcome based approach. In Figure 2.9, a flowchart can be seen with which to apply
the SFAIRP process.
Figure 2.9: Flowchart demonstrating the SFAIRP precautionary process for mitigation of significant outcomes which could
potentially confer liablity in a court of law, as adapted from Robinson and Francis (2014).
The third step in Figure 2.9 deals specifically with the question: "What does a court of law need
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that due diligence has been carried out correctly?". The sentiment
of courts in a common law system seems to be that where it is possible to guard against risk, albeit
with a low probability, can be done with little effort or expense, the failure to adopt controls is
determined negligent (Robinson and Francis, 2014). This implies a certain cost-effectiveness that
is inherent to the controls implemented. If little costs are involved for little effectiveness, a control
should always be implemented. By assessing all controls available to mitigate a critical hazard,
that assessment can always made conscientiously beforehand. In order for a mining company
to successfully execute this methodology, it needs to understand what hazards and controls are
critical, and monitor their performance.
2.6. Current Industry Best Practices
AngloGold Ashanti and all other global mining companies face the issues outlined in the intro-
duction. Focusing on critical risks and prevention of Material Unwanted Events has become a
staple safety approach for the world’s leading mining companies. This section gives a brief, limited
overview of some of these organizations and the way in which managing critical risk has become
central to their approach, based on material made publicly available. However, this section is in no
way meant to represent the opinions or standpoints of the organizations in question and is merely
a perspective on material made public by these organizations.
2.6.1. Rio Tinto
A global mining company with a diverse range of commodities, Rio Tinto is one of the world leaders
in the advances of safety management in mining. The ten ways in which it manages safety all
correspond with the goals set out in this project (Rio Tinto, 2017). Of these commandments, the
following are of special interest:
• Report and investigate all incidents, ensuring the learnings are shared and imple-
mented across the organisation
• Implement safety performance standards and expectations for managing critical risks
associated with aviation, confined spaces, cranes and lifting, electrical works, isolation,
vehicles and driving, and working at heights
• Maintain an appropriate safety assurance framework through a range of audits, reviews
and verifications against our standards
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• Develop, implement and embed a focus on process safety and fatality prevention pro-
grammes
• Establish, implement and monitor critical control plans to manage our key safety
risks.
These are but five of ten ways in which Rio Tinto aims to improve their standard of safety. All
of these align exactly with the goals set out in the introduction, while their other initiatives at
least provide synergy to the set-up for this project. The programme that Rio Tinto applies is called
"Critical Risk Management (Rio Tinto, 2017) and focuses directly on the implementation and
auditing of critical controls. It integrates across the chain of command, providing everyone with
different tasks yet endeavouring to achieve the same goal.
On their website, Rio Tinto claims to have performed 1.3 million critical control verifications
in 2016, with 6.500 company leaders completing tasks and states that it has been implemented
across all 60+ sites. Although the current scope of the project only relates to one site, eventually
critical control management should be incorporated at all AngloGold Ashanti sites. Not only does
the Rio Tinto case show it is possible, they also show that it is worth significant effort to get this
right Rio Tinto (2017).
2.6.2. BHP Billiton
Perth-based BHP Billiton is the largest mining company in the world industry with operations on
four continents. Similarly to Rio Tinto, BHP have set out extensive documentation regarding the
management of critical risks and associated controls. Many of the hazards set out by BHP mirror
those found at AngloGold Ashanti, stemming from the similar nature of operations conducted BHP
(2016). Furthermore, like AngloGold Ashanti, BHP Billiton is one of the founding members of the
International Council of Minerals and Mines (ICMM).
2.6.3. ICMM
Founded by a collective of global mining companies, the ICMM was initiated as a collaboration
platform to achieve a safe, fair, and sustainable mining industry. With members like AngloGold
Ashanti, BHP, Rio Tinto, Anglo-American, Freeport-McMoran, Barrick, Gold Corp, Teck, Glencore
and others, over 30% of global mining production is represented on the platform (ICMM, 2015b).
The ICMM has worked continuously since 2012 to reduce fatal incidents. Central to the approach
are operators facing (high-potential) hazards in the operations themselves. Through combined
assessments it was found that reducing Lost Time Injuries does not decrease the frequency of
fatalities. Instead, the focus was shifted towards High Potential Incidents (HPI’s) and their causes.
During investigation of HPI’s, the weaknesses of controls and their adequacy became apparent. In
2015, a good practice guide on critical controls was published by the ICMMM, followed shortly by
an implementation guide. (ICMM, 2015a).
It is clear that within the domain of operational safety, critical control management is considered
to be an essential part of doing business sustainably within the mining industry. On the path to
complete integration of critical control management lies measuring their performance. This the
second to last step and it was the aim of this study to support AngloGold Ashanti in making those
leaps, implementing the next generation of safety and risk management approaches.
3
Methodology
The aim of this research was to develop a scalable, non-invasive Critical Control Management
System for AngloGold Ashanti. In order to fulfil this goal, a wide range of methods was applied to
ensure that the system functions as intended. In this chapter these methods and their implications
are discussed. First, the interview strategy with which to gather organizational requirements
is examined. Next, the bow-tie modelling software used throughout the project is presented.
Thirdly, the domain and application of business intelligence is discussed, after which its use for
risk management is demonstrated. Finally, a summary is given of all methods and applications
used to complete this research.
3.1. Interviewing technique
The use of interviews is one of the main research methods within this project. By interviewing key
personnel on their opinions and wishes around a Critical Control Management System, a framework
of organizational requirements could be developed. The method applied in these interviews was
that of semi-structured, open-ended conversations centred on multiple open questions. This form
of interviews is considered the most-used format for qualitative research (DiCicco-Bloom and
Crabtree, 2006). Through usage of a standardized interviewing format, comparing and combining
requirements into satisfactory categories was a straightforward process.
3.1.1. Selection of stakeholders to be interviewed
The goal of interviewing key employees of AngloGold Ashanti was to get a broad, yet deep under-
standing of the way safety and risk management is applied throughout the organization. Based off
that knowledge, further conversation could then explore the possibilities for critical control man-
agement. Gaining this understanding was only deemed possible through interviewing employees
on every level of the organizational hierarchy.
Selection of personnel to interview was an iterative process focusing on current or potential
future stakeholders. An example of this phenomenon is that of the heads of other sustainability
disciplines. While critical control management is currently only being piloted for operational safety,
other sustainability disciplines will also follow suit, pending successful trial. Taking their wishes
and opinions into account allowed for establishing a better foundation of the system.
A second, non-explicit goal during the interviews was re-familiarizing the employees with criti-
cal control management. This lack of familiarity was not without risk for the project itself. If any of
the senior managers would have found that the project was at odds with their own goals, long term
support could have been lost. The nature of these interviews was therefore very non-committal,
without official statements and anonymous.
In total twenty-six interviews were conducted with personnel based at group headquarters in
Johannesburg, regional headquarters in Perth and at Sunrise Dam Gold Mine. An overview of the
roles fulfilled and their base of operations is provided in Appendix D.
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3.1.2. Set-up
All interviews were planned beforehand as a 30 minute session on developing understanding of
requirements for a Critical Control Management System. Because some of the personnel to be
interviewed only had a very limited timeframe, no preparation was asked from the employees to be
interviewed. Instead, it was explicitly stated that a broad introduction to the topic would be given
before getting into the questions section of the interview.
The general set-up of the interviews consisted of three distinct parts. First, an introduction
to the project, interviewer and purpose of the interview was given. Secondly, the history of
critical control management at AngloGold Ashanti was explained as the building blocks for a next-
generation safety management system. Lastly, the official interviewed was asked to contribute his
or her opinion on what such a system would need to become successful. This success was measured
both with regards to the wider organization and the person in question.
In order to frame the conversation and standardise the type of answers received, several open
ended questions were asked at the last phase of the interview. These questions were:
• What uncertainties do you face with regards to risk management?
• What would you like to see come out of this project?
• What is the level of granularity you look at when dealing with safety or risk?
• How could output from this project support your decision-making?
The first question was designed to get the employee interviewed to think about his or her work.
It revolves around identifying current gaps in knowledge hindering decision making. The second
question builds on that thought process by implying these unknown do not need to stay that way.
This opens up an entire perspective on fixing those things that now have to be decided on gut feel
or without confidence. The third question sets the interviewee up as a potential stakeholder. When
the data behind uncertainties is clear it needs to be presented to the right person, at the right
level. Finally, the fourth question helps the interviewee think about his or her decision-making,
whether that would be stopping or increasing production, changing out a fleet or implementing
new controls.
After these four general questions, two specific ones were asked related to the work or initiatives
of the interviewee. These specifically looked into integration of critical controls in their work. An
example of these questions was around the issue of integrating another sustainability discipline
into Critical Control Management. As the officials within this domain had already made their
bow-tie models, a successful trial of the project could lead to accelerated inclusion of this specific
discipline into the wider system. This led to the adjustment of design scoping to be able to include
the other sustainability disciplines in due time.
3.1.3. Execution
Because all interviews were conducted one-on-one, special attention was paid to interviewer conduct
during the interview. Main goals for behaviour were being clear, patient, and knowledgeable while
interpreting and remembering the items discussed during the conversation. Of the objectives
stated, interpreting answers correctly was paramount to the successful completion of an interview.
Although gentle steering was applied, during some interviews conversations strayed into very
abstract territory. This had no negative consequences, but it was difficult to scope such an approach
in a six month study. The use of remembering became more apparent in later interviews, as the
amalgamated views of the officials previously interviewed could be presented as a middle ground if
need be.
After the interview was finished, a short review of the conversation was held to confirm
agreement on the official’s views. If requested or precipitated in the conversation, updates of project
progress were subsequently shared with the official interviewed.
3.1.4. Analysis of outcomes
During interviews, notes were taken on comments as the speed of conversation allowed. These were
entered into a combined file within a day to preserve recollection of the interview. This document
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was then re-read before a new appointment to take the outcomes of other interviews into account.
After no new themes emerged from the data, a high-level overview was presented to the project
owner, of which the results will be discussed in Section 4.6.
3.2. Bow-tie Modelling
The application of bow-tie modelling has already been discussed in Section 2.3. The software
package that AngloGold Ashanti uses to develop their bow-tie models is called BowTie XP and
is developed by CGE Risk Management Solutions. This package allows in-depth building and
modification of models to suit a given operational environment. Currently being trialled is a
web-application version of this software package called Bow Tie Server. This online platform allows
sharing of bow-tie models through a company and has added the preliminary functionality of
sending audits to personnel for review. By storing all data in one place, Bow Tie Server functions
as a hub for all bow-tie related data that AngloGold Ashanti has developed over the years.
3.3. Business Intelligence
The data that is generated within a company often remains unused other than as a document for
future reference. An example of this phenomenon is the registration of incidents on-site at a mine.
This process is carried out as part of the due diligence process required of an HSE department.
What and where it happened, what personnel and machinery were involved are all entered into
records. Unless the details of an incident are required by some future event or need, the data will
merely be archived. However, the aggregate of that data might provide some interesting thoughts
about the business.
This is the domain of business intelligence (BI), where meta-data generated by a company is
examined in order to predict trends in performance, detect underlying issues and solve business
process inadequacies (Al-Aqrabi et al., 2015). The reason that BI is central to this thesis is that
it has significant potential for risk management and operational safety purposes. Previously
unrelated incidents can now be correlated to controls implemented to prevent them. This could
result in identifying areas within a mine with significantly higher risks, thus justifying a re-
evaluation of processes carried out in those areas. Through monitoring the health and performance
of controls, one of the essential steps is taken in applying a precautionary approach to risk
management.
By providing analysis of this data to decision makers in real time stakeholders can make
informed decisions, replacing gut feel with facts. Note however, that the aggregation of data is
subject to the knowledge and skills of a business intelligence developer. This can apply a degree of
subjectivity to the data, so relying solely on business intelligence analytics should be avoided if
possible. Furthermore, a BI system does not simply take meta-data and transforms it into analytics.
It consists of seven different layers (Al-Aqrabi et al., 2015):
1. IT infrastructure
2. Data acquisition
3. Data integration
4. Data storage
5. Data organizing
6. Data analytics
7. Data presentation
For the purpose of this thesis, the IT infrastructure is beyond scope. All other layers have been
applied in some shape or form. The methodology of this these revolves around moving through
each of the steps listed above to develop the system and included BI environment. In the next few
paragraphs, the steps taken through each of the BI layers are explained in a general sense. Of
these steps, data acquisition required the most significant effort by a large margin, and will be
discussed extensively in Chapters 5 and 6.
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3.3.1. Data Acquisition
Traditionally, BI has been one of the most data intensive business processes (Al-Aqrabi et al.,
2015). It draws the data from databases across the organization and stores it in relational data
warehouses. These are updated as frequently as business demands to enable use of data in (near-
)real-time. The data of interest in this study revolves around performance of critical controls, safety
incidents and holistic bow-tie models.
Because critical control data is being gathered through multiple processes and transferred to
Bow Tie Server (BTS), it served as a convenient intermediate source of all bow-tie related data.
Through adapting BTS into the BI environment, all related critical control data can be used for
analytics. The other major source of data used is the Event Management System utilized on site
to record incidents and actions related to operational safety. AngloGold Ashanti Australia uses
a platform called InControl by INX to store all their incidents and related meta-data. Together,
these form the foundation of data sources for a management system that monitors both leading
and lagging indicators with regards to critical control performance.
3.3.2. Data Integration and Storage
After data is moved from its source to a warehouse it is merely stored though rows and columns,
forming an array. Even from a single source, multiple arrays might be needed to encompass all
data. This is especially true when dealing with the import of models into the BI environment.
An example of this can be seen in figure 3.1. For each of the distinct entities an array is drawn
up, such as hazards, threats or controls. Each of these have their own properties, are applied
within certain models and can be used more than once. When storing data from multiple sources,
another layer of complexity is added. Arrays linking a single application have to be related to
other applications. Both integration of single and multiple sources is done through a process
called Online Analytical Processing (OLAP). Through applying queries, it allows multi-dimensional
analysis of data warehouses. These combine the arrays into so-called data cubes. After cubes are
built, OLAP allows manipulation of the underlying data. A representation of a data cube with
interface is shown in figure 3.2.
Figure 3.1: Several arrays created when importing a Bow-tie
environment into a Data Warehouse
Figure 3.2: Generic dashboard interface that
allows manipulation of the underlying arrays,
forming a data cube
The system that was used to gather and store primary data was a SQL-based Server based in Perth.
This infrastructure was already present and useable when project execution moved to Australia. A
benefit of this type of server is that it allows easy integration with a PowerBI environment, which
will be discussed in the next paragraph.
3.3.3. Data Organization, Analysis and Presentation
OLAP enables presentation of data in the form of dashboard interfaces to business intelligence de-
velopers or other end-users. As such, OLAP combines data organizing, analytics, and presentation.
An application that provides this OLAP capability is PowerBI. Developed by Microsoft, it allows
small users and businesses alike to perform data analysis on a wide variety of sources. Key in the
use of PowerBI or OLAP applications is relating the stored arrays. As an example, one can relate
different arrays formed through import of the Bow-tie models.
It is important to understand that the BI environment does not automatically relate the different
arrays back into a bow-tie model. In order to assess performance of the model holistically, queries
need to be applied. The arrays that are formed often have relational columns in which the relation
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to other entities is specified. If one looks back to the Bow-tie model in figure 2.4, a threat can be
related to a so-called parent bow-tie hazard. Because this is something that can be made for each
threat, a column can be made that specifies what the parent hazard is for that threat. In that way,
loose arrays are joined again forming data cubes, enabling analytics. This means that multiple
sources can be integrated in a straightforward manner, as long as the relationships between these
sources are applied correctly.
3.3.4. Potential for Risk Management
Using data analytics to assess company performance is one of the key elements of successful HRO
functioning. It supports multiple core tenets of the HRO such as assisting in problem anticipation,
learning orientation and mindful leadership. It allows stakeholders to be knowledgeable of
what goes on at the shopfloor, even if not present at the location in question. Secondly, system
performance provides a clear indication if problems are more likely to occur. By providing the
means to identify negative trends, problem anticipation within the company is enhanced. Thirdly,
it has the ability to provide this information at a moment’s notice, depending on the frequency with
which the data is refreshed within digital warehouses storing the data. Furthermore, by relating
multiple incidents over a longer time span, one can start to identify underlying patterns in risk
exposure for an operation or company.
Incidents and assessments might be far and few in between at a well-run operation, thus
reducing the inherent potential. Therefore, trialling this project at an operation with a good safety
record was a double-edged sword. Stakeholders were assumed to be more inclined to adaptation, as
aspects of the HRO such as Just Culture and the Learning Orientation had already been (partially)
adopted. The return on investment for the system might not have been as high as an operation
with a worse safety record. However, one thing that the system would provide when implemented
was the definition of "what good looks like". This will make duplication of the system much easier
after successful implementation. It will make the identification of gaps in operational safety at
other operations much more straightforward, as a good example is already present. That is why
the goal of this study was getting the system to click. If other operations can see the small benefit
is it generating in a safe environment, the potential of critical control monitoring becomes visible
to the other operations as well.
3.4. Summary of Methods and Applications
In this thesis, both qualitative and quantitative research methods are applied. Before designing
and building, a thorough review of literature was performed. After the state-of-the-art was assessed,
it could be applied to the problem at hand. As AngloGold Ashanti has a decentralized structure,
an in-depth analysis of the organizations global requirements had to be conducted. These were
elicited through semi-structured, open ended interviews. Systems design was done using the
standard sub-systems of BI to extract data from multiple business processes into one environment
for analysis and presentation. During systems building the following applications are used:
• Bow Tie Server
• INX
• SQL Server
• PowerBI
The first two listed applications function as data sources for controls and incidents, respectively. The
other two make up the infrastructure of the BI environment. Together, these form the foundation
of the Critical Control Management System designed in Chapter 5 and implemented in Chapter 6.

4
Organizational environment
In this chapter, the current practices at AngloGold Ashanti will be introduced that relate to
operational safety and risk management. The theory discussed in Chapter 2 will be brought
to the fore and applied to the processes found. Next, the organizational requirements will be
discussed that have been ascertained during twenty-six interviews with employees ranging from
the COO’s of international and South African operations to the coordinator of processing operations
at Sunrise Dam Gold Mine. These requirements have been amalgamated into several main
categories in Section 4.6 to keep discussion clear when moving forward towards designing a system
for continuous risk management.
4.1. Current safety systems in place
Moving from theory into practice, this section will discuss the ways in which AngloGold Ashanti
already manages its safety issues. The goal of this paragraph is not to discuss all elements in
detail. Rather, an impression of the company’s safety approach is developed through the major
systems it applies within its operations. At a company like AngloGold Ashanti, compliance is a key
element of demonstrating that operational safety issues are adequately addressed. In order to meet
this required compliance, different international standards are used depending on where a specific
operation is located. One of the main standards applied is the OHSAS 18001 standard, which
was developed by an international collaborative group and distributed by the British Standards
Institute (2017) to form a single approach to managing safety. It lies at the basis of ISO 45001
standard currently in development, which aims to be the most comprehensive OHS standard to
date.
4.1.1. Safety Management System
In order to comply with the OHSAS 18001 standard, AngloGold Ashanti has developed an extensive
safety management system. Not only does it function as a repository for procedures, AGA standards,
training manuals and more, it also puts all of the requirements for OHSAS 18001 in one place.
Some of the key elements that need to be managed within the system are:
• Occupational Health and Safety policy, planning and objectives
• Competence, training and awareness
• Documentation System
• Operational Control
• Emergency Preparedness
• Internal Auditing
• Incident Investigation
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• Non-conformity, corrective & preventative action
• Company Risk Assessment & Hazard Identification
The Safety Management System deals with several of these requirements by itself through
making all relevant documents available in one place. Here, the company’s procedures, commit-
ments and goals are specified. Any auditor can come in and discuss all related issues through
assessing the different sub-elements of the system. This reflects a high degree of document control.
4.1.2. Training, Competence and Awareness
One of the main pillars of OHSAS 18001 is making sure operators are adequately equipped to deal
with hazardous situations when working in any environment. At AngloGold Ashanti that means
employees are trained through extensive programmes aligned to risk assessments of their working
environments. Only after they are verified and validated as being competent can they fully enter
the working environment independently. Should an operator change jobs within the same mine,
re-training and verification of competency is carried out. After certain periods of time, operators
might be required to re-assess their skill level.
Two other ways in which operators are trained in making decisions every day are Job Hazard
Analysis (JHA) and Stop & Think, Look, Act and Manage (SLAM). These personal programmes are
tools an operator uses to assess if a job could potentially be hazardous, or if a hazardous situation
is currently ongoing. A JHA is carried out before each task marked as potentially hazardous and
requires sign-off from a supervisor. It recognizes risks and helps operators to take the necessary
steps to carry out a task safety. SLAM is a procedural tool that operators can use on the job when
they feel a something is or seems to be unnecessarily hazardous. This four step programme helps
an operator to identify the steps needed to mitigate a hazard successfully.
4.1.3. Emergency Preparedness
Every operation has its own emergency response team (ERT). These are often drawn up from
employees at the mine itself, performing this duty to assure the safety of their co-workers. Being
an ERT member does not just mean one is exposed to hazardous situations. Being a member grants
access to extensive training programmes on first response, working at heights and firefighting,
amongst others. Secondly, operations specific perks may be given such as free use of sporting
facilities and use of ERT vehicles.
4.1.4. Internal Auditing
To become OHSAS 18001 verified, a company has to conduct internal audits into safety performance.
Essential to this auditing is a systematized approach that verifies if:
• company OHS goals are met
• controls for health & safety are effective
• data is recorded and mitigating actions are carried out
• monitoring systems are calibrated according to standard
Apart from actions being completed, no specific auditing frequencies are given. A company should
set these for itself depending on the findings in risk assessments and safety performance. AngloGold
Ashanti has its own audits set up by the sustainability disciplines and its internal auditing team.
It uses a cross-departmental approach that assures both individual processes and overarching
systems are running as desired. Apart from that, commitment is shown by the board through
frequent updates on company safety performance and high level involvement in improvement
discussions.
4.1.5. Incident Investigation
After an event has occurred in which occupational health or safety was (possibly) impaired, a
detailed investigation has to be conducted. The outcome of this process then results in recommen-
dations for changes to procedures, processes or systems in order to mitigate similar incidents in
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the future. Every mining site at AngloGold Ashanti manages their own incident reports and needs
to report on those incidents that could have potentially had a high impact. This data is entered
into an Event Management System (EMS) which allows returning to cases if need be.
4.1.6. Operational Risk Assessment
Only after the risks in a specific situation are understood, proper controls can be introduced to
mitigate Material Unwanted Events. AngloGold Ashanti has conducted risk assessments of all
operations, indicating the most problematic issues faced throughout the company. By doing this,
they have established a detailed overview of what operators might encounter on a day-to-day basis.
There is one problem with these assessments however, which is not addressed in OHSAS
18001 either. An analysis of the risks on site provides merely a snapshot of operations, hazards
and controls in place. This might give an operation full marks at the time of auditing, while
deteriorating assets are not identified until they fail. This creates potential for holes in the cheese
of Reason’s model as discussed in Section 2.1.
4.1.7. Above and beyond the standard
While being OHSAS 18001 compliant is an objective of AGA safety strategy, the goal is to provide a
safe working environment for its employees. Exceptional conditions require exceptional measures,
both of which are essential for profitable and sustainable operation. So while the standard is used
as a framing document, managing safety at AngloGold Ashanti means being a step ahead of the
rest. This is clearly identified when comparing the goals of this research to OHSAS requirements:
• Hazard Identification - 1. Indicate performance on hazards and the performance of controls
• Operational Control - 2. Grant operations real-time information on safety performance and
actions
• Internal Auditing - 3. Provide information to relevant stakeholders in real-time
• Incident Investigation - 4. Assess trends in incidents to identify systemic issues
What this research aims to do is move safety management from a static to a dynamic situation.
This gives all relevant stakeholders the power to change safety performance on a day-to-day
basis. Instead of spending time on reporting, employees can spend their time on achieving process
excellence. To get to the desired dynamic state, one needs to understand how hazards are identified
at AGA.
4.2. Hazard Identification at AngloGold Ashanti
Barrier-based risk management has been one of the main pillars of safety thinking at AGA since
2014 (AngloGold Ashanti, 2014). Since that time, the company has identified 19 Major Hazard
Standards (MHS) which are the cause of the majority of fatal or high-potential incidents in its
operations. These MHS are part of normal operations and demonstrate the processes involved in
the aforementioned incidents.
One example of a MHS is the use of hazardous materials. Through the carbon in-leach process,
crushed gold ore is mixed as a slurry with a solution of cyanide in a staged circuit of tanks.
As the slurry moves through the tanks, the gold continually leaches into the cyanide solution.
Carbon particles are simultaneously suspended in the tanks to adsorb the gold ions from the
cyanide solution. Carbon with the highest gold value is then sent to the elution process for further
extraction (Wadnerkar et al., 2015). Other examples of chemicals and hazardous materials used
include hydrochloric acid, caustic soda and hydrogen peroxide. This does not include the use and
handling of explosives, which have a dedicated MHS. The entire list of Major Hazard Standards is
listed below (AngloGold Ashanti, 2015).
• Aviation
• Confined Space Entry
• Electrical Installations
• Energy Isolation
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• Equipment Safeguarding
• Explosives
• Fire
• Hazardous Materials
• Heavy Mobile Equipment
• Inundation, Inrush and Submergence
• Lifting Operations
• Light Vehicles
• Pressurized Equipment
• Surface Excavations
• Underground Ground Control
• Underground Rail bound Transport
• Underground Ventilation
• Underground Vertical Transport
• Working at Heights
These MHS cover the entire company, therefore not all MHS are suited to each operation. Exactly
which hazards are applicable to a certain site are determined by a site-based approach. Each site
has its own bow-tie models in order to map the hazards and controls relevant to them. Because
regulations differ from country to country and perhaps even more so from continent to continent,
safety thinking requires tailoring to local norms and regulations. On top of that, Critical Control
Management can potentially provide a one-size-fits-all solution for fatality prevention. Not through
application of specific controls, but by providing a single platform for management of these controls.
4.3. Critical Controls and their Application
All operations of AngloGold have made Bowtie models based on the hazards faced on site. To miti-
gate these hazards successfully, controls applicable to both the reduction of cause and consequence
escalations were identified. If all possible and practical controls are then implemented correctly,
the theory states that material risk to the operation should be prevented. Applying this way of
thinking when modelling can lead to expansive models that demonstrate all possible pathways
and all critical controls. This loses the visual effect of quickly identifying vulnerable pathways and
possible controls. Oftentimes, implementing such an extensive approach with numerous systems
proves too difficult (Bakolas and Saleh, 2011). After identification of all possible controls, focus
shifts to assessing their criticality.
The central question to control assessment in this stage is: which controls are critical to
mitigating Material Unwanted Events (MUE’s)? (Sklet, 2006). To answer that question, the
International Council of Minerals and Mines has adopted a critical control identification flowchart
as seen in Figure 4.1 (ICMM, 2015a).
Figure 4.1: Decision tree for the identification of critical controls as specified by the ICMM (2015a).
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Assessments of controls applied globally at AngloGold Ashanti identified multiple thousand controls
already in place. After applying the flow-chart in Figure 4.1, AngloGold Ashanti identified 134
critical controls essential to risk management in occupational safety. When spread over the relevant
hazards each MHS has 5-9 critical controls that are considered essential in mitigating the relevant
MUE’s, possibly resulting in fatalities.
Although the possible pathways, MUE’s and critical controls were identified on a corporate
level, the actual degree of implementation of critical controls company-wide was not known. Due to
AngloGold Ashanti’s international nature, operating in 3 continents with 4 operating languages,
communication and standardization is made difficult. Making matters worse is that each mine
can be completely different in nature, varying from surface operations to shallow and ultra-deep
underground operations. Depending on the concerns of running day-to-day business, each operation
is at a different stage in the implementation process of critical controls.
4.4. Performance Standards
In order to draw the different operations level in terms of critical control monitoring, AGA developed
so-called Performance Standards (PS). These specify the nature of each critical control and the way
in which verification and validation should be applied. As such they help operations understand
the nature and operation of critical controls. By adhering to the PS set for the relevant critical
controls on-site, an operation automatically achieves required company standard.
Although the Performance Standards themselves are merely a page in length, achieving the
set company standard takes significant effort. The PS know six aspects that are relevant to the
operations:
1. Functionality - Aim of the control
2. Availability - Competency required to use the control
3. Survivability - expected integrity of control after incident
4. Dependency - Requirements of other systems in order for control to function properly
5. Compatibility - Relationships to other systems when functioning
6. Validation - Steps with which to ensure performance of control
Because the corporate Performance Standards will apply to all operations in equal measure,
integrating these standards into the design will ensure the long-term viability of Critical Control
Management at AngloGold Ashanti. It should be noted that the Performance Standards are a
broad, yet not exhaustive list of controls. This means they will not cover all of the critical controls
on each site. It is therefore each site’s accountability to add site-specific critical controls to manage
the risk for MUE’s relevant to their operation.
The corporate Performance Standards were rolled out during the course of the project. Its
adaptation was therefore identified as a common goal for both the project and the AGA global
safety team. By adopting Performance Standards on-site, avenues of approach could be created for
integration of critical controls into normal business processes. One such Performance Standard can
be viewed in Appendix A. Here, the entire Performance Standard document for a critical control on
hazardous materials is detailed to give an impression of a Performance Standard and their level of
detail.
4.5. Site selection
Successful trial of Critical Control Management depended both on the system being developed
and the site in which it was trialled. Site selection was therefore based primarily on capability for
adopting critical controls. AngloGold Ashanti’s Western Australian gold mine Sunrise Dam had
already been introducing critical controls in some shape or form over the last 5 years. This meant
the knowledge and support for critical controls was already present on-site. The willingness of
SDGM’s safety department to implement critical controls was the deciding factor in picking this
site as the platform for further stages of Critical Control Management implementation. Although
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there might be more pressing concerns regarding safety for AngloGold Ashanti worldwide, it was
deemed more important to create a system that works. Once it is up and running, other operations
can utilize the ready-made version to their advantage.
4.5.1. Sunrise Dam Gold Mine
Located about 50 kilometres south of Laverton in the Eastern Goldfields region in Western Aus-
tralia, the mine Sunrise Dam is has been in operation continuously since 1997 and is wholly owned
by AngloGold Ashanti. In its development stages it was considered to be world-class, being the
largest gold deposit in the Laverton gold mining district in the Yilgarn Craton of Western Australia.
Its location can be viewed in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, which show its location within the Yilgarn craton
and Laverton gold district, respectively. Open pit operations were conducted from 1997 until
2013, while the current underground workings have been operated since 2003 (Hill et al., 2014).
Currently operating at a depth of around 600 meters, Sunrise Dam is one of AngloGold Ashanti’s
shallow gold mines in comparison to its South African operations.
Figure 4.2: Sunrise Dam’s location within the Yilgarn Cra-
ton, adapted from Hill et al. (2014)
Figure 4.3: Close-up view of the Laverton gold dis-
trict, adapted from Mair et al. (2000)
4.5.2. Location and Resources
The operation Sunrise Dam lies in the Eastern Goldfields province of Western Australia within
the Laverton Greenstone Belt (LGB). This district has attracted significant attention over the last
decade, as shown by the discovery of world-class deposits Sunrise Dam, Wallaby and several other
minor gold deposits (Sung et al., 2009). Sunrise Dam is the largest deposit with some 6.59 Moz
gold poured to-date. Addtionally, it still has resources and reserves totalling up to 4.5 Moz, with
potential of up to 5.9 Moz with average grades around 2.04 ppm Au (AngloGold Ashanti, 2016). The
operation has its own processing plant that produces a concentrate with gold as the sole product. In
Figure 4.4, an satellite image of the general mining area can be viewed, with the processing plant
marked in the middle-bottom of the image. In Figure 4.5, the marked section can be examined as a
close-up of the processing plant with description of its various assets.
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Figure 4.4: Satellite Image of Sunrise Dam mining area Figure 4.5: Close-up view Sunrise Dam Processing Plant
4.5.3. Ore body Geology
The orebody is hosted in a structurally complex Archaean greenstone belt, which has undergone
metamorphism of lower-mid greenstone facies. The host sequence to Sunrise Dam has an upper
layer of turbidite sedimentary rocks dominated by BIF and iron-rich shales (Hill et al., 2014).
The intermediate sequence consists of metavolcanic and volcanoclastic rocks with mafic extrusive
and intrusive rocks. The sedimentary rocks are intruded by doleritic dykes and sills as well
as ultramafic rocks, while rhyodacite porphyry intrudes both the sedimentary as well as the
volcanoclastic sequence. All ore lenses are centred on a series of parallel, NE-trending shear zones
that dip at an angle of around 30°. These gentle dipping structures are characteristic of many of
the orogenic gold orebodies in the Laverton Greenstone Belt (Sung et al., 2009), and these shear
zones carry the majority of gold found in the deposit. grade variability is high even over short
distances. A cross-section of the deposit can be viewed in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: Cross-section of the Sunrise Dam ore deposit divided into its respective ore zones, as adapted from Hill et al.
(2014).
The mineralization is hosted in arsenopyrite as "invisible gold", meaning nano-particles and/or
lattice bound, in pyrite both as "invisible gold and in micrometer-sized inclusions of native gold, as
electrum or Au(Ag)-tellurides (Sung et al., 2009). The ore lenses consisting of structurally complex
vein systems have been formed over four distinct mineralizaton stages (D1 through D4), which
were influenced by multiple events of fluid flow leading to repeated alteration and mineralization.
Of these, Brown et al. (2002) estimate stages D3 and D4 to have occurred 2,670-2,650 MA. Pyrite
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is the main ore in all veins, while arsenopyrite is found mostly in structures formed during D4. Ore
grades found in arsenopyrite average 562 ppm with a maximum of 5,662 ppm, while the average
grade in arsenian pyrite is 1.6 ppm (Sung et al., 2009).
4.6. Organizational requirements
In order to align the piloting of critical control implementation to long-term company strategy,
interviews with (senior) company officials were conducted in Johannesburg, South Africa and Perth,
Australia as well as at SDGM itself. These interviews were conducted using the methodology speci-
fied in Section 3.1 and the functions and locations of these employees can be viewed in Appendix
D. The success of occupational health & safety (OHS) strategy depends on the willingness of line
managers to take a leadership role with regards to OHS risk and champion its implementation
(Costella et al., 2009, Pillay, 2015). The safety department is there only to facilitate this process.
The goals of these interviews were therefore twofold:
1. Assess possibilities for critical controls to be integrated into long-term systems strategy
2. Create a platform for active involvement and discussion amongst senior stakeholders
In twenty-six separate, one-on-one interviews the possibilities and limitations of critical controls
were discussed with employees ranging from operator to company executive. Out of these discus-
sions, the requirements throughout the organization were identified. These were subsequently
amalgamated in five main goals, which will be discussed in the next five paragraphs. Together,
these were used as the main requirements set forth by AngloGold Ashanti for the developement
of the Critical Control Management System (CCMS). To these requirements is strictly adhered
during design and implementation phases, thus successfully defining the key elements required for
adaptation by stakeholders.
4.6.1. Keep it Simple, Stupid or "KISS"
First and foremost, all layers of the organization desire a simple, straightforward system. This
goal for systems design aligns closely to the acronym “KISS”, short for Keep it Simple, Stupid.
This principle has been attributed by some to Kelly Johnson, who was a lead engineer at Lockheed
Martin Skunk Works, and others to a U.S Navy project in the 1960’s. Whatever its origin, this
need for a simple system is corroborated by literature, stating the effectiveness of large, complex
safety management systems is often diminished through sheer size (Costella et al., 2009). The
necessity for a simple system that is introduced companywide at AGA is very real. When assessing
the level of education of Basotho migrants moving from Lesotho to South Africa to work in mines,
it was found none had completed primary education (Maphosa and Morojele, 2013). Another study
by AMCA Inter-consult LTD (2012) for Terre Des Homme found that only 29% of migrants in
Tanzanian mining districts had completed secondary education, while 2% said to have gone on to
college. This principle also resonates with the Human Factors theory stated in Section 2.1, where
systems prevent humans interacting with them from making decisions through their inherent
complexity. In order for the system to work, it has to work for everyone. This can only be achieved
through inherent simplicity, both in design and in use.
4.6.2. Weave critical controls into the cloth of the business
As was discussed in Paragraph 2.6.3, critical control management should be integral in the
organization. Everyone ought to participate in its use and become aware of what it does on a
day-to-day basis. Essentially, it should become second nature to all AGA employees. In order
to make that happen, everyone should be introduced to critical controls. Such a process is not
completed instantaneously. Rather, gradual yet persistent change is the preferred way forward.
Build up knowledge, and expand.
4.6.3. Integrate broader sustainability approach
A second aspect identified during the interviews is the possibility for integration of other sustain-
ability disciplines. While the safety department is currently the leading discipline for critical
control thinking, the application of critical controls can be just as impactful for managing risks of
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the business with regards to the environment, security of operations or health of its employees.
Especially when dealing with environmental issues, long-term complications derived from acid
mine drainage or inadequate closure can lead to significant damage to environment, assets and
reputation.
4.6.4. Observe cultural differences in implementation
As a third requirement, added to the necessity for possible integration is the abundance of different
cultures on-site, be it in language, safety maturity or professionalism. The system should allow
for local conditions to be a factor in the integration of site-level critical control applications. This
includes creating understanding and making the implementation of critical controls manageable
and suited to local circumstances. Without support from the organization and especially senior
company officials, the outcomes of Critical Control Management will be less effective (Domingues
et al., 2017).
4.6.5. Assure data integrity
Developing a system to monitor and assess critical control data could prove an exercise in futility if
the data that goes in the system is not correct. Any data coming out of the system will then include
systemic errors which will limit the value of the output. To assure this, steps should be taken in
the data input phase to assure the validity of data. Because the data goes through multi-stage
analyses within the BI environment, data acquisition and entry are identified as the process steps
with the most significant potential for both systematic and random error.
4.6.6. Minimize impact on business
Monitoring critical controls is not the only process that is in place at SDGM to manage risks. Oper-
ators do risk assessments of hazardous jobs (JHA’s), have an assessment program to investigate
hazards called SLAM and do a small assessment each time they do a new job called the Start Work
in Control (SWIC) (AngloGold Ashanti, 2015). All these processes have an impact on the business
through improving safety, yet costing time to complete. Relevant stakeholders within AGA senior
management explicitly requested to forego development of new processes. This limited the scope
solely to the modification of existing processes, something that delivered the intended result in the
end.

5
Systems Design
In this chapter the design of the Critical Control Monitoring System (CCMS) and its subsystems
will be discussed. Because not all subsystems are within scope of the project, the potential for
future integration of these items will be discussed as well. The chapter is divided up into three
parts. First, the overarching system and its requirements and functionalities are examined. Next,
the subsystems relating to data acquistion are discussed and the way they need to be integrated
as to cover all critical controls applicable. Last, the design of the BI environment is explored into
which all of the data acquisition subsystems filter through.
5.1. Considerations
Integration of critical control management within AGA’s business processes can not be achieved
instantaneously. Instead, it will be a gradual process that depends on the capability and willingness
of the organization at large to adopt it. Tracking the maturity of each of the sites and regions
assists senior management in developing strategies for support. This maturity journey has been
made into a model that gives an indication what the organization should be doing in order to make
the next step to full critical control management. The model used was originally developed for
sustainable operations integration by Machado et al. (2017) was applied. Although the methodology
mainly focuses on manufacturing industry, the authors see the potential for use in other industries
as well. The model is slightly adapted in Figure 5.1 to reflect the inclusion of safety into the domain
of sustainable operation.
Figure 5.1: The maturity model developed by Machado et al. (2017) to identify steps necessary to achieving thte operation
of sustainable systems
The first step in the maturity model has already been achieved at Sunrise Dam. This was
accomplished through the application of an extensive safety management system tailored at trans-
parency towards regulators. In order to assess how SDGM is performing in terms of safety or other
sustainability disciplines, its compliance towards company goals should be measured. The CCMS
will form the basis for the sustainable systems approach combining performance measurement, pro-
cess improvement, best practices and integrated strategy for risk management on-site. Combining
the implementation of CCMS in other sites with the model in Figure 5.1 will allow stakeholders to
measure progress of implementation and simultaneously assess scalability of the system. Machado
et al. (2017) identify several implications for the design of the CCMS based on the maturity model
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and sustainable operations management (SOM) capacity:
• Lean and green operations
• The need for a sustainable system
• Practical application of an information system
Integrating lean and green operations is quantifying metrics within the sustainability disciplines
that function as key performance indicators for a company. Instead of measuring the statistics for
incidents and injuries, the CCMS provides opportunity for moving towards pro-active measurement.
This transition of lagging to lead indicators should be embraced by senior management in order to
succeed within the company. In its design, the CCMS should therefore incorporate the capability
for senior management to understand the issues their relevant sphere of influence is facing.
Safety is the leading discipline within AGA for implementing critical controls across the company.
Other aspects within the broader context of sustainability follow closely behind. That means the
CCMS should be open to implementation and integration of the other sustainability disciplines.
This development is already foreshadowed by bow-tie modelling of environmental, health and
security disciplines at the corporate level. In time, this data should be run through the CMS as
well, generating a comprehensive overview of all sustainability critical controls.
The information generated within the CCMS should be available to the relevant stakeholders
and therefore enable informed decision-making at any level of the organization. This requires
functional knowledge of the user interface and the implications of data at every applied level in the
organization. Not only that, the system itself should also be maintained by employees of AGA and
that requires sufficient understanding of the back-end in order to maintain and update the system
if necessary.
5.1.1. Data Features
In order to move forward with design of the overarching CCMS, the nature of data within the
system needed to be assessed. The data that flows into the system will be generated out of every
level within an operation. Unless every person working with critical controls works within the
same system, flexibility should be guaranteed to accommodate a person’s working environment.
The Performance Standards set out by the global safety team are based on closed questions. This
made data handling very straightforward as the binary nature leaves little room for interpretation.
The data itself is not manipulated until the analytics stage, in which time-dependent analysis
will be applied to ascertain trends in critical control performance. While the primary data is
binary, some Performance Standards require extra evidence to be submitted in order to comply
with validation of the controls. This data provides a quality assurance process before the data is
entered into the wider BI environment.
Although critical control data is binary, other data sources consist of a different make-up. An
example of this is data recorded for incidents on-site. These risk assessments, investigations and
other data. Therefore, flexibility should be built into the BI environment in order to cater not
just to additional bow-tie data, but also other related data. Potential sources of data for the BI
environment can be incident related data, HR statistics, maintenance registers or production
figures.
5.1.2. Information Flow
On top of general considerations and the nature of data, a closer look had to be taken at what
exactly needs to go in and come out of the system. At the very base of data acquisition are the
critical controls. Their performance has to be recorded at certain frequencies and entered into
the system. After combining the data, analytics should be used to continuously monitor control
performance. Based on those measurements, stakeholders ought to make decisions positively
affecting their sphere of influence. Here, two different stages within the wider implementation
context can be identified, which can be viewed in figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Overall flow of critical control data represented in process steps, as adapted from (Gandomi and Haider, 2015)
The process follows the same steps as are often used in big-data projects (Gandomi and Haider,
2015). By dividing the data flow into these two separate stages, several things are accomplished.
First off, it allows flexibility with regards to data acquisition in the critical control stage. This
flexibility is needed due to the heterogenetic nature of critical controls and their validation steps.
Every level of the operation should participate in order to weave critical controls into the fabric of
business. It is also one of the main steps within the requirement for mindful leadership set out
to become an HRO as discussed in Paragraph 2.2.5. Now, the data input for the EMS generally
follows the same data flow. Both systems enter the BI environment in the data integration phase.
5.1.3. Risk Application Landscape
At AngloGold Ashanti, bow-tie modelling software is only one of many systems present within
risk management. It is central to the critical control approach, thus it is easy to see why such
a system could help support CCMS. Not only does it categorize the Bow-tie models for all of its
operations, the publisher of the software package in use at AngloGold Ashanti is also trialling a
concept version for auditing critical controls as a data gathering process. The data obtained in
those audits is then aggregated in a web environment where basic dashboard functionality can
deliver insight into the performance of critical controls. Both of these applications are therefore
considered key to the design of a CCMS at AngloGold Ashanti.
In this paragraph the goal of identifying other systems that could potentially support CCMS
in the overarching risk management structure within AngloGold Ashanti is discussed. The
landscape in which all of these applications function is characterized similarly to the structure
of BI environments discussed in Section 3.3 in order explain their respective roles. The overall
landscape is divided into applications that primarily gather data, aggregate it, serve a data
warehouse function or facilitate reporting and can be viewed in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: The landscape of relevant applications used at AGA in order to manage or categorize risk.
An overview of the application landscape in Figure 5.3 was developed during the course of
this research and divides the flow of data into four sections. Through separation of the different
applications by their nature, systems that had potential for integration into the CCMS were
identified. One of the systems found during this analysis was the Event Management System
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(EMS), marked on the data gathering level. All incidents that happen on-site at SDGM, whether it
be safety or otherwise, are recorded within the EMS. Significant and high-potential incidents are
effectively a lagging indicator for critical control performance. Inclusion of incident statistics was
therefore deemed to be a valuable tool for assessing whether the implementation and application
of critical controls made a noticeable difference in safety performance. Although the potential for
results is limited within the scope of research, inclusion should be trialled to explore possibilities
for CCMS implementation at a larger operation.
The Regional Data Warehouse (RDW) for the Australian operations of AGA provides the
opportunity to use ready-made BI infrastructure to host the BI environment necessary for the
CCMS. Through the RDW, all potential critical control sub-systems within the Australian context
can be integrated. This makes inclusion of the EMS within CCMS also more straightforward.
Within the risk management reporting structure, dashboards could be integrated through the
RDW in order to give employees a bird’s eye view of their day-to-day performance issues. By
inclusion of critical controls into these dashboards, awareness is created throughout the company.
Added benefit here is that reporting of figures on risk management, which is already required
through corporate standards, can then be done in a familiar environment with little process
interruption.
5.1.4. Systems That Are Out Of Scope
Other systems that could potentially be included in CCMS but are currently out of scope are
Planned Maintenance (PM), EMS - Consolidated and SAP BW. Planned maintenance and SAP
could potentially use the same companywide application. Additionally, BI capability is included to
form a single application capable of performing data gathering, aggregation, BI and reporting in
one go. However, the SAP infrastructure had not been implemented during the design phase of the
project and was therefore removed from scope. How the system could potentially be integrated in
PM will be discussed in Section 8.1 of Chapter 8, Discussion.
5.2. Critical Control Validation
Every person views a critical control differently. Their view is determined by their experience,
job title, hierarchical status and/or education. That means no single view is necessarily perfect.
Effort should be put forward to assess critical controls from different perspectives. By doing so,
a comprehensive view of a control’s performance is determined. The validation questions within
the Performance Standards were set out with a similar approach. They were set up to cater to
different layers within the company hierarchy, but were not designated as such. The following
list of validation questions are applicable to the critical control of emergency stop button & trip
switches related to equipment safeguarding:
1. Is a system in place to inspect, maintain and record all emergency stop and/or emergency trip
switches/pull wires in use on site?
2. Is a system in place to ensure modifications and changes to work environment are assessed to
verify additional requirements for emergency stop and/or emergency trip switches/pull wires?
3. Are operational tests routinely carried out on the emergency lanyards and stop switches with
records maintained?
4. Are emergency stop and/or emergency trip switches/pull wires positioned conspicuously and
within immediate reach of operators?
5. Are all operators familiarised with lanyard or stop switch activation and response to the
activation alarm?
The Performance Standards apply these questions to the validation of a critical control. By
themselves, the questions are quite comprehensive and have inherent expectations formulated
in the yes or no answer. This way, criteria relating to the control all have to be met or otherwise
result in a non-compliant entry. At the design phase of the project, neither the roll out nor the
designation of relevant personnel for answering these questions had been conducted. That posed
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quite a challenge as the Performance Standards number around 540 verification questions in total.
The dimension of frequency had also not been incorporated into the Performance Standards, so
design of the critical control monitoring system had to include these aspects into the greater design.
5.2.1. Integration with company hierarchy
As stated in paragraph 4.6.2, one of the core requirements of this project is to integrate critical
control monitoring and thinking throughout the entire company hierarchy, from operator to
executive. Operators, supervisors, superintendents and managers all need to be aware and
participate in maintaining critical control integrity. If they do so, significant incidents resulting in
severe injuries or fatalities will be minimized. The nature of validation steps in the Performance
Standards provides an opportunity to match questions to appropriate levels within the company
hierarchy.
Because the validation questions were already in the final drafting stages, little could be done in
terms of developing the questions themselves. Instead, questions could be matched to the relevant
abstraction level in the organization. Going back to the different perspectives of personnel on-site,
an operator is more likely to look at a single part, while a manager is more concerned with the
running of entire processing plants. Mirroring the questions to relevant personnel was thus about
finding that overlap where the nature of question matches the detail in an employee’s daily work.
In line with "KISS", three levels within active operation where defined:
1. Operators
2. Supervisors
3. Managers
That operators needed to be one of the categories, if not the main category, is without any doubt.
Mindful leadership is about understanding what "front line" personnel experience, and it is these
men and women that encounter the hazards on daily basis. Building their awareness is perhaps
the most important goal with regards to implementation of critical controls. The need for inclusion
of management has already been thoroughly discussed in Paragraph 2.2.5, but there is one extra
category that was needed to cover the entirety of operations. Between operators and management
sits an intermediate step. The employees in a supervisory role understand the tasks at hand, but
also have knowledge of the processes that facilitate day-to-day work. While operating on a slightly
less abstract level than a manager, these employees carry out an important role in being the
conduit from management to operator, and back. This division of hierarchical levels corresponds
with the reality gradient set out by Pillay (2015). This idea applies to mining safety systems and
assesses the gradient from work imagined to work performed. The categories are explicitly kept
on a fairly broad level. This will ensure they also work for other operations once the system is
duplicated there. It is then up to an operation to classify who sits in a front-line, intermediate and
managerial role.
5.2.2. Matching validation questions
Now the three main levels have been established, a methodology has to be applied to match
the questions in the Performance Standards to the hierarchy categories. To do this the level of
abstractness inherent to the questions was used. In order to manage operational safety effectively,
a system is needed. Such a system is subsequently governed by processes that apply procedures to
safety controls, alarms and interlocks (SCAI) (Hochleitner and Roche, 2017). This relates to the
hierarchy within the company in that managers generally look at systems holistically, supervisors
understand procedures and the overlying processes, while operators are mostly concerned with
carrying out the task or procedure. The sought after levels of abstractness in the questions can
thus be categorized as:
1. Procedure/Task
2. Process
3. System
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To understand how this methodology was subsequently applied to the validation questions in the
Performance Standards, the example questions in Section 5.2 are assessed. These can be viewed
with keywords determining the hierarchical level highlighted in the following list:
1. Is a system in place to inspect, maintain and record all emergency stop and/or emergency
trip switches/pull wires in use on site?
2. Is a system in place to ensure modifications and changes to work environment are assessed
to verify additional requirements for emergency stop and/or emergency trip switches/pull
wires?
3. Are operational tests routinely carried out on the emergency lanyards and stop switches
with records maintained?
4. Are emergency stop and/or emergency trip switches/pull wires positioned conspicuously
and within immediate reach of operators?
5. Are all operators familiarised with lanyard or stop switch activation and response to the
activation alarm?
The first two questions are matched relatively easily. Both discuss overarching systems that
ensure emergency stops function on site, the first being a maintenance system and the second
a Management-of-Change (MoC) system. The third question is less straightforward as it refers
to "operational tests", perhaps implying that operators should answer this question. Yet the key
aspect here is the word routinely, which indicates that this questions is about a process. That
puts it firmly in the domain of supervisors. If one looks closely, question three is the same as the
first, yet one level of abstraction lower. The fourth question is indeed an operator level question. It
refers to a visual inspection that could and should be done by an operator. The last question is not
about the task of familiarization, but the process to familiarize all operators. This means it is yet
another supervisor level question.
5.2.3. Overview of Results
The methodology stated in Paragraph 5.2.2 was applied to all Performance Standard validation
questions. Due to the use of different levels of abstraction, incorporating questions within the
categories was achieved without exemptions. The resulted in a distribution as can be seen in figure
5.4.
Figure 5.4: Overview of levels with both absolute and relative number of Performance Standard validation questions
During the course of this research, the model in Figure 5.4 was created based on the division
of hierarchies as noted by Pillay (2015). Immediately noticeable is the discrepancy between the
amount of manager and supervisor questions on the one hand, and operator level ones on the other.
A positive outcome of this distribution is the ample opportunity for inclusion of line management
into the process. While 54 questions on the operator level might appear to be an insignificant
number compared to the other categories, one dimension has not been taken into account as of
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yet: the frequency of assessments. This factor was still unknown at the design stage of the project.
As discussed in Paragraph 2.1.1, a system will fail when the underlying processes stop working.
By changing the frequency of assessments per level, over-prescription of safety audits can be
prevented.
5.2.4. Missing dimension of validation questions
While operator level questions were designated through the use of procedures and tasks, a distinc-
tive feature was found in the nature of these questions: they were more focused on the technical
aspects of safety than on operator behaviour. Below some examples are listed that detail the nature
of these questions:
• Are all permanent anchor points identified by clear markings for effective identification by
persons required to work at height?
• Are all flow rate devices positively identified and flow direction indicated?
• Is a quarantine bin provided and used for unserviceable or untagged rigging equipment?
• Is the operator’s console safely isolated from the remotely operated loader?
By failing to fully drill down to the behaviour of operators, critical controls are not completely
integrated into the business. Therefore, another dimension needed to be added in order to make
sure all layers of the organization are adequately made aware of critical controls. This last layer is
that of operator behaviour. In order to remedy this, 140 extra validation questions were specifically
developed on that very level. That means the total amount of validation questions is around
670 and still subject to change. These additional validation steps were developed with the safety
department of SDGM and focused on three things:
1. What control affects an operator personally?
2. How can we build awareness of these controls to the operator?
3. In what way can we integrate the assessments of these controls in daily work?
These extra validation steps are seen as the last step towards becoming a fully integrated, critical
control managing company. While this is a step that every operation should take eventually, for
now it is merely a way to go above and beyond what is expected at AngloGold Ashanti. The nature
of these questions is quite different to those on the technical level. This can be seen in the following
examples:
• Are you hydrated and have you eaten a meal prior to starting work?
• Have you verified the isolations in place with the isolations officer?
• Are you aware of the steps to take in case a PRV starts discharging into a working area?
• Is a licensed Dogger or Rigger present prior to commencing your lifting task?
The questions on the behavioural level are fairly straightforward. They action the operator to
think about the controls possible, questioning if they are put in place and what steps to take if one
fails. By answering these questions, operators are not impeded in their work while still building
awareness. When taking the operator behaviour questions into account, another picture arises
around the distribution of questions amongst the different levels. This can be viewed in Figure 5.5
where the model of Figure 5.4 was extended to reflect the addition of a behavioural component to
the PS questions.
The distribution of questions among company hierarchy is much more equal, with 37, 34 and
29% total for each of the hierarchy levels. This reflects the fact that everyone ought to participate in
critical control monitoring. The inclusion of these questions into a business process was out-of-scope
for the thesis project. However, the questions will be adapted at SDGM in a peer-to-peer process
called Safety Observations in which the operators review each other during hazardous tasks. Not
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Figure 5.5: Distribution of Critical Control validation questions amongst the company hierarchy levels
to blame or assign guilt, but merely to become aware of critical controls and identify possible
behavioural errors. This reinforces the concept of a just culture as set out in Paragraph 2.2.3 as
one of the tenets of an HRO. The roll out of that system will be conducted end of 2017, beginning of
2018.
5.3. Working Environment
One of the main issues with underground operations is the fact that wireless connectivity is seldom
available, if possible at all. While tele-remote operations are applied when extracting ore from
stopes, Wi-Fi connectivity is often left to be desired. While some mines might offer that kind of
capacity, an integrated system that works for all of AGA’s operations should be capable to work with
off-line capability, if desired. This is essential for the operators that go into the most hazardous
sections, which are often also the deepest levels, and conduct their work in a safe manner. While
hierarchy in SDGM is relatively flat, this is also because of the small size of the operation. In some
of AGA’s South African operations more than 10,000 operators work in a single mine, meaning that
supervisor and manager roles are conducted at least partially if not completely underground.
5.4. Summary of design implications
The division in questions into three employee levels is already indicating the fact that three
separate processes are necessary to facilitate the evaluation of critical controls within an operation.
What these look like will be discussed in the next chapter. It is clear that the processes will have to
take the following aspects into account:
• Levels within company hierarchy
• Frequency of assessment
• Working environment and off-line capacity
As was discussed in Section 1.5 of the Introduction, addition of an operator-based process is the
only level that is within scope for development during the project. However, potential integration
with processes catering to supervisors and managers should be taken into account. This is where
the data-flow model comes into play. Because the assessment of critical controls is separated from
the BI environment, room is created for multiple assessment processes. In order to keep the system
simple, only three levels of assessment were distinguished. Within the wider data application
landscape, multiple systems have been identified that could potentially be integrated with CCMS
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in order streamline development. However only several of those are of interest to the immediate
project, which are:
• Event Management System
• Regional Data Warehouse
• Detailed (Board) Dashboards
The inclusion of these systems into the CCMS enable assessment of incident registration as a
lagging indicator though the Event Management System. BI capacity is enabled through the
Regional Data Warehouse as it provides an online, SQL-based platform for storing arrays of data
from a multitude of systems. The use of dashboards decreases the learning curve for end users and
allows possible integration of multiple interfaces, i.e. together with maintenance data.
5.5. CCMS Architecture
In order to make sure all flows of data could be integrated, a systems infrastructure model was
developed during this research based on the BI and OLAP framework set out by (Al-Aqrabi et al.,
2015). The infrastructure model was made to include the initial data input process to capture the
entire to-be engineered data infrastructure and can be viewed in figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6: Systems infrastructure for the CCMS project at Sunrise Dam Gold Mine
The systems infrastructure adheres both to the organizational requirements set out in Para-
graphs 4.6.1 and 4.6.6. It clearly shows the dependencies in terms of data flow. If a survey method is
not developed, no critical control data can be presented within the bow-tie environment, ultimately
leading to an empty dashboard. However, the method or process for data generation is independent
of the overarching design. This means that whatever process is deemed suitable at an operation, it
can still be adapted into the CCMS. This allows the system to be scalable to other operations and
therefore gives an answer to the second research sub-question in terms of data input.
Creating a survey method thus has the highest priority when implementing the CCMS at
SDGM. When that is accomplished, data should be drawn from the bow-tie environment into the
regional data warehouse, where data integration with EMS and other sources is achieved. When a
data flow to the Regional Data Warehouse is established, an interface can be created to truly enable
critical control monitoring. The interface should then contain a back-end and a separate front-end.
The back-end allows members of the global safety team to tailor the dashboard to relevant issues
found in AGA operations. The front-end for employees should be tailored to the sphere of influence
of the respective employee.
In the design shown in Figure 5.6, integration with the Event Management System has been
included. This is not only a demonstration of technical capacity, it also allows monitoring of incident
data starting from the implementation of CCMS at SDGM. Reflecting on the way in which AGA
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wants to go above and beyond of what is expected of a company, as discussed in Paragraph 4.1.7,
this design accomplishes several things. It allows real-time auditing of non-conformities, systemic
incident investigation and assessment of critical controls while being scalable to other operations.
When implemented, it provides AngloGold Ashanti more control of their working environment.
5.6. Design remarks
The current data infrastructure was explicitly designed as a short to medium term solution
with application in less automated environments. For an environment with a higher degree of
automation in relation to the average IT infrastructure of AGA operations, a more advanced
process could potentially remove intermediate steps for more efficient data flow. This optimization
problem is discussed in further detail in Section 8.1 of Chapter 8, Discussion. There, the existing
data infrastructure landscape at SDGM will be explored more thoroughly to come up with a more
streamlined, long-term systems design.
6
Implementation
In this chapter, the implementation of the Critical Control Monitoring System is discussed. It
examines all aspects necessary for taking the design developed in the previous chapter into the
operational environment at Sunrise Dam Gold Mine (SDGM). First, the strategy applied to fulfil
the required steps and build the system is discussed. Systems implementation is subsequently
treated in the following sections. As the implementation carried out during the project was the
first of its kind, lessons learned during this study are discussed last. These can then be applied to
ensure a successful outcome at all other AngloGold Ashanti operations.
6.1. Strategy
Simultaneous with piloting the CCMS, Performance Standards were rolled out at SDGM. Because
these specified exactly what needs to be assessed and reviewed on a control level, they provided
a framework in which to set-up control monitoring. Adopting these questions however, meant
that now around 540 new audit questions became part of the work that needs to be done on-site.
Before any critical controls could be weaved into the fabric of the business, Performance Standards
needed to be reviewed, accepted and adapted. Afterwards, operational processes could be assessed
for integration. Once a suitable target was found, the rest of the implementation was carried out
according to the methodology set out in Section 3.3. The implementation strategy formulated to
develop critical control monitoring on site can be summarized in the following steps:
1. Adopt corporate Performance Standards on-site
2. Identify compatible business processes for critical control assessment
3. Adapt business process(es) to include critical control assessment
4. Integrate processes in Bow-tie software to reflect multi-level assessment of controls
5. Import and model critical control data in data warehouse
6. Code measures for control performance
7. Develop dashboards with data models for relevant stakeholders on-site
It should be noted that some steps taken ran partly simultaneously to accommodate availability of
AGA employees during the various stages and time steps of the project.
6.2. Adoption of Performance Standards
In order to pilot critical controls monitoring on site, the first step in the process that needed
to be taken was to integrate the corporate Performance Standards and their requirements on-
site. Without those, no assessment metrics for the critical controls could be developed. Although
the validation questions provided a good starting point for an assessment tool, nothing in the
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Performance Standards was stated about the frequency they have to be applied. As the validation
questions number over 540 separate instances, there was a need to limit the impact of these
questions on business processes. Should all be subjected to a daily assessement, more than 189,000
assessments ought to be carried out on-site on a yearly basis. To get an idea what might be a good
number of assessments, the example of Rio Tinto (2017) can be taken. As a company it conducts 1.3
million assessment over more than 60 sites, thus averaging some 20,000 audits per site. Deciding
how many might be necessary depends in large part on the characteristics of an operation. Being a
small-size, shallow gold mining operation, a frequency ought to be designed that provides regular
input yet is not over-prescriptive.
To achieve this, a frequency assessment was done based on the hierarchical levels of the
questions. This hierarchy has already been extensively discussed in Paragraph 5.2.1. On the
supervisor level, SDGM already carried out an own validation process with the help of so-called
Critical Control (CC) Champions. These were designated out of their respective departments and
championed a single Major Hazard Standard. Championing such an MHS meant doing quarterly
audits similar to the Performance Standard validation questions. The CC champions were generally
located within the hierarchical level of experienced supervisors to managers. However, it was found
that managers would often delegate their championing tasks to superintendents. As such, the
conduct of these assessment was carried out completely on the supervisor level.
The interval for the supervisor level critical control monitoring process was kept on the same
level to reflect the system already in place. These assessments were trialled simultaneously to
this research in the third quarter of 2017 as part of quarterly evaluations. Together with an
implemented operator process, they formed the core of critical control data for this study. The
quarterly evaluations are sent out as audit forms to the relevant stakeholders who are then
accountable for their completion. In order to complete an audit a significant amount of evidence
with regards to critical control functioning is required. The additional information is use to validate
that the process audits use a more representative sample to measure their performance.
6.2.1. Frequency for manager level questions
Regulations in the United States specify that systems audits should not exceed an interval of 3
years (Satish and Crow, 2014). To comply with OHSAS 18001, which is the leading standard in
Australia, annual audits are conducted by a third party. The standard itself however does not
specify any figure for internal assessments done by a company. Other authors specify that each
organization has to set its own auditing interval according to its own needs. In line with "KISS" and
organizational goals specified in Paragraphs 4.6.2 and 4.6.6, frequency for manager assessments
was set at yearly intervals. The following factors were used to decide on the annual frequency:
• Size of the operation
• Operational culture
• Site specific hazards
Weighing heavily on the frequency for annual audits is the fact that small sized mines like
SDGM only have a narrow top layer of departmental managers. When the CCMS is duplicated
to other mines, a re-evaluation of the frequency assessment will have to be carried out to match
the operational environment of the mine. While there is a drive to push safety performance to
excellence at SDGM, much of that momentum stems from the safety department itself. In order not
to lose traction with regards to the implementation of new systems, cautious integration should be
applied. SDGM is a shallow gold mine with good ground conditions and its safety track can already
be considered better-than-average or even good for Australian standards. Therefore employees
might feel that the auditing process becomes to constrictive when increasing the frequency to
bi-annual or quarterly and thus lose faith in the overall approach.
6.2.2. Frequency of operator processes
Having stakeholders succesfully utilize the CCMS is one of the main goals of this project, reflected
in sub-question 1 of the research questions. Operators on the shopfloor face high potential hazards
on a daily basis, and they are therefore the main stakeholder with regards to the end product of
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the system. However, determining an appropriate frequency for operator processes was not as
straightforward as those mentioned in the previous paragraphs. Control assessments have to be
conducted during work on the operation itself, therefore downtime for auditing is limited. The
Safety Observations process was designed to be minimally impactful itself. It only contains 8 to
14 closed questions per audit that relate to a single Major Hazard Standard. An audit using this
process should not take longer than a quarter of an hour if no non-compliances are found. The goal
of this process is to acquaint operators with critical controls through a peer-to-peer review process.
The over-saturation of safety assessments during work is the main concern in implementing a
regular frequency to such a new process. Operators already have to fill out several processes during
their work: the so-called SLAMS, SWIC’s and JHA’s. It is well understood that adding a process
can lead to disgruntlement, if it detracts operators from doing their job while providing no clear
benefit. The intended frequency of assessment as developed with the SDGM safety department is
bi-monthly. Effectively however, that means operators are only exposed to the processes monthly
as A and B crews alternate their work. Adding such a process was not in scope for this study as it
goes against the requirements set by the organization, especially considering no new processes
were allowed to be implemented on-site. The control monitoring process of Safety Observations
goes above and beyond what is considered company standard. As such, it is carried out by SDGM
on its own accord well after conclusion of this research.
6.2.3. Results of frequency assessment
Currently, three out of four layers have been discussed. Manager level questions are asked annually,
supervisor questions per quarter, while operators are planned to have monthly safety observations.
While the technical level have not been assessed yet, a balance can drawn up regarding the amount
of audits done on a yearly scale. When all of the frequencies are matched to the amount of questions
asked, 4,650 assessments are done at SDGM per year. Note that when the Safety Observations are
subtracted from that figure, a mere 1,150 assessments are done. This is well below the average
figure given for the operations of Rio Tinto (2017) and very much in line with Keeping It Simple,
Stupid ("KISS"). By helping the operation understand the relatively low impact of assessments,
a barrier was removed. What seemed daunting at first, now turned out to be a comprehensive
system that on average only assesses a question every two months. As Safety Observations make
up the bulk of assessments at about 3,500 audits, this just goes to show the commitment made at
SDGM to achieve operational excellence. Without Safety Observations, the average frequency of
assessments drops down to an assessment every five months.
However, the technical layer of the system has not been assessed yet. This will be done in the
next Section, where it will become clear how much impact critical control integration can have.
First, an analysis is conducted of the suitability of existing operator processes to determine which
one is best suited to intergration of technical questions for critical controls. After modification of
the related process, a final tally is made to demonstrate how CCMS manages to adhere to "KISS",
assures data integrity and minimized impact on the business.
6.3. Control Integration in an Operator Process
The identification and implementation of a shop floor critical control monitoring process went
through several iterative steps before integration was carried out. An initial study looked into
employing an additional pre-start routine but this idea turned out not to be compatible with
organizational requirements. Thus it came down to using processes at the operator level. To keep
the scope of the project limited with regards to data acquisition, the goal here was to take a single
process and modify to include critical controls. Operators at AngloGold Ashanti already have
several procedures in place to assess safety, which makes targeting processes straightforward.
These processes are:
• Start Work In Control (SWIC)
• Job Hazard Analysis (JHA)
• Stop and think, Look, Act and Manage (SLAM)
• Safety meetings
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• Workplace Inspections (WPI)
Looking at the list above, one gets an understanding of the apprehension of adding yet another
safety process. The first three processes are used on a daily basis, with the latter three being
applied weekly or monthly, in the case of workplace inspections. Does one really need critical
controls when so many processes have already been implemented? The answer to that question is
yes. This project is about doing less while achieving more with regards to fatality prevention. The
question then is, which of these processes can be best used as a data acquisition process for critical
controls? In the next few paragraphs, a short description of each of the processes is given, as well
with reasons for and against integration.
6.3.1. Start Work In Control (SWIC)
Whenever an operator changes his general working environment, he or she has to conduct a SWIC
in order to make sure that all conditions for safe work are met. An example of such a switch in
work conditions, is doing a spot check on a secondary crusher if a foreign element is detected. In
such an example, a SWIC demands systems are isolated, supervisors are aware and that the right
tools are selected for the job.
While the frequencies of SWIC’s carried out is high, the changes in working environment do not
specifically relate to high risk activities. As such it is difficult to assess what controls might be
relevant in any change. Because operators are not familiarized with Major Hazard Standards or
critical controls, it is unwise to rely on operator understanding. Essentially this process would have
too much impact and too little direction. The upsides are significant awareness and adjustment to
the relevant operating conditions.
However, there is no documentation process after a SWIC is completed. In order to gather data
through SWIC’s, operators would have to document the process, perhaps even multiple times per
shift and afterwards deliver them for review. The potential of this process is purely in spreading
awareness, much less in data acquisition around control performance.
6.3.2. Job Hazard Analysis (JHA)
Instead of only focusing on a change of scenery, Job Hazard Analyses are purposefully carried out
to assess high risk activities. The assessment consists of documenting the hazards and controls
required to carry out the work safely. When a routine activity is carried out, pre-made work
instructions may be used instead of a JHA. The entire work team including the supervisor must
review the JHA and sign off on it.
Contrary to SWIC’s, a JHA explicitly details the controls needed for a job to be carried out safely.
Additionally, there is a documented process that could be adapted for data acquisition. However,
while a JHA specifies controls, nothing is done to assess their performance. Only if the controls
were also checked beforehand could this process potentially help assess the effectiveness of critical
controls.
The JHA does have potential for the identification of general hazards documented in the MHS.
Whichever controls then relate to the MHS could then be made aware off during the JHA process.
This potential has already been partially implemented through specification of critical controls in
the JHA, if present. While the JHA is a pro-active process all review and sign off is beforehand,
making the process have little potential for critical control monitoring.
6.3.3. Stop and Think, Look, Act and Manage (SLAM)
While JHA’s focus on doing high-risk jobs within a controlled environment, the SLAM process
focusses on mitigating high-risk situations when found on the shop floor. However, it is core an
intrinsically reactive process. When looking back at the ALARP versus SFAIRP debate, such an
approach is flawed in trying to implement, monitor and maintain controls. SLAM’s do have purpose
in providing operators the tools to get unexpected hazards back under control.
The benefits of the SLAM process are that it is tailored to the hazards found on site. As such
data generated through the SLAM process can focus explicitly on control failures. The potential for
SLAM’s within critical control management thus lies with lagging indicators. When encountering a
hazardous situation caused by failing critical controls, this should be documented though incident
recording.
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6.3.4. Safety Meetings
The second to last of the evaluated operator processes, a safety meeting is held for the underground
crews every swing. As all underground operators worked on a 2 weeks on, 1 week off, they average
about 4 safety meetings per quarter. Topics during the meetings focus on incidents and conditions
on-site, as well as notable incidents within the province of Western Australia. If very impactful
or similar to SDGM, incidents throughout the entirety of Australia could be made subject of the
meeting. An example of such an incident was an operator who died of heat stroke while working in
his jumbo alone. Although heat is not a problem at SDGM, it is common for workers to operate
machinery alone in headings.
Like the SLAM, meetings tend to be on the reactive side of safety management. While specific
controls may be discussed, no performance measurement is or can be done. The safety meetings do
have potential for developing wide-spread awareness on critical controls or specific hazards.
6.3.5. Workplace Inspections
Throughout the entire mine, workplace inspections (WPI’s) are carried out to assess general
working conditions. The checks done are based off of a inspection sheet that leads an auditor
through the relevant working area. Because the inspections can be quite extensive, research had
already been carried in optimizing the path taken through the operation during auditing to reduce
inspection time.
Workplace inspections are carried out by safety representatives who are elected by crews to
represent them on HSE matters. They get time allocated to perform these inspections to fulfil
regulatory requirements set out by the Western Australian Department of Minerals and Petroleum
(1994). In effect this means that without inspections a mining site is not allowed to operate.
The safety representatives are briefed and consulted on all changes made to the site and
get an accredited occupational health and safety course on top of their two year term. On the
operator level, these employees guarantee the highest level of valid data when taking the site
safety maturity into account. Only then can the validity of that on the operator level be guaranteed
(Baybutt, 2014).
The inspection sheet itself contains closed questions and has to be uploaded to the EMS after
sign-off and completion. This means a documentation process is already in place which could
contain the status of critical controls checked throughout the mine. While potential for spreading
awareness is lower than the other processes, it provides an excellent platform for checking control
performance. Additionally, it is a pro-active process that checks all relevant, hazardous areas of the
mine. As WPI’s have a monthly frequency, it provides a steady stream of data that can be easily
assessed on throughput and quality.
6.3.6. Selection
Out of all process identified, the monthly Workplace Inspections were considered to have the most
potential for integration. It is pro-active, extensive, has a documented process and is a physical
inspection of hazardous areas on-site. The deciding factor in choosing WPI’s however was based on
the competence of auditors involved in the process. On the operator level, safety representatives
are the most skilled and competent personnel available for conducting a technical level audit of
the controls. In Table 6.1, an assessment has been made about the most relevant decision factors
relevant to selection of the process.
Table 6.1: Table lining out the decision variables and manner of scoring for each of the operator processes
Scoring within the table was determined through assessment of the descriptions listed above and
the relative quality of the components for each of the processes. A double plus scores best, a double
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negative worst. The workplace inspections perform well on all criteria except general operator
awareness. However this is more than compensated by the fact operator competency ranks highest,
while each of the other criteria scores at least positive.
Based on this assessment, the workplace inspections were selected as highest scoring operator
process for further adaptation of critical controls. In the next Section this process will be discussed
extensively. What can be concluded from this selection procedure is the identification of criteria
that have impact on the integration of critical controls into operator processes. This way the third
research sub-question is answered not through the identification of one or more processes, but by
development of a framework that helps an operation and its stakeholders decide for themselves
what is most important in terms of critical control monitoring. This informs the decision for
integration and thus generates both flexibility and scalability for the CCMS to other AngloGold
Ashanti operations.
6.4. Modification of Workplace Inspections
While the workplace inspection process was deemed to have extensive potential for auditing, not
all employees necessarily agreed on adding critical controls to the inspection sheets. A big concern
here was that already extensive inspections might become too cumbersome. Should that occur,
operators might apply a "tick and flick" process to filling out the inspection sheets, making the
inspections effectively useless.
As doing less, achieving more through the utilization of a least-invasive system is one of the core
goals during the project, a step of process optimization had to be applied. This approach centred
on targeting existing questions for modification instead of just adding new ones. During this step
it would also become clear that a significant portion of questions is duplicated in other processes,
thus allowing for removal of questions not relevant to the inspection at hand.
6.4.1. Overview of the inspection process
Each month, 23 inspections are carried out across processing and maintenance areas, as well
as any area related to the underground workings. Any above-ground workshop, in-pit limits or
working area is also included. These inspections totalled 1909 closed questions on technical safety
aspects on the mine. 18 out of 23 inspections are between 34 and 104 questions in length, with 2
being shorter and 3 longer. The latter category all exceeded 200 questions, which 212, 223 and 295
respectively. With such lengthy inspections, the apprehension of personnel to extend them is easily
justified. The workplace inspections at SDGM were carried out according to a path moving the
auditor along all relevant aspects of the mine site. The general areas assessed for the underground
workings workshop can be seen in Figure 6.1
Figure 6.1: Flowchart for workplace inspection of underground workings SDGM
For each of these stages, a series of closed questions was asked to verify the state of the
workplace. Because a significant amount of critical controls affect the workplace by themselves, the
assessments could be made to include these to introduce control audits. The goal of the monthly
inspection is not to repair defects when found, merely to note any faults or failures and send them
through to the maintenance department.
Although the goal is to do less, the inspection should remain complete. The reason the largest
inspection is 295 questions is that it concerns the entire part of the plant involved in the multi-stage
crushing of gold ore. In Figure 6.2, a picture can be seen of the crushing plant. This includes four
separate crushers, seven conveyors belts and multiple take-up towers.
The crushing circuit inspection is the most significant in terms of questions by a large margin.
The underground workings inspection rivals its extent however. Not in the amount of questions, of
6.4. Modification of Workplace Inspections 55
Figure 6.2: ROM pad with primary and secondary crushers and additional conveyor belts at SDGM.
which it has 72, but in time spent completing the inspection. The ore body at Sunrise Dam consists
of several connected lenses which are accessed through six portals in the now unused open pit
operation. Because of its high degree of dissemination and therefore also working areas, checking
these environments takes a long time. Taking into account limited space and traffic, an inspection
might take close to a full working day to complete.
6.4.2. Data acquisition for control monitoring
The closed questions used in the inspections made that applying critical control monitoring meant
only modifying, adding or removing questions. This means that the nature of inspection forms
remained unchanged. However, there was no way to extract the data efficiently from the process
at that time. In order to understand how data acquisition was solved, the process behind the
workplace inspections needs to be understood. In Figure 6.3, the steps behind assigning, doing and
completing a workplace inspection can be viewed.
Although safety representatives (reps) get time allocated, this process is not automated but
based on prevailing working conditions in the mine. It could be that their expertise is required
elsewhere during non-routine tasks, and as such the time to do an inspection is fitted in between
normal work. The allocation of that time is done by the operations coordinator or someone in a
similar function. After time is allocated in the enterprise resource planning (ERP) system, the
safety rep takes a paper form to the relevant working area and performs the audit. Next, the safety
rep uploads the paper form as a scan to the event management system as proof the inspection has
been conducted. Finally, based on non-compliances found during the inspection, actions are put
into the ERP system for maintenance personnel to pick up.
6.4.2.1. Data Identification
In the workplace inspection process, two types of data are generated as output of the system. One is
the scanned inspection form and the second type is the actions put out in the ERP system. Taking
the systems design discussed in Chapter 5 into account, a link should be made to the bow-tie
environment, so all critical control data generated is homogenous and can be pulled into the BI
environment. Additionally, no other infrastructure was available to support bow-tie models and
critical control data.
Unfortunately, neither form of data can be directly fed into the bow-tie environment. In order
to process the scanned form, Optical Character Recognition (OCR) ought to be applied as an
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Figure 6.3: Process steps with personnel and applications involved for workplace inspections
intermediary step. This technology is used in the South African operations of AGA, but was not
viable as a solution for the CCMS project. Being the system that already stores the bow-tie models,
the bow-tie environment was the foremost choice as a platform for data aqcuisition. However,
input to the system is currently limited to audit forms detailing critical control questions. That
means it is similarly not possible to route actions out of other systems into the bow-tie environment.
Alternative routing the data streams will be discussed in Section 8.1 of Chapter 8, Discussion.
6.4.2.2. Data Extraction
So in what way can the inspection forms be put into the bow-tie environment? As discussed, audit
forms can be distributed by e-mail to relevant employees for fill-out of critical control questions.
In its most basic form, that would mean a safety rep would have to complete another process
after uploading the form and putting out actions for maintenance. It is a solution that could work
immediately, however it would include the addition of one more step to the inspection process.
Solving the data extraction problem this way has two important caveats however. For one, a
safety rep that voluntarily looks out for the best interest of his co-workers has to complete another
data acquisition step that does not generate attributable benefits for the individual in question.
Squarely put, it means that after an 6-8 hour inspection, another process irrelevant to the operator
has to be completed. That is a problem, as volunteering for such a role should not mean one is used
as a data "mule".
The only result of transforming the role of safety representative into a data entry position is
that those who volunteered will not continue, nor will their co-workers seek to get elected. The
role of safety representative should be about looking out for your co-workers, with as little clutter
around it as possible. That makes adding a process step after the inspection itself undesirable.
More of an overall business concern is the second caveat of this solution. In order to be able to
receive audit forms, an employee has to have a purchased license. For a relatively small mine like
SDGM that means 20 safety representatives require such a license, on top of all other processes
using the auditing portion of the bow-tie environment. However for the scope of this project the
focus will be solely on the licensing around the workplace inspection piece. A conservative estimate
of required licenses for AGA globally would be around 500 licenses. At 2017 purchasing costs, solely
the workplace inspection licensing would cost upwards of $100,000 dollars annually. For a process
that is copying ready-made data into a question form delivered by mail, that is quite excessive.
6.4.2.3. Working Solution
The process itself however is not the issue. It scomes down solely to licensing and not having the
safety representative bother with an extra data entry step. The scanned forms can be readily
used to input the audit forms. These files are available on the EMS that can be accessed by safety
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personnel on-site. Instead of having all safety reps fill out an extra step, a member of the safety
department can use the scanned files to import control data into the bow-tie environment using
the audits. This solves two things: safety representatives no longer have to be concerned with an
extra step, while secondly the licensing issue is reduced to one or two licences on-site. That reduces
the process cost to a little over $7,000 dollar annually for all AGA operations.
This solution satisfies several other requirements and considerations set out in systems design.
It maintains the capacity for offline work to be conducted underground or on-site. Secondly, it
adds a data verification step in the input of this data in the bow-tie environment. Thirdly, through
compounding the fill out of all workplace inspections in one go, the process can be optimized
for speed and accuracy. Within scope of the project, the solution given was deemed the most
cost-efficient, least impactful and most of all the simplest. That there may be a more efficient
solution is not contested, rather their use and implementation requirements will be discussed in
Section 8.1 of the Chapter 8, Discussion.
6.4.3. Critical Control Integration
Following from the previous paragraph, the forms on which to note the state of workplace in-
spections is the basis for further data processing. To implement critical control monitoring into
workplace inspections, four process steps where defined that were repeated through several cycles:
1. Assess workplace inspections for the addition of potential critical controls
2. Integrate critical control validation questions in the monthly workplace inspections
3. Optimize workplace inspections for safety representative evaluation and subsequent data
entry
4. Verification and validation of the monthly workplace inspections
As discussed in Paragraph 5.2.3, 54 Performance Standard questions on the technical level were
identified. In principle, these should all be viable for physical inspection, as it involves personnel
auditing the state of being of controls applied within the mine. Therefore, assessing workplace
inspections for control integration will revolve in matching these 54 technical level questions to the
inspections at hand. The questions span 40 out of 117 control applicable to SDGM and 100% of
MHS present on-site. The questions themselves can be found in Appendix B, together with their
parent controls and MHS listed in tables B.4 and B.5. Within the workplace inspections, three
categories of questions are relevant to control integration:
• Questions that are the same as Performance Standard validation questions
• Questions that are similar to Performance Standard validation questions
• Questions that are irrelevant to control integration
The first two categories are relevant to the integration process itself. The last category might not be
of use to critical controls, but it is an integral part of the workplace inspections. The first category
is both the most applicable and the rarest. Out of 1909 questions, 20 were completely the same,
and could thus be ear-marked for control integration. The more interesting category are those
questions that are similar, but may differ in context or semantics from the use within the control
standards. An example of a question similar to a critical control validation question is:
• Workplace inspection question : Are emergency stop and/or emergency trip switches/pull
wires positioned conspicuously and within immediate reach of operators?
• Performance Standard validation question : Is the emergency stop button clearly marked and
visible?
Like in the example, some workplace inspection questions are actually more specific than the
related Performance Standard question. All monthly inspection questions similar to Performance
Standard questions were categorized and in total, 252 questions were found that have a high
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degree of similarity to the PS validation questions. This result shows the potential for workplace
inspections as a data acquisition process for critical controls: 272 out of 1909 or 14% is almost
directly attributable to critical controls.
Next, the workplace inspection questions were related to their most applicable PS validation
question. Out of that assessment, 48 out of 54 (89%) technical level Performance Standard
Questions could be related. These 48 PS elements relate to 35 out of 40 (88%) critical controls on
the technical level. If not applicable to the workplace inspection process there were three possible
causes:
• The inspection task requires specific technological knowledge. An example of this is inspection
of Pressure Relief and Blowdown Valves, which is covered by maintenance.
• The technical question involved a reactionary, non-standard hazardous task. The treatment
of misfires concerns one such technical element.
The addition of maintenance into critical control management facilitates a perspective not necessar-
ily attainable through monthly inspection routines. It adds a level of technical expertise to perform
a more critical assessment of the integrity of physical assets. On-site, the maintenance department
sets out a strategy to inspection, maintain and repair systems on site. Factors involved in setting
up maintenance routines consist amongst others of OEM specifications, statutory requirements,
FMECA analysis and operational conditions. Data on maintenance activities is routed through the
PM system, of which the integration into CCM is currently out of scope. In a next step, integration
of maintenance data could complete all unutilized Performance Standards questions to implement
full critical control management. How this can be done is thoroughly discussed in Section 8.2 of
Chapter 8, Discussion.
6.4.4. Addition of extra validation questions
Because Sunrise Dam has been in continuous operation since 1997, operators on-site have a
thorough understanding of the capacities and limitations of the mine and its processing facilities.
In lay-man’s terms, that means personnel understand their working environment well, and are
thus able to run the operation efficiently. For the workplace inspection process it means the
relevant hazards are all categorized in some shape or form within the operation. However, not all
hazards might be identified in any single place. Through cross-referencing the inspections and
hazards encountered, additional questions could be marked for insertion through their similar
nature of working environment.
This was done through a two-step process. First, potential questions to be integrated in all
sections were assigned within the existing workplace inspections based on their relevance on-site.
One such example was the existence of emergency stop button questions that were denoted within
the grinding circuit inspection, yet not in the one applied to the crusher circuit. Questions relating
to emergency stop buttons are relevant to both inspections, as both share the same type of conveyor
belts. When checking on conveyor belts in the crusher circuit, emergency stop buttons were added
for potential integration.
This process was conducted for all inspections, making two separate passes to take knowledge
gained through all inspections once more. This was only the first step in the process of adding
questions however. The second question consisted of doing all inspections in person with a safety
representative to validate the addition of new critical control questions. This same process was
used to verify and validate the removal of non-essential questions discussed in Paragraph 6.4.6.
The final result of this process was the addition of 61 critical control questions to the inspections.
Combined with those previously found, this generates 316 critical control questions within the
workplace inspections. As these are assessed on a monthly basis throughout the year, this amounts
to 3,792 data points collected yearly. These questions can be found in Appendix B, within the
mapping tool applied to identify the elements across the inspections in Tables B.1, B.2 and B.3.
6.4.5. Design of Inspection Forms
The second step in which errors around critical controls can be generated is after the actual
inspections are conducted. When safety personnel transcribe the critical control data into the
bow-tie environment, errors can be made when data is misinpreted. While the questions are
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answered either yes or no, the variety in critical control questions and hazards could potentially
cause errors of judgement.
Adding the critical controls to the inspections should therefore include an easy data verification
step for both personnel conducting transcription and possibly auditors. In order to conduct a
least-invasive approach to changing inspections, the overall format was left in tact. An example of
the layout of the inspections can be seen in Figure 6.4
Figure 6.4: Example layout of the crusher circuit workplace inspection form
Several aspects of the inspection are clearly visible in the example shown in Figure 6.4. Entities
that had already been identified as a critical control on-site are marked with an hourglass figure
together with a bold marking of "critical control". The first question marked as such in the example
does correspond with one in the Performance Standards set out by the global safety team, namely
"Guarding of moving equipment" within the Major Hazard Standard "Equipment Safeguarding".
The second such entity corresponds with the critica control "Confined Space Register" within the
Major Hazard Standard "Confined Space Entry".
In the last column, "W/R" is specified. This denotes the work request set out to fix the deficiency.
Because the work request itself is done through EMS, tracking of these requests can be drawn
into the BI environment as well. Another aspect that is clearly visible is the sequential nature of
the workplace inspection form. Before each section, the general programme of the inspection is
specified. In the example, this is through two separate instances:
• "Observe up CVR01 Walkway"
• "Make your way to Sump Pump under CVR01"
These questions refer to Conveyor Belt 01 within the crusher circuit, specifying both the
walkway next to the conveyor belt and a separate sump pump located under it. Both instances
require no answer as they are merely pathfinding specifications that help the observer find his
or her way. While two critical controls had already been marked for their nature, they do not
correspond with the global Performance Standards at this stage. As such, the questions were
aligned to the relevant critical control entities listed in Appendix B in Tables B.4 and B.5.
After aligning the questions to global Performance Standard entities, they were given a code to
identify them within the bow-tie environment. Additionally, the critical control questions within the
inspections were numbered. This was done to support data entry personnel in correctly transcribing
the data, should multiple of the same critical control questions follow each other in sequence. The
resulting changes can be seen in Figure 6.5.
Several changes are visible in the example of final workplace inspection design. The critical control
questions are numbered sequentially in the first column. Another change is the addition of a second
column before the actual question that specifies with which entity it should be matched within the
Bow-tie environment.
Thirdly, a new critical control question is added (no.3 going by the first column), that determines
the status of the emergency stop button along the conveyor belt. The coding supports understanding
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Figure 6.5: Example of final design change of the workplace inspections
of this entry through clarification of MHS in the first three letters, frequency in the second, and
lastly which question specifically should be filled in. When examining the code applied to critical
control question 2, it specifies (E)quipment (S)afe(G)uarding-(M)onthly.Question(06).
That does not mean that data entry personnel have to look up the questions. Instead, they are
lined up straight below eachother, specifying both sequential number and code. The only task left
then is to match each corresponding question. One such audit can be seen in Figure 6.6.
Figure 6.6: Example audit within the Bow-tie environment
The example audit in Figure 6.6 does not match the questions in Figures 6.4 and 6.5. However, the
sequential nature of the questions is clearly visible with no questions irrelevant to critical controls
clouding the data. Additionally, actions put out in the EMS can be added as remarked in the
workplace inspections. Due to limited access to the audit environment of the bow-tie environment,
an older example had to be used in which the sequential numbering before the questions had not
yet been added and the MHS were still only coded by two letters. In the example in Figure 6.6, the
questions refer to (C)onfined (S)pace-(Q)uarterly questions. Because those asked in the quarterly
audits are only asked once per audit, the sequential coding of questions is already embedded.
Because the actions taken to remedy control non-compliances have a number that is noted in
the inspection, the action can be tracked in relationship to the issue found. This enables a new
avenue of approach into performance monitoring, as it also gains the capability to show how long it
takes to close out a maintenance request. Based on the average close-out time, new priorities can
be set if necessary.
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6.4.6. Process Optimization
The process found at SDGM had been through multiple iterations, increasing its complexity
beyond what was strictly necessary. During these iterations, questions were merely added without
considering their duplicate use elsewhere. Because the process in its original form was considered
somewhat cumbersome, a platform for changing the workplace inspections with employees was
created through asserting the goal of achieving more, while doing less.
In line with “Lean and Green” operations as set out in Section 5.1 of Systems Design, the process
was then optimized to make the workplace inspections as effective as possible. At the beginning of
the project, the workplace inspections were found to be the product of years of small, incremental
additions with little consideration for the overall usefulness of the process. This resulted in a
bloated, cumbersome process. In order to fulfil objectives as set out by the requirements from
AGA, the assessment of the process was used as a complete re-evaluation of the monthly workplace
inspection process.
The re-evaluation was done with the intent of the safety representatives in mind. The questions
in the workplace inspections were assessed according to the questions:
• Does this question add value to the level of occupational safety at Sunrise Dam?
• Is the question specific in its requirements for satisfactory answers?
• Is the question relevant for the current state of the inspections?
If any of these above requirements was answered unsatisfactory, the question was assessed for
potential modification to fit the requirements set out above. If this was not feasible, the question
was slated from the inspection. Questions related to hygiene in and around workplace areas were
assessed not to be the task of safety representatives as these are already carried out by the business
services contractor on site. Questions that did not satisfy the second requirement were for instance:
• Is the safety signage in place?
• Is the area well ventilated?
The first question does not make an accurate assessment, as a single instance of safety signage is
enough to mark answer the question yes or sufficient. The second question requires the auditor
to be completely knowledgeable on the ventilation requirements in different sections of the mine.
Both types of questions were modified to include the specific demands of their respective locations
in the mine.
Some examples of questions that did not meet the third requirement were all questions related
to a battery charging station no longer in place. An entire inspection for a paste plant was
withdrawn as the paste plant in question was no longer in use. The inspection was being done until
that time, however. The result being an inspection filled out with all questions NA. Another entire
inspection was removed as well as designating two entire inspections for full re-evaluation. Other
questions withdrawn through the third requirement related to the assessment of operators in the
workplace themselves.
After addition of the critical control questions and completing the re-evaluation of the workplace
inspections on site, the new workplace inspections were validated with operators working in the
various sections of the mine site through manual assessment. Through the validation process,
small changes were made to the inspections to reflect the actual state of the mine. After completion
of the verification and validation steps, the dataflow from finished inspections had to be drawn into
an automated system for further analysis.
6.4.7. Resulting changes for process
After addition of the critical control questions and completing the re-evaluation of the workplace
inspections on site, the new workplace inspections were validated with operators working in the
various sections of the mine site through manual assessment. Through the validation process,
small changes were made to the inspections to reflect the actual state of the mine. After completion
of the verification and validation steps, the dataflow from finished inspections had to be drawn
into an automated system for further analysis. The re-evaluation of the workplace inspections and
integration led to:
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• The removal of two entire workplace inspections
• Overall reduction in workload of 18% or net change of -341 questions
• Addition or modification of 316 critical control questions (21% of total remaining questions)
Because the net change of questions is negative, widespread support was generated for the
integration of critical controls into the process. When assessing the 316 critical control questions
in the workplace inspections, their potential for further quantitative analysis was assessed based
on the spread of critical controls assessed across the mine site. The critical control questions in
workplace inspections cover:
• 35 out of 117 or 30% of critical controls relevant to mine site
• These critical controls cover all MHS relevant to the mine site
• 37% questions relate to engineering controls, the rest (63%) being administrative controls.
Especially the last observation generated interest among senior AngloGold Ashanti officials, as
the fraction of engineering controls is higher than was first assumed. In fact, it shows that the
percentage of engineering controls is 2.5 higher than looking at the absolute number of different
critical controls. For other operations and companies implementing critical controls, it means that
the relative abundance and vulnerability of administrative controls only becomes an issue if the
balance is not adequately redressed through a higher frequency of similar engineering controls.
Additionally, the workplace inspection process now adds 3,792 data points on a yearly basis. This
is more than three times the amount of 1,150 assessments that was estimated in Paragraph 6.2.3,
thus given a much more comprehensive view of controls in place on the shopfloor.
6.5. Integration into bow-tie environment
While the workplace inspection feature an intermediate step with regards to data entry, both the
supervisor and manager level questions can directly be utilized through the auditing part of the
software. Once these processes are started, adaptation into the bow-tie environment is immediately
possible and practical.
With the workplace inspection process however, adaptation into the bow-tie environment was
more difficult. Although the environment allows audit forms to be sent out to any given user, any
question is only allowed to be asked once in the form. This becomes a problem when controls
questions have to be asked multiple times per inspection. Going back to the example with the
crusher installation in figure 6.2, the same question has to be asked multiple regarding guarding
of conveyor belts.
This issue could possibly be resolved by making separate questions for each of the control
verification steps in the bow-tie environment. As SDGM already has 316 verifications, that
would lead to thousands of different questions amongst all AngloGold Ashanti operations. To
administrate such an amount of detail would be a job onto itself. Keeping in line with "KISS",
using the same question multiple times allows reduction of 316 verifications into 48 Performance
Standard elements. This in turn allowed for much more straightforward performance review
against company standard.
For the company that distributes the software package, identifying this specific gap was seen
as very valuable. Unfortunately they were willing nor able to adapt their audit forms to allow
multiple inclusion of the same question within scope of the research. It is set on their internal
timeline as a deliverable, yet no target could be given as to when this could be resolved.
The fact that data acquisition in the workplace inspection process is disconnected from the
necessity for direct feedback into the system, allows storage of that data until the integration issue
can be resolved. The identified process of Safety Observations could be implemented similarly
to the quarterly and yearly audits, therefore not running into similar issues as the workplace
inspection piece. As the quarterly audits were being implemented into the bow-tie environment
simultaneously, that process could be utilized as feed to further tailor the BI environment to
AngloGold Ashanti requirements. Any data generated during modelling and dashboard creation
will thus primarily contain quarterly audit data.
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6.6. Data Import and Modelling
During critical control integration of workplace inspections, importing data into the regional data
warehouse was implemented through collaboration with the AGA Australia BI team. In order to
do so, the servers on which the bow-tie environment is hosted were identified. After analysis it
was found that data stored in the bow-tie environment was based on SQL, a Microsoft Database
language which is also applied in the Data Warehouse. Importing critical control data therefore
only required a request to be put out with the required level of access for the bow-tie environment.
After the data had been put into the data warehouse, the different matrices that were imported
had to be related in order to make sense of the core concepts of a bow-tie model. Before that could
successfully be done, a Unified Modelling Language (UML) model was made to better understand
the nature and relationships and data within a generic bow-tie model. The reason for creating of
such a model was that the system needs to be sustainable for further amendments, if necessary.
Ensuring the system is easily understandable is a critical element of the life cycle cost of the
system, as software maintenance consumes about 40-80% of the total software development cost
(Fernández-Sáez et al, 2016). Of that cost, about 50% is spent on comprehension of the software
(Bashir et al, 2016).
Model-driven Software Engineering has been demonstrated to improve efficiency and effective-
ness in various studies (Brambel et al, 2012), with UML being one of the most applied methods in
object-based modelling (Bashir et al, 2016). A UML class diagram denotes the cardinality between
the different objects in the data. These UML associations are called object relationships, and can
take on various forms. In the UML model created for understanding of the underlying data, only
one relationship is used : one to many, denoted as 1 to 1 .. n or 1 to 1 .. n. An example of this
relationship is one hazard being related to a variety of causes. Similarly to the bow-tie model itself,
the hazard or top event is central to the UML model, which can be viewed in Figure 6.7.
The UML diagram was developed specifically for relating bow-tie models and the audits that
relate to them. The model in Figure 6.7 demonstrates the straightforward nature of the extracted
arrays. Additionally, no distinction is made between the nature of inspections/audits and their
respective questions. This means that once the data is generated in the bow-tie environment, it is
immediately assessable as input for the BI environment. Once the audits allow not just singular
questions but their repeated use, the data can immediately be forwarded to the dashboards.
6.6.1. Event Management System
During systems design, integration of the Event Management System (EMS) was targeted as a
primary data source for a lagging indicator on critical control performance. Although the EMS
was already integrated with the Regional Data Warehouse, no addition into the critical control BI
environment was achieved. In order to make the data within the EMS applicable to critical control
management, a slight change is required within the format of incident reporting. Both Australian
sites have the capacity to add their own fields to incident registration, requiring such things as
who reported the incident, to whom, when and where an incident took place. When a drop-down
menu is added that specifies the Major Hazard Standard involved in the incident, the case studies
that are done in Chapter 7, can be repeated for any newly generated data.
6.7. Dashboard creation for end users
Data analytics demonstrate the effortless way in which someone can drill down in the data
generated through the critical control assessments. To do this, dashboards have to be generated
based on measures in the data. Essentially, the data has turned into a series of pivot tables which
can now be manipulated to suit the users’ wishes. An example of a dashboard generated for users
can be seen in Figure 6.8.
Based on the selection of the control with the largest number of absolute non-compliances issues,
the non-compliance trend for this control can be shown within the domain of a single department.
This allows a department to immediately focus on that control, while tracking progression of the
trend in with which the data moves. An example of a control and its selected implications can be
seen in Figure 6.9.
By using a slicer function that can sort the data hierarchically within the organization, every
single stakeholder can track his own non-compliance issues and set out actions to mitigate them.
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Figure 6.7: UML diagram detailing the relationships of arrays generated for bow-tie models
This allows for an evidence-based approach of solving operational risk on every level of the
organization. Not only does it allow stakeholders to take action based on enduring trends or spikes
in incidents, it also simplifies reporting with regards to critical controls. Any MHS or critical
control compliance level can be immediately brought to the attention of auditors. As such, safety
specialists and supporting personnel can help develop measures to specifically help local managers
instead of only looking at the general data. Furthermore, any sudden increase in issues can be
picked up to mitigate emergent risks. This is of particular importance in mining, as conditions in
the mine change over time. Aspects that play a role in these changing conditions are for instance
depth, ground conditions, water inflow and seasonality.
6.8. Implications for other sites
The integration of critical controls into the workplace inspection process can be considered suc-
cessful for SDGM. Its implementation has provided an offline capacity, operator based, low-level
technical inspection process for critical control management. These three aspects provide ample
potential for integration in other sites. Workplace inspections are required within mining reg-
ulations in Australia, South America and South Africa, with varying degrees of requirements
in continental Africa. As such, these processes are already available for potential integration.
Through use of existing, offline infrastructure and a low license structure, once it is implemented it
provides extensive data for little expense. The key here is "after implementation". For a relatively
small operation like Sunrise Dam, it took one person 2.5 months to implement the process. Main
cost associated with the implementation of critical controls will thus be around the use of a safety
specialist assisting with integrating critical controls into existing processes.
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Figure 6.8: View of a BI dashboard demonstrating amount of positive compliance, relative compliance and all answer values
Figure 6.9: Working Example - View of a BI dashboard demonstrating amount of positive compliance, relative compliance
and all answer values
Implementation of critical control management at other sites should use a phased approach.
Although changing operations for the better, resistance to change remains a constant, as noted for
AngloGold Ashanti in the context of its South African mining operations (Robbins, 2010). In terms
of adopting critical control management, integrating the workplace inspections per site would be
the best option with respect to changing the existing situation as actual process optimization can
be realised. However, due to the current inability of the bow-tie environment to adapt the used
form of inspections into the system, other operations are advised to move forward with quarterly
audits first.
While it implements another process, its coverage of 225 Performance Standard elements
covers 41% of the entire required company standard. Through quarterly updates, trends in system
behaviour can already be noted a half year after implementation. Additionally, critical control
awareness is raised on the supervisor level, which benefits both subsequent manager and operator
learning.

7
Case Studies
Two separate case studies were conducted to ascertain the potential for critical control monitoring
and safety decision-making at Sunrise Dam Gold Mine. Additionally, these serve as a validation
study for use of incident data as a lagging indicator for critical control performance, as specified
in research sub-question 4. The case studies both target a single Major Hazard Standard with
one focusing on underground Ground Control and the other on underground Fire. Within the
scope of these hazards, the case study on Ground Control focuses on incident prevention and thus
preventative controls. Contrarily, the case study on underground Fire focuses on reactive controls,
specifically the critical control Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF). It is the only reactive critical
control in the MHS for Fire, and one of the only engineering critical controls on the reactive side
of any bow-tie model within the scope of SDGM. The goal of both case studies was to look into
systemic issues potentially affecting critical controls, while providing guiding principles for other
studies in this domain.
First, the scope of both case studies is discussed. Next, the case study for underground Fire is
examined. Subsequently the different aspects related to prevention of Ground Control incidents
underground are assessed. Finally, lessons learned from both case studies will be drawn up into a
conclusion relating the effectiveness of critical controls back to the incidents studied.
7.1. Scope
In this chapter incidents over a 5 year time period from July 2012 until July 2017 will be assessed.
The incidents related were obtained from the Event Management System based on keyword
searches and subsequently filtered on relevance. The data is used to validate the CCMS put in
place with the goal of improving risk management. Therefore systemic and emergent risks are the
focus of investigation. In order to implement the presented level of analysis in the BI environment
of CCMS, the relevant MHS should be linked to an incident. Addition of this feature is technically
feasible in incident reporting. It is even possible to add failure of specific critical controls to an
incident, unfortunately this could not be achieved during the scope of this research. However, to
use such a system efficiently means that relevant personnel should be knowledgeable in MHS’s
and their implications. Furthermore, where adding the correct MHS to an incident is a relatively
straightforward decision, finding the correct failed critical control requires a lot more knowledge.
7.1.1. Underground Fire
With respect to the incidents related to underground fire, 57 instances of incidents were found in
the aforementioned time-period. These include both actual and potential incidents. It is important
to keep in mind that these 57 instances could have led to a fire, but might have been reduced to
near misses due to adequate response and controls in place. The specific pathway in which AFFF
is applied can be seen in Figure 7.1.
In the bow-tie model, AFFF is a critical control mitigating the possible consequence of damage
to equipment. All other pathways can be viewed within the entire right half of the Bow-tie model
in Appendix C in Figure C.3. While another pathway after the top event regarding underground
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Figure 7.1: The pathway from top event until consequence in which AFFF is applied
fire focusses on potential human injury, none of the incidents within this case study have triggered
the use of other critical controls such as rescue chambers. The scoping on AFFF keeps the area
of investigation confined to the immediate area of the affected vehicle, something that will prove
useful in the elaboration of the case study.
7.1.2. Underground Ground Control
While underground fires are relatively easy to classify, ground control issues can be considered a
broader category of incidents. This case study contains 74 instants that (potentially could) have
impacted ground control within the mine. This research is dependent on the data submitted in the
incident reports. Like the learning organization in HRO’s, near-misses are reported. How many
incidents go unreported could not be established. Instead of looking at only one critical control
after a top event as in the case of UG fire, the entire left hand side of the Bowtie diagram for
Underground Ground Control is examined. Because the model assessed is rather comprehensive,
merely the critical controls and the main causes within the model will be assessed. The full model
up until the top event for Ground Control can be found in Appendix C in Figures C.1 and C.2.
7.2. Case 1: Underground Fires at SDGM
As discussed in paragraph 2.4.2, operational safety risk is the product of probability and conse-
quences of Material Unwanted Events (MUE’s) within AngloGold Ashanti mining sites. Thus the
risk experienced over the past five years can be described as the probability of all underground
fire events and the aggregate of all related consequences. To quantify the exact amount of risk
experienced by AngloGold Ashanti with respect to underground fire would require establishing a
measure for probability of all related incidents. This is out of scope for the case study.
Instead this case study focussed on doing an analysis of all underground fire incidents within
the mine to pinpoint target areas for improvements in firefighting capacity. Essentially only the
right hand side of the bow-tie diagram was examined, with extra attention paid to the effectiveness
of the critical control Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF). Using data gathered over the last five
years and a half several assessments were made with respect to firefighting capacity, AFFF and its
applicability, fire sources and predictions regarding escalation. Additionally, other critical controls
were assessed to give an indication of the expected effectiveness of the entire model with regards to
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mitigation of underground fires at SDGM.
7.2.1. Aqueous Film Forming Foam
To understand why Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) is the focus of the case study on under-
ground fire, one has to look at the causes of underground fire within the scope of SDGM. All but
two of the 57 instances were caused by a form of vehicle malfunctioning, such as liquid on spraying
on hot engine parts after a line burst. Similar results are corroborated in a study by de Rosa (2004).
Because the source of fire in all cases at the mine was a vehicle, the scope is limited to combating
vehicle fires with the help of AFFF. If the AFFF system on the vehicle was not used or was not
effective, recommendations are made to what controls might replace or support the AFFF system
in containing and quelling instances of fire.
7.2.2. Risk: Potential for Underground Fire
Because it is the right hand side of the bow-tie diagram that is of interest, probability of the incident
is not as much the focus as is the potential severity of the incident. As Hansen and Ingason (2013)
have demonstrated, it is not unfeasible for a drilling jumbo without petroleum-based fuel to burn
up beyond all repair using solely the hydraulic tank, lines and tires as fuel. Some incidents reports
found have incidated that AFFF was needed with the help of three handheld fire extinguishers,
pointing in no uncertain direction to the timely reaction of operators and their prevention of a
worse outcome.
As stated in Paragraph 5.1.3, incidents on site are registered with a potential and an actual
outcome as part of an obligatory risk assessment done to review the incident. A scatter plot for the
potential incident severity plotted over the last five and a half years can be seen in Figure 7.2.
Figure 7.2: Risk scores attributed to the incidents plotted as scatter against time frame of case study
It shows two trends that have occurred since January 2012. First is a trend that the relative
frequency of incidents has decreased severely until 2015 and has since picked up again slightly. The
second trend revolves around a relative decrease in the severity of incidents. The three incidents
with the highest potential (29 or major) all occurred in 2012 or January 2013.
On the absolute scale of the AGA risk matrix, 29 is on the second to highest consequence level
indicating a fatality or multiple severe disablements, a financial loss of 10-50$ million dollar and/or
serious adverse media/public/NGO attention. Something that illustrates the relative decline in
incidents as well as decreasing severity is when the scatterplot is aggregated as a 6 month moving
average scale over 1 month increments, which can be viewed in Figure 7.3.
Because no data is available before January 2012, the moving average only starts to be valid
after July 2012. The Y-axis represents a relative risk score reminiscent of, but not equal to the
values in the AGA risk matrix. The value for the moving average curve has been achieved through
the use of a one-sided 6 month moving average (Hyndman, 2011). Often used for uncomplicated
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Figure 7.3: Moving average curve of potential risk score for fire incidents over the time-frame of case study
forecasting, such a formula was deemed adequate for indicating total risk exposure for any given
moment in time based on the incidents in the six months before it.
The equation used above is the same as the one used in the case study for fall of ground incidents.
This allows establishing a relative severity between the two cases in terms of overall impact on
the underground mining operation. What can be seen in Figure 7.3 is the rising potential for
underground fires until a high point of 33.1 on April 10th 2013, rapidly declining until a low-point
of 2.9 on March 9th 2015 almost two years later. After the low-point there is a slight increase again
hovering somewhere in the 10-16 range. In order to establish what the causes of these trends are,
the incidents will have to be examined more closely.
7.2.3. Causes of Fire incidents
As discussed in Section 7.2, all but two incidents originated from the malfunctioning of a vehicle in
or with potential to be in the underground workings. Further specifying the origin of the fire will
require determine several factors, being the following:
• Vehicle Type
• Fire Source
• Fire Type
The fire type is of special concern here, as it is both a determinant in the ultimate potential of the
incident as well as an important aspect with regards to applicable firefighting methods.
7.2.4. Vehicle Types
In Figure 7.4, a distribution of the different vehicles in the incidents can be seen.
Together, underground hauling trucks, light vehicles (LV’s) and integrated tool carrier’s (IT’s, a
multipurpose front loader) account for 71% of all underground fire related incidents on-site. Utility
trucks and cement trucks account for another 12% of the incidents, with the rest of machinery
(16%) is mainly used in or near production areas. To illustrate how vehicle types as a source of fire
have changed over time, vehicle categories have been plotted as areas under the moving average
graph as shown in Figure 7.3 to illustrate their respective significance over time in Figure 7.5.
Evident from the plot in Figure 7.5 is that in 2012 a significant fraction of the vehicle types used
underground was subject to one or more incidents concerning fire. Contrarily, 2013 shows that a
significant portion of incidents was solely due to underground trucks. The decrease seen from April
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Figure 7.4: Distribution of vehicles as a fire source at SDGM
2013 until March 2015 in the aggregated risk score in Figure 7.5 can therefore be largely attributed
to the elimination of IT fires and the extensive decrease in fires on underground hauling trucks.
The increase seen from March 2015 until mid-2017 can conversely be attributed to a resurgence in
underground hauling truck fires followed by an increase in fires on LV’s.
The decrease in underground hauling truck related incidents has in part been due to a re-
evaluation of the supplier and vehicle type and phasing out the fleet for a new, less fire-prone
hauling truck type. It goes to show that a sequence of incidents in close succession can at partially
lead a company to evaluate their entire fleet choice. A similar fleet change has not been one of the
main factors in either the decrease in IT fires as well as the increase in LV fires. To get a better
understanding of the incidents, not only the type of vehicle but also the source of fire has to be
examined.
7.2.5. Sources of Fire
In 52 out of 54 vehicle related fires on-site, a cause was established as part of the investigation for
reinstatement of the vehicle. The two cases where a cause could not be established were both LV’s,
a source of fire that will described in more detail after underground trucks have been examined.
The goal of this paragraph is to establish if sources of fire differ significantly across different vehicle
types. The types of vehicle that will be examined with regards to the fire source are underground
hauling trucks, LV’s and IT’s. Within that scope, underground hauling trucks will be first discussed
being the largest source of incidents on site.
7.2.5.1. Underground hauling trucks
To identify if there is an underlying cause for multiple similar incidents, a reliability block diagram
(RBD) for a hauling truck will be used to categorize the different incidents involving underground
hauling trucks. The reliability block diagram used to categorize the different failure modes can be
seen in Figure 7.6.
The diagram in Figure 7.6 has been adapted from a study into the productivity improvement of
open pit mining equipment (Morad et al., 2014). Essentially a reliability block diagram functions
as a fault tree analysis in identifying common failures of machinery leading to critical failures.
Although the vehicles studied in the case study might not feature the exact same sub-systems, a
more detailed approach is not required as all fire sources correspond to one of the sub-systems
listed in the RBD. The resulting causes are then super-imposed on a RBD that only contains the
relevant branches in Figure 7.7.
Figure 7.8 shows that all but three causes lead back to either hydraulics or engine failure. The
red sections of the bars indicate that the source was a Class A or B fire, meaning a flammable
liquid or solid. The green section indicates a Class C, electrical fire. Failures with a fuel, hydraulics
or steering line are indicated with a dot and account for 13 out of 19 engine/hydraulics failures, or
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Figure 7.5: Vehicle types as contributing to moving average risk score for fire
60% of total underground hauling truck failures. Other sources of fire only account for one or two
incidents over a 5 year time scale. Finally, only two of all underground truck incidents were caused
by an electrical source.
7.2.5.2. Light Vehicles
The only category that was not explicitly built for mining are light vehicles (LV’s). These are often
durable 4x4 off-road pick-ups or passenger cars. For simplicity’s sake, the same reliability block
diagram used for underground trucks is applied to the sources of LV fire incidents. When the
causes are super-imposed over the RBD in Figure 7.9, it becomes clear that the source of incidents
is mostly due to failure of electrical components as shown by the corresponding bar colour in Figure
7.10.
The significant portion of electrical fires directly impacts the effectiveness of AFFF, which is
typically not rated for fighting electrical fires.
7.2.5.3. Integrated Tool-carriers
The last category of investigated fire sources is that of the integrated tool-carrier. When taking
a closer look at the incidents, three of the instants were due to broken coolant hoses, one due to
the air filter being incorrectly fitted and one due to damage to the AFFF system itself. No RBD is
strictly necessary to demonstrate fire sources, as all causes for IT related fires originate within the
engine block.
7.2.6. Types of Fire
What has become clear with regards to the origins of fire on all investigated vehicle types is that
the fire source differs significantly per category. Both trucks and IT’s face a majority of B class fires,
which originate from combustible liquids such as diesel, coolant and hydraulic fluid. These types
of fires are most effectively put out when the AFFF is able to apply a smothering effect through
creation of a aqueous film across the pool of fire (Hetzer et al., 2014). LV’s however face mostly C
class fires originating in electrical circuits. Essential to fighting C class fires is de-energization of
the circuit involved as well as using a non-conductive agent such as carbon dioxide. The difference
between A/B and C class fires across vehicle types can be viewed in Figure 7.11.
The bar chart in Figure 7.11 shows that LV’s face significantly more electrical fires than other
types of vehicles. If LV’s are more prone to electrical fires could not be determined from literature.
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Figure 7.6: The reliability block diagram for an underground hauling truck showing the different subsystems of the vehicle,
most notably the engine and its subsystems.
7.2.7. Outcomes of Fire Incidents
The most prevalent vehicle types and failure modes have now been established. This will help sup-
port the assertions made in the outcomes of the events and the effectiveness of measures developed
to combat these incidents. None of the incidents categorized as relevant for this case study caused
a fire to be uncontrolled for any significant amount of time. Hansen (2017) demonstrates that
similar vehicles have been entirely lost as a result of unattendance. In SDGM, no such cases were
recorded and in all cases the operator on-duty was able to quell the fire before it escalated beyond
his or her control. This is also a sign of competency with respect to the operators involved at SDGM.
Subsequently, no injuries were sustained during any of the incidents in this study. This is reflected
in the actual outcome as given in the risk assessment accompanying the incident reports:
• Insignificant: 23
• Minor: 28
• Moderate: 1
Similarly to the risk curve presented in Paragraph 7.2.2, the actual outcome of the events can be
plotted as a 6 month moving average curve over the last 5 years which can be seen in Figure 7.12.
The graph in Figure 7.12 shows that the actual impact has been reduced by an order of magnitude.
This is expected as it relates to the risk matrix score given in both instances. As the potential for an
outcome does not change, movement on the risk matrix is only vertical as discussed in Paragraph
2.4.3. The graph demonstrates another possiblity in terms of risk quantification. Because the
absolute amount of risk reduction is known, attributable factors can now be used to indicate
relative importance of mititgation factors. Naturally, operator conduct is one of, if not the most
important factor at play. Other things that may be influenced by human behaviour include usage
of a fire extinguisher, disconnection of the battery or engine, self-extinguishing, or the use of AFFF.
7.2.8. Potential for escalation
That is not to say a severe incident cannot happen. In a study by Hansen and Ingason (2013), two
underground vehicles were ignited to measure heat release rates of the subsequent fires. In both
instances a Class B fires was the primary source. Any fire of a similar nature therefore has at least
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Figure 7.7: Failures super-imposed on RBD for underground
trucks
Figure 7.8: Bar diagram showing the discrep-
ancy in fire sources on underground trucks
Figure 7.9: Failures super-imposed on RBD
for LV’s
Figure 7.10: Bar diagram showing the discrep-
ancy in fire sources on LV’s
some potential of leading to a complete burning of the vehicle. Unfortunately, no conclusive data
was available to investigate the risk potential of electrical fires.
As the vehicle types involved have changed over time, so have the fire causes. In Figure 7.13,
the type of fires has been projected as area under the graph in Figure 7.3 to indicate what the
potential for each of the different fire sources was for the last 5 years.
If the fire class is then related to the critical control AFFF a measure of its potential effectiveness
over time can be assessed. This is done by first assessing what the actual effectiveness of AFFF
was in incidents in which it was used. In incidents where only AFFF was used, it was the single
measure that reduced the incident from its potential to its actual outcome. Again, the risk score
can be superimposed on the risk score to visually quantify the risk reduction achieved through use
of AFFF, which can be seen in Figure 7.14.
Additionally, there are the incidents where AFFF was used in conjunction with other firefighting
methods, primarily dry chemical powder extinguishers. Of these incidents there is not enough
detail to ascertain exactly how much of the firefighting was due to AFFF. What is clear however, is
that AFFF alone was not able to completely put out the fire, thus at least partially failing in its
task. This can be added to the moving average curve as a zone of medium confidence in the control.
There is a last category of incidents where the AFFF could have been used, but was not used
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Figure 7.11: Fire types as plotted across vehicle types
due to whatever circumstance dictating the response at the time of the incident. This is only the
case for Class B fires across the different vehicle types. These incidents can be classified as a
zone of low-confidence. For the purpose of this study these were not quantified in the figure as to
overstate the significance of this portion of risk reduction. Together, these give the potential for the
use of AFFF within SDGM over the last 5 years, and can be viewed in Figure 7.15.
The diagrams above show that AFFF has played a significant part in risk reduction. The effect
can be quantified as the area for each of the different confidence zones, being:
• High: 14.3%
• Medium: 12.0%
Together this represents a little over a quarter of total risk reduction. Perhaps the more
interesting thought however, is the fact that the potential for risk reduction through AFFF has
also changed over time. Figure 7.16 shows that the relative potential for risk reduction, using both
the compound and the individual confidence classes shows a decline when moving from 2012 until
2017.
The major cause of this is the change of a majority underground hauling truck fires to LV fires
and the difference in fire types across these vehicles. That is where associating costs and possible
benefits with regards to critical controls comes into play. The fleet size has remained the same
over life of mine in the timespan examined in this case study and so have the AFFF systems. This
means that the costs associated with the control also remained the same. One of the reasons for
this is that diesel powered, turbo-charged vehicles rated above 125 KW have to be equipped with
an AFFF system under Australian law (Department of Minerals and Petroleum, 1997). Therefore
capex and opex have remained the same while (potential) effectiveness has gone down.
This is the issue with fighting symptoms instead of the underlying issue. Only after the fire
has started will the AFFF be used or remain unused, demonstrating its effectiveness in the
process. Especially solutions that are not in a way “one-size-fits-all” like rescue chambers, the
one-dimensional side of controls has to be considered. The only engineering critical control in the
Major Hazard Standard for Fire is a method of fighting class A&B fires on underground vehicles,
regardless of their proneness to these kinds of fire.
7.2.9. Discussion of other (critical) controls
If we look back at Figure 7.1, the only critical that prevents a loss of control fire event from
escalating to "damage to equipment due to fire" is the AFFF system. In this paragraph a brief
discussion is presented reflecting on the "critical" nature of the control.
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Figure 7.12: The 6 month moving average curve of actual impact plotted against potential impact
Looking back at the definition given in Section 4.3, the AFFF does qualify as a critical control.
It mitigates MUE’s, prevents event escalation and can be used for multiple risks. That is, it
can be applied in class A and B fires. But when a portable Dry Chemical Powder (DCP) Fire
Extinguisher is examined, it factually does the same. Both are operator activated, yet a DCP
extinguisher also applies to class C electrical fires. Arguably, the presence of a DCP extinguisher
should then be qualified as a critical control as well. Comparing effectiveness of both systems, the
DCP extinguisher participated in 26 of 57 incidents, often assisting where AFFF was not effective.
In 19 cases, the AFFF worked as intended. A case can be made that a DCP extinguisher is more
effective, has more purpose and can be used at all affected areas. However, the distinction has to
be made that while the AFFF works automatically, the operator has to physically approach and
fight the fire to use the DCP extinguisher effectively.
However, none of both controls matter if not for intervention of the operator present. In all but
one cases at SDGM, the operator on duty was the first to notice the signs of fire. This is thus a key
element of figrefighting on underground machinery: it is the operator that is the first and most
important line of defence. This is alluded to in the bow-tie model, where fire response training for
all personnel is listed as an administrative, non-critical control.
As discussed in Section 2.3, this is a misconception often had in the building of bow-tie models.
The training does not actually prevent escalation of fires. Instead, it is a tool which validates that
the control will work, when depended on. Consciously or not, putting "fire response by operator"
literally in the bow-tie model might rub stakeholders the wrong way. It is a way of saying: "if
the machine catches fire, we expect the operator to try and deal with it". The emphasis here is
on trying. Meaning, an operator is responsible nor accountable for quelling the fire. Should the
situation require retreat due to excess heat, an operator is expected to move away from the scene.
However, the pathway discussed controls mitigating damage to assets, not human injury. It
must be concluded that in this pathway, operator response is without a doubt the most important
control. While defined at AngloGold Ashanti as an administrative control, literature shows that
AFFF, DCP extinguishers and operator fire response could fall in the same category of socio-
technological controls (de Ruijter and Guldenmund, 2016). Until an automatic fire suppression
system is fitted a true engineering control is implemented. Then the question remains if it is
applicable to the fire and the location at hand. In a way, reactive critical controls will always
remain a form of symptom killing instead of addressing the “true” issue. As the underlying issues
change in the operation, so does the potential and thus value of a critical control.
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Figure 7.13: Fire types plotted as a 6 month moving average at SDGM
7.3. Case 2: Underground Ground Control
The case study on underground ground control will focus on prevention of incidents and thus the
left hand side of the bow-tie diagram developed for SDGM. The potential of this approach lies in the
fact that the aim becomes eliminating the cause of incidents, instead of solely fighting symptoms of
the underlying causes. The goal of this chapter is to look past the immediate incidents and, like the
previous case study, develop ideas on the patterns influencing incidents. The analysis will focus on
the critical controls in place and ways in which these can be used more efficiently. To accomplish
that, a risk pattern will first be established for the timeframe from January 2012 until July
2017. Secondly, the incidents relevant to ground control will be assessed in separately designated
categories. Lastly, probable causes will be specified within each of the incident categories.
As the bow-tie model for ground control is quite extensive, the full extend of the left hand side
of the model can be found in Appendix C. The identified causes of ground controls issues within the
model are as follows:
• Unsuitable Mine Design
• Less than Adequate ground support
• Drill and Blast practices
• Excavation interaction
• Rock mass characteristics
• Discrete geological features
• Seismicity
• Pit wall Integrity
• Access to non-active areas
The identified causes form an exhaustive list of possible ways in which ground control could be
negatively impacted. In the next few paragraphs, categories of incidents will be discussed as found
at SGDM. Although these might not directly relate to the causes listed, the case study will conclude
with an analysis of their adequacy. Like fault tree analysis example on strain burst in Figure 2.2
in Chapter 2, intermediate causes will be used to explain some of the underlying issues.
7.3.1. Risk: Potential for underground Fall of Ground
Like the incidents related to underground fire, all incidents involving ground control have a risk
rating attached to them in terms of their risk potential. Using the same methodology used in the
previous case study, the potential risk score of the underground ground control incidents is plotted
as a scatter plot in Figure 7.17.
78 7. Case Studies
Figure 7.14: AFFF reduction with high confidence over time-frame study
Figure 7.15: AFFF reduction plotted with confidence zones over 5 year time-frames
In this scatterplot, no pattern or trend is clearly distinguishable. That would imply that as opposed
the fire incidents, ground control has improved nor deteriorated significantly since January 2012.
The only noticeable effect is the notion that the frequency of incidents exceeding the threshold for
"high potential" have increased since January 2015. To identify if the frequency of incidents has
increased, a 6 month moving average line is plotted in Figure 7.18, applying the same methodology
as used in Figure 7.3.
As opposed to Figure 7.3, no trend is distinguishable from the moving average curve. As with
the underground fire incidents, a major change did take place during the timeframe in which the
data was gathered. In early 2013, a change was made to using fiber shotcrete instead of unadded
shotcrete. The change was made after issues with the adhesion qualities of the shotcrete applied
before that time. It should follow that shotcreting incidents have thus decreased since, something
which can be explored through examination of causes related to fall of ground.
7.3.2. Causes of Ground Control incidents
Within the case study a wide variety of incidents have been classified as related to ground control.
All 54 instances were at least partly due to the fact that ground control integrity was impacted.
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Figure 7.16: Potential of risk reduction for high and medium confidence classes of AFFF
This led to a variety of incident categories, where all of the incidents in one category are related in
nature. These categories are:
• Scaling: 15
• Stope Rilling: 15
• Unplanned Breakthroughs: 10
• Shotcreting Application: 9
• Supporting Operations: 8
• Operator Procedure 3
• Impact through blasting 3
• Build-up of salt 3
Through assessing the separate categories, cause analysis can be done to indicate if the loss of
ground control was precipitated by design or changing conditions. To see if trends can be identified
on a yearly basis, a graph was made representing the different incidents categories which can be
seen in Figure 7.19.
Within the graph, no specific upward or downward trend is identifiable. A slight decrease however
can be seen when looking into shotcreting application, which moves from 5 incidents in 2012 to
1 incident in 2016 and 2017 together. It is important to understand that some of the incidents
are considered an acceptable loss, as controls have been put in place to maximize value extracted
elsewhere. This is especially the case for stope rilling, which will be discussed second. First
however, incidents related to scaling activities are examined. Thirdly, shotcrete application and
supporting operations will be discussed, as they are individual categories but with significant
overlap. Finally, several minor categories are reviewed.
7.3.3. Scaling
The single most impactful category with respect to ground control issues at SGDM is that of scaling
incidents. A technique used to check for loose rocks before continuing operations underground,
scaling is one of the most hazardous tasks required in any mine. The purpose of scaling is to make
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Figure 7.17: Scatter-plot of the risk potential of fall of ground incidents at SDGM
Figure 7.18: Fall of ground incidents plotted as a 6 month moving average at SDGM
sure rocks do not unexpectedly come down when performing supporting operations under newly
exposed rock. This process is usually carried out mechanically at SDGM using hydro-scaling.
With a jumbo a high-powered jet of water is used to clear any loose rocks from the relevant face.
However, manual scaling is still carried out at SDGM as part of surveying rock conditions. All but
four incidents listed in this category involve these manual scaling activities carried out to assess
local rock conditions within the mine.
Close to a quarter of all ground controls incidents would be eliminated if scaling issues could be
resolved. Therefore a closer look into the underlying trends and patterns is necessary. In Figure
7.20, scaling incidents are plotted per year against the areas in which the incidents occurred.
What can be seen in Figure 7.20 is that scaling incidents concentrate in the GQ and Dolly/Vogue
sections of the ore body. Except for 2013, scaling incidents have occurred over the entire time-frame
from 2012 to 2017. As scaling explicitly targets less supported or unsupported areas, it could
follow that the likelihood of ground instability during scaling is higher in areas with poor ground
conditions. According to the geotechnical department at SDGM, the only area where conditions are
noticeably worse than else is at the bottom of Cosmo East. This area is in the middle-bottom of the
image in Figure 7.20. Unfortunately, no detailed maps of geological features were available at the
time of study. It is therefore uncertain if localized geological features have played a role in causing
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Figure 7.19: Ground Control incident categories plotted per year
incidents.
It could be theorized that local ground conditions are not the underlying issue that is causing
scaling incidents. An assessment of the impact of scaling incidents concluded that 9 out of 15 cases
specified an injury to have occurred while another two incidents have falling rocks hit scaling
operators. Furthermore, two more incidents have rocks falling dangerously close to operators or
in places occupied a short time-frame ago. In total, 11 out 15 times a rock made contact with two
additional near-miss incidents. The reason this category is considered more significant than stope
rilling is that scaling incidents represent the only category of incidents leading to injury.
To see if critical controls cover these scaling incidents, the relevant pathways in the bow-
tie model can be examined. None of the pathways in the greater model explicitly cover scaling,
however two relate to the partial cause of scaling incidents: Rock Mass Characteristics and Discrete
Geological features. The bow-tie pathway for Rock mass characteristics can be seen in Figure 7.21.
In the pathway of Figure 7.21 two critical controls are present. The first, which is called
excavation monitoring, deals with holistic mine planning, having surveying systems online that
monitor rock mass behaviour as new parts of the mine are opened. It deals with having people who
perform surveillance being adequately trained. This is the category of employees that is involved
in scaling elements: surveyors, geologists and development operators. In Figure 7.22, the bow-tie
pathways for discreet geological features can be viewed.
While the bow-tie pathway in Figure 7.22 features structural interpretation as a control, it is
not categorized as a critical control. As such, no Performance Standards have yet been drawn up at
a Group level to reflect the nature of this control.
Because the incident registration did often not specify details nor is it the goal to assign blame,
no cause relationship was attributed to specific operators. One possible solution to eliminating
these hazards is removing the need for operators to be physically at the face. If this is not a
viable solution, re-training of personnel might help operators detect hazardous situations. While
this is already specified in the Performance Standard related to the critical control "Excavation
Monitoring", specification on scaling and other surveying procedures might clarify what training
has to be given. The high rate of injuries and hits could suggest that operators find it difficult to
disseminate what is standard scaling procedure and what constitutes an incident. Agreeing to
report incidents when in doubt might facilitate a more detailed look into why scaling takes up such
a significant portion of ground control incidents.
Should the verfication questions within the critical control Excavation Monitoring also contain
an assessement of training programmes on scaling proficiency, this incident category could be
monitored. However, that is currently not the case and could be something that would add value to
a next iteration of control monitoring.
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Figure 7.20: Scaling incidents mapped per year within the underground workings of SDGM
7.3.4. Stope rilling
This paragraph is concerned with the phenomenon of stope rilling, which is the case of 15 out of
66 or 23% of ground controls incidents. Stope rilling is the phenomenon of a fall of ground within
the confines of an active stope. As the ore body of SDGM is extracted in hard rock conditions,
geotechnical properties of the surrounding rock allow for blasting of large open stopes. Dimensions
often exceed 20 meters in every direction leaving a significant gap on which the overlying layers of
rock press down. As the stresses on walls of a cavity underground face increasing pressure with
increasing size, these cavities face much more than average pressure compared to the rest of the
underground workings.
Combined with the fact that these stopes are not supported means that every so often, a part
of the stope collapses. This does not imply there are negative consequences, if right precautions
were taken beforehand. If no personnel was present at the time of rilling and it was limited to the
confines of the stope in question, this event posed no threat to operational safety. The way this
is solved in SDGM and many other underground mines globally is the use of remote Load-Haul-
Dumpers (LHD’s). These machines are operated by personnel sitting as far as is practical and the
teleremote system is capable.
Limiting stope rilling to the cavity itself is achieved by the construction of a bund where the
drift meets the stope. The only other procedure that has to be applied within the confines of the
stope other than extracting the ore is measuring stope dimensions as a result of blasting. This is
done through a cavity monitoring system (CMS) on a telescopic arm. An example of the use of a
telescopic arm can be seen in Figure 7.23.
An operator can control from across the bund on the side of the drift. With regards to fall of ground
incidents, this is one of the most hazardous tasks underground. Due to the close proximity to the
stope confines, rocks might still impact operational safety when rolling over the bund.
In order to get a better understanding of stope rilling at SDGM, all incidents classified as such
have been heat mapped in Figure 7.24. As only the relevant level is recorded in the incident reports,
heat spots have been accumulated when occurring on the same level and year. Furthermore, heat
spots have been drawn on the right level according to the expansion of mining areas per year.
The area impacted most during 2013 through 2015 are the GQ 1900-2000 levels. This area is
where full underground production commenced in 2013, increasing tonnage after closure of open
pit operations. The high frequency weakening towards 2016 having no 2017 incidents in 2017
might point to a more mature mine design process taking place over the years. While rock mass
characteristics might play a role, another cause for these incidents that has been specified is
Unsuitable mine design. In Figure 7.25, the pathway for unsuitable mine design in the greater
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Figure 7.21: Bow-tie pathway for rock mass characteristics as a cause of ground control incidents
bow-tie model can be viewed.
Similar critical controls as in the previous pathways can be viewed again: Excavation Moni-
toring, Geotechnical Design and Geotechnical Design. Apart from the critical controls noted in
Figure 7.25, "Long, medium, and short term mine planning" is one of the controls that may have
had significant impact since SDGM has turned to an entirely underground operation. Working in
concert with sound geotechnical design, stope rilling incidents have decreased since monitoring
these instances in 2012. However, a low probability of stope rilling could well have been included
by design and/or mine planning. This could however not be verified during research into the subject
while on-site.
If the critical control Remote Loading is fully functioning, stope rilling will not be an issue with
regards to operational safety if operators do not enter the confines of stopes.
7.3.5. Unplanned Breakthroughs
Long hole drilling is an essential step of mining operations at SDGM. In order to create a free face
needed for blasting, a so-called V30 hole drilled. This is the first step in extracting a new stope as
it provides the blasted material room to expand to when the explosives are set off. In Figure 7.26, a
diagram of this V30 hole or slot raise is presented.
In the blasting sequence in Figure 7.26, after the longhole is drilled subsequently rings 1 and 2 are
fired. After significant room is created within stope, mass blasts fire the majority of stope material.
The slot raise is at least as high as the stope, often exceeding the requirements. Risk management
wise, it is cheaper to drill slightly ahead than risk a misfire of the expansion rings. If that occurs,
significant production delay could be incurred.
Drilling slightly ahead is not always without consequence however. If the drilling operator is not
aware of an opening is present above the stope, an unplanned breakthrough can occur. This is what
precipitated in ten incidents across the timeframe of the case study. Although procedural error is
at the base of such a breakthrough, a pattern may be established using similar heat mapping like
the previous ground control categories. The unplanned breakthrough incidents can be viewed in
Figure 7.27.
What can be established from Figure 7.27 is that since 2015, only one incident in 2017 has occurred.
Additionally, most incidents were precipitated in the GQ orebody, which was excavated early into
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Figure 7.22: Bow-tie pathway for discrete geological features as a cause for ground control incidents
Figure 7.23: Cross-section of a telescopic boom for a Cavity Monitoring System
full underground production and it is one of the most developed underground areas within the
mine. Combining these factors could point to a relatively high pressure underground environment
where drifts on intermediate levels might not have been indicated on drilling plans. This can be
corroborated by the downward trend in breakthroughs, indicating a increasing level of maturity
with regards to production processes.
Similar to the bow-tie pathway for unsuitable mine design in Figure 7.25, better collaboration
between geotechnical design and mine planning could explain why unplanned breakthroughs are
trending downwards. Another bow-tie model pathway of interest when dealing with breakthroughs
is that of Excavation interaction, which can be seen in Figure 7.28.
Apart from Excavation monitoring, another critical control in the pathway in Figure 7.28
is that of Hazard Control. This critical control focuses on the identification, demarcation and
communication of geotechnical hazards. While it is not relevant to unplanned breakthroughs, this
control might however be a more effective tool in preventing scaling incidents.
Although it is not a critical control, Review of Mine Design is the most important factor in the
prevention of unplanned breakthroughs. In order to cover this discrepancy within critical controls,
a verification step might be applied to Excavation monitoring. This step verifies acknowledgement
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Figure 7.24: Heatmap of stope rilling incidents across case study time-frame
of potential interaction between mining areas in mine planning. If correct design is implemented
and an operator is aware he or she is not to drill past a denoted length, only operator conduct
remains in the way of truly preventing unplanned breakthroughs.
7.3.6. Supporting Operations
In this paragraph, incidents during general supporting operations are considered. As can be seen
in Figure 7.19, supporting operations incidents have known two years in which multiple incidents
have occurred: 2014 and 2017. If the supporting operations incidents are examined more closely,
seven out of eight incidents are clustered around a similar part of the orebody. The area in which
these incidents are clustered can be seen in Figure 7.29.
The slightly larger green ball in the Dolly/Vogue orebody represents two separate instances. The
clustering of 4 incidents in 2017 represent four similar instances in which ground conditions precip-
itated a rock fall during remote supporting operations. Ground conditions can differ significantly
across an orebody, which is not unlikely in Sunrise Dam as slocal features demonstrate strong
structural variation over short distances (Hill et al., 2014). As a new part of the orebody get
developed, these changing conditions affect the way in which supporting operations can conduct
their work. If the blasted area remains the same while conditions get worse, the integrity of ground
that needs support will decrease.
The pattern established at SDGM gives a similar impression with regards to these changing
conditions. Unfortunately, assessment of geotechnical data could not be included in the scope of
research. In the bow-tie model for ground control, a pathway is explicitly made for development of
new mining areas: drill & blast practices. In Figure 7.30, this pathway can be viewed.
What is noticeable about the pathway on drill and blast practices is that no critical controls are
present. In the pathway two controls apply to the aforementioned supporting incidents: blasting
practices and face preparation standards. As several incidents have occurred after the face was
already scaled, better face preparation might help resolve such instances. Effectively, this is
the boundary on what is, and what is not a critical control. Looking at the potential for MUE’s,
incidents in the currently discussed category have not had any potential for severe injury let alone
fatalities. As such it can be concluded that using remote machinery and extended booms is enough
to maintain operational safety.
86 7. Case Studies
Figure 7.25: Pathway for Unsuitable mine design in the ground control bow-tie model
Figure 7.26: Top view of cross-section of a sublevel stope with a V30 slot raise
7.3.7. Application of Shotcrete
The application of shotcrete and its subsequent integrity forms one of two lines of defence against
fall out in non-stope areas of the mine together with roof and wall bolting. In Figure 7.19, it was
demonstrated that incidents involving a loss of integrity with shotcrete have decreased from 5 a
year in 2012 to 2 from the beginning of 2016 until half of 2017. Yet, categorizing incidents only on
the involvement of shotcrete is merely pinpointing a symptom of several underlying issues. If the
incidents are more closely examined, several contributing factors come to light. These factors are:
• Deterioration of shotcrete over time 5
• Poor quality shotcrete applied 3
• Impact due to nearby blasting 3
• Insufficient shotcrete applied 2
One or more contributing factors might be at play in any given incident, and study have shown
shotcrete decays over time (Usman and Galler, 2013). Blasting as a contributing factor thus helps
accelerate the decay of shotcrete integrity. Furthermore, a study by Mittermayr et al. (2012) on
concrete liners of Austrian tunnels points to chemical reactions in a saline environment with
sulphates present in the surrounding rock. Similar to the environment in the study by Mittermayr
et al. (2012), the SDGM orebody features a porphyry vein system surrounded by alteration haloes
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Figure 7.27: Heatmap of unplanned breakthrough incidents at SDGM categorized per year
dominated by various combinations of pyrite, dolomitic to ankeritic carbonates and quartz (Hill
et al. 2013). Furthermore, the alteration is not symmetrically distributed around veins, and may
be absent. Changing geotechnical properties of the rock could therefore be a source of shotcrete
deterioration.
If these conditions are related to the bow-tie model for ground control, the most relevant
pathway within the ground control model points to less than adequate ground support. It may have
been adequate directly after application, but time-based deterioration and other outside factors
have reduced its effectiveness. The pathway from less than adequate support can be seen in Figure
7.31.
The most extensive of the pathways in the ground control model, the pathway from less than
adequate support to the top event, features ten controls. Two of those are designated as critical, the
previously discussed Hazard Control and Ground Support Systems. When taking a closer look at
the Performance Standard critical control ground support systems, it focuses mostly on preventing
personnel from working under unsupported ground. With validation questions on signage and
barricading, support work procedures and scheduled visual inspections, a wide range of topics is
covered.
While inspection alludes to the issue, what is really missing from this pathway is maintenance
of ground control, when needed. An inspection will not prevent ground support from failing, it
is actually monitoring, repairing and maintaining support that provides mitigation. Short of an
extensive maintenance programme, inspections ought to be conducted in older sections of the mine,
especially if nearby blasting has the potential to accelerate support deterioration.
7.3.8. Other Incident Categories
The last three categories within ground control incidents at SDGM are Operator procedure, Impact
through Blasting and Build-up of salt. Although these are minor categories, some conclusions can
be drawn on incident prevention, especially with regards to operator procedures.
7.3.8.1. Impact Through Blasting
Interaction between open areas and blasting is a issue in mining when done in close proximity
to other sections of the mine (Xia et al., 2013). As shotcrete deteriorates over time, blasting can
accelerate the formation of cracks or continuous damage across the shotcrete. This can then
subsequently lead to loss of adhesion and finally loss of support for the surrounding rock.
Closely related to the category dealing with the application of shotcrete, impact through blasting
is something that can be checked fairly easily after explosives have been set off and the mine has
been ventilated. In areas where shotcrete had been applied over five years before and nearby
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Figure 7.28: Bow-tie pathway for excavation interaction extracted from the greater ground control model
blasting takes place, extra geotechnical inspections might be prudent to verify continued integrity
of ground support present.
Using the controls asserted in the pathway of drill & blast practices in Figure 7.30, the controls
of vibration monitoring and blasting practices might be applicable to preventing accelerated
deterioration of support. Like the category of shotcreting application, maintenance and inspection
of shotcrete possibly impacted by nearby blasting could be the most effective way to mitigate impact
through blasting.
7.3.8.2. Build Up of Salt
Because mining at SDGM is done in a hyper-saline environment, any flow of water contains
suspended salt particles. When water trickles down the open pit works, salt is deposited along
the benches of the open pit, as well as along openings within the pit walls. This leads to the last
category of ground control incidents: an excessive build-up of salt. A problem arises when this
build-up becomes unstable over a used mining portals. In three cases, sizeable salt blocks have
come down.
In the first two cases, the blocks landed close to where an operator was standing moments
before. In the last instance, the rock was caught by meshing suspended across the mining portal.
Being a reactive control, it performed when depended on. In order to prevent salt build-up from
causing incidents, hydro-scaling could be used periodically to remove any excess salt from active
areas within the open pit.
As the open pit areas are not actively mined anymore, any sudden impacts to the pit wall can
mostly be attributed to underground activity. While pit wall integrity is featured in the bow-tie
model for ground control, it does not address the issue with salt build-up: it occurs steadily over
time until a piece breaks off. Like deterioration of support elements underground, the build
up occurs gradually and is measurable. Having netting in place might prevent incidents from
damaging equipment or causing injuries, yet the only way to prevent these incidents is through
proper maintenance and scaling of the pit wall above mining portals.
7.3.8.3. Operator Procedure
All three cases in the category of operator procedure concern entry into unsupported ground. In one
case, this was due to the fact the person involved was not familiar with the supporting process at
SDGM, causing this person to mistake a face with shotcrete yet without bolts for a fully supported
entry. The second case concerned an operator moving his shotcreting jumbo under unsupported
ground but not himself. In the last instance, an operator worked too close to the face, which caused
stope rilling to hit the operator in question.
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Figure 7.29: Heatmap of supporting operations incidents across case study time-frame
Within the mine, significant awareness is spread on never going into unsupported ground. None
of the incidents mentioned seem to have precipitated out of malice. Rather, unfamiliarity with
proper distancing rules might have been the underlying factor in causing an operator to mistake
what is considered safe, and what is not. Access through non-supported areas is classified as a
pathway in the ground control bow-tie model, which can be seen in Figure 7.32.
Although the application of barricading and signage prevents people unfamiliar with the current
state of affairs in the mine, it does nothing to prevent the three incidents discussed above from
happening. These are better mitigated by the critical control Ground Support Systems discussed
in Paragraph 7.3.7. What might be difficult for planners is acknowledging that access to non-
supported areas rarely happens in a static environment. That is to say, no activity is currently
taking place in a dead end of the mine and someone crosses into unsupported ground in such a
location. Rather, moving under unsupported ground takes place when during development, or
moving that extra meter to help spot something for a jumbo operator. Taking this dynamic factor
into account means that ground support procedures need to be clear for everyone entering active
mining areas.
7.3.9. Bow-tie modeled causes and critical controls
An overview of all incidents related to ground control has been given, and underlying patterns have
been established in some cases. All of those listed have been discussed throughout the incident
categories but for Seismicity. Most of the causes described in the bow-tie model capture ground
control incidents at SDGM to a considerable degree. In the case of scaling as an injury category,
the causes identified are applicable however the controls in the model do not reflect the nature of
scaling activities.
7.4. Summary of Outcomes
Both case studies demonstrate the use of incident data in critical control management. When the
aggregated risk score was measured over a prolonged period, relative significance of all Major
Hazard Standards within the mine can be established. This can help operations prioritize which
controls need attention or even overhaul. As such, it can be used as a lagging indicator for critical
control performance. The case studies also demonstrated that if critical controls are monitored, a
considerable amount of risk can be reduced with regards to Material Unwanted Events. Although
failures of specific critical controls could not implemented into incident registration within scope of
this research, the possibility to do so is there. It should be noted that this can only be implemented
effectively if incident registration is conducted or verified by an employee knowledgeable about
90 7. Case Studies
Figure 7.30: Bow-tie pathway for drill and blast techniques extracted from greater ground control model
relevant critical controls on-site.
7.4.1. Case 1: Underground Fire
In the first case study, the effectiveness of AFFF as a critical control was measured against the
rate of underground fire incidents at SDGM. Applying a 5.5 year period, a moving average risk
score was created to reflect the relative significance of fire incidents during 6 month periods with a
one-month interval. A steady decline from 2012 to 2015 with a slow rise until 2017 was at first
partly attributed to a fleet change-out. Although the decline could be related to change-out, upon
closer examination the rise in fire incidents was due to an increasing amount of Light Vehicle (LV)
fires. Not only were LV’s the major cause of fire incidents since 2015, the nature of LV fires was
also a majority of electrical fires.
While the AFFF did help reduce risk in terms of fire on most of the truck fires, the increasing
amount of electrical fires reduce its effectiveness as it is not rated to fight those fires. Because the
critical control produces an aqueous film forming foam, its effectiveness is reduced as it conducts
electricity. This is particularly the case in the underground environment of SDGM, which is
hyper-saline.
The conclusion of the first case study is that through the reactive nature of the observed
control, its effectiveness can change over time without outside influence on the control itself.
However, a reduction of risk of 25% was generated out of AFFF alone. As such, ensuring the
control performance when needed supports the prevention of a significant amount of risk exposure,
especially when the source of fire is a flammable liquid or solid.
7.4.2. Case 2: Underground Ground Control
Instead of the reactive side of the bow-tie model, the second case study focused on looking at
incident cause and proactive prevention. Within SDGM, 8 incident categories were identified. For
each of these the validity of the bow-tie model for ground control issues was verified. While none
of the causes specified in the model exactly denote the incident cause, controls were assessed to
be adequate. For some critical controls, additional verification steps were identified in order to
mitigate incident borne out of a lack of understanding such as scaling incidents.
However, the critical control most effective within the studied domain at SDGM was that of
remote loading. If this form of extraction is applied exclusively, incidents involving personnel are
minimized. The questions that verify the performance of this control are of the same nature as
all other controls and can thus be routed through the Critical Control Management System. This
demonstrates both the scalability and potential effectiveness of the system.
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Figure 7.31: Bow-tie pathway with controls mitigating less than adequate ground support.
Figure 7.32: Bow-tie pathway for access to non-supported areas out of the ground control model

8
Discussion
8.1. System Design
No validation has been carried out to assess if the Critical Control Management System is the
most efficient way of of monitoring control performance and supporting stakeholders in safety
decision-making. Although all but one of the critical control data gathering processes can be
routed through the bow-tie environment, this could potentially generate issues in the future. If
stakeholders have to take extra data entry steps with no clear added value, they might lose faith
in the overarching system. The bow-tie environment allows for uncomplicated identification of
hazards and controls through its excellent visualization properties. However, the environment
currently supports leveraging of critical control data generation in a minimal way. Additionally,
analytics have not yet been introduced in that particular software package. To develop a working
Critical Control Management System within the scope of research, analytics were run through
a data warehouse and OLAP to give stakeholders relevant dashboards for performance review.
Furthermore, the bow-tie environment can currently not be adjusted to have questions appear
multiple times in a single audit.
In a way, these problems stem from the fact that AngloGold Ashanti is pushing beyond what
is expected or required and set the standard instead of following it. When dealing with software
development, standardized or not, this may cause problems as going beyond what is standard
means redefining systems and therefore the underlying software. Instead of following market
products, AngloGold Ashanti could choose to develop an own system with an external party suited
directly to its operations. Such a system can utilize a similar approach to Planned Maintenance
(PM), that sends requests for audits or maintenance to relevant personnel, and aggregates data
based on reaction time, items fixed and close-out time. Because the data in the Performance
Standards is a series of closed questions, a binary approach could be applied for data acquisition,
simplifying codification of such a system.
This removes the need for reporting every single control based on their inclusion in an inspection.
Instead, a form is generated for the relevant employee in which the control questions are pre-coded.
If an action request related to a critical control is put in the system, this get denoted as a binary
non-compliance in output to the BI environment. As a result the data entry step at the end of
workplace inspections is eliminated too. The basis for this project is around using forms that are
already sent out daily to fulfil such things as maintenance requests to also include closed questions
for critical control integration. It also provides other opportunities such as use of maintenance data,
which is described in Section 8.2. Blending automation, BI and resource planning is discussed
extensively in literature, as well as doing so in a sustainable manner (Chofreh et al., 2017, Nofal
and Yusof, 2013, Sganzerla et al., 2016). Through generating data in such an integrated system,
the entire bow-tie environment can be taken out of the equation. Instead, it is used for what it is
best used: easy to use visualization of bow-tie models.
Although this systems design will essentially streamline entire critical control management in
one system, significant organizational change will be required to allow it to function effectively.
In order to create more support for critical control management, a more grass-roots approach as
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demonstrated in this project can be utilized. As such it is a less-impactful, useful intermediary step
to "full" critical control management. Taking the lessons learned through the design, implementa-
tion and application of the system developed in this research and using these in other operations
will generate the foundation for definitive Critical Control Management at AngloGold Ashanti.
8.2. Expanding Critical Control Management
One of the outcomes of integrating workplace inspections was the fact that complex technical
questions were not applicable to that process. In order to get full understanding of the performance
of critical controls, maintenance strategy and subsequently generated data could added to give
a broader perspective on critical control performance. At AngloGold Ashanti, this is generated
through a process called Planned Maintenance (PM), as stated in the previous paragraph. It should
be noted however that maintenance data does not cover all critical controls nor all their aspects.
This is due to their varying nature: some controls can also be a series of acts, a system or design
philosophy which do not adhere to physical maintenance. It can however use technical expertise to
ascertain the condition of physical critical controls.
Using the data generated with PM, an accurate picture of critical controls that have technical
aspects, such as pressure release valves or storage tanks with hazardous materials can be drawn
up. A second benefit of the use of this data is the fact that planned and unplanned work is taken
into account. Although uncorroborated by scientific literature, company officials at AGA pointed to
this source as potentially much more hazardous for individual performing the task. This is because
it is often a rush job, at the end of shift or non-routine work which makes it extra hazardous for
the operator.
While incident data can now be integrated on a low level through the addition of relevant Major
Hazard Standards to incidents, another data source that could provide significant value is that of
incident close-out actions. Instead of treating incidents solely like a lagging indicator, follow-up on
reports can be used to indicate at what level the learning organization is operating.
Another use of data on safety incidents could revolve around hot-spotting of high-hazard areas.
Already demonstrated in the case studies in Chapter 7, creating a heat-map for similar instances
could help establish underlying patterns in incidents. These could be utilized to support decision-
making around improving certain areas of plant or underground workings categorized as more
hazardous. The potential for this to be used in mining is extensive as ground conditions change
through a multitude of factors: distinct geological features, depth, water table and geotechnical
properties of the rock.
8.3. Operator Awareness
In Section 6.3 the consideration of operator awareness was discussed. While workplace inspections
is valued highly on all other performance indicators, awareness remained lacking. This is in part
due to the fact that processes within the current Critical Control Management System focus on
assessing the status of controls in place. For a majority of higher order controls this is the only
audit required to make sure they are working. A solid steel cage does not rely on operator behaviour
to keep personnel safe, it does so by its ongoing integrity.
For the majority of lower order critical controls, this is not the case however. Being admin-
istrative, they rely at least in some part on operator behaviour. The perception that operators
have of critical controls thus influences their actions, especially in high-stress, demanding working
environments. When looking at the data made public by Rio Tinto with regards to their approach
to Critical Risk Management, it seems a very comprehensive approach was taken (Rio Tinto, 2017).
While generating significant awareness, the changes made to existing processes might bring about
negative effects that diminish the overall effectiveness of such a system. Change to production
processes often carries risk with itself, and should be controlled through Management-of-Change
(MoC) processes (Gerbec, 2017). It also represents a return to the comprehensive framework of
applications applied in traditional safety management approaches as noted by Makin and Winder
(2008) in Section 1.1. When dealing with a plurality of operations, stakeholders and cultures, these
can have significant impact on the end result of such an implementation. A grassroots approach
might therefore be more suitable, at the expense of direct impact on the organization.
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One way to solve this issue is already being pursued by SDGM in the form of Safety Observations.
This process functions as a peer-to-peer review for operators on the ground and helps assess jobs
on use of critical controls. When looking at the processes discussed in Section 6.3, potential for
slight integration into all of the processes was found. Although in many cases no results may be
monitored, performing that integration within all processes could generate significant operator
awareness at little cost for disrupting the business.
Central around such an approach should be branding of Critical Control Management. At
Rio Tinto, it is called "Critical Risk Management" (Rio Tinto, 2017). At Glencore, it is called
"Catastrophic Hazard Management (Glencore, 2016). Generating operator awareness could be
done merely through low-impact integration of marking critical controls within the aforementioned
processes.
8.4. Tailoring of Business Intelligence
While an adaptable, functional dashboard has been created for stakeholders, more features can
still be included to expand leveraging of data generated. In this section two methods to this end
are discussed: using maintenance actions and close-out times to identify vulnerabilities in the
operation, and developing an overall measure for the performance of an operation with regards to
sustainable development.
8.4.1. Maintenance
In addition to the notions set forth in Section 6.7, several other measures could be developed to help
leaders business-wide understand their own processes better. The immediate target for integration
here is that of maintenance strategy and behaviour. It should be noted that at this stage the BI
environment transcends safety and moves into the technical domain of different maintenance
strategies. Especially when performing preventative maintenance or Condition Based Maintenance
(CBM), an organization can benefit from data-driven processes supporting (high-level) decision
making (Cerrada et al., 2018).
8.4.2. Performance in Terms of Sustainability
One of the main goals of the other sustainability disciplines within AngloGold Ashanti is integration
into Critical Control management. This opens up another avenue of sustainable production, as BI
can be utilized to deliver a real-time sustainability performance index for all included operations.
Not only could such a measure indicate performance, it also provides a broad risk profile of the
operations and their most pressing concerns. It supports decision-making as it can link previously
unseen trends in all disciplines, as demonstrated in Chapter 7, Case Studies.
While integration of Health, Environment, Security and Community are projects onto them-
selves, the infrastructure for Critical Control Management is already laid down. As discussed in
Paragraph 5.1.2, once the data is being generated into the bow-tie environment, it can immediately
be adopted for further use. This can help sustainability leaders establish priorities, especially when
vying to gain and or maintain the social license to operate.
8.5. Implementation
The first step to take for other operations is implementation of the quarterly, supervisor process
on site. As discussed in Section 6.8, it covers a little over 40% of all required company wide
Performance Standard validation questions. It has can be measured within a reasonable timeframe
after implementation and gives supervisors, who are the conduit between managers and operators,
the knowledge and tools to identify and maintain critical controls. Because this process is more
abstract than the exact situation on the shop floor, it requires little tailoring in order to suit it to
other operations.
For successful implementation to take place, buy-in is required from senior managers on-site.
This layer in the organization does not necessarily particate in verification of controls, but is
accountable for their performance and their ownership. It is the responsibility of safety personnel
on the operational level and especially the corporate level to convince managers of its use. The
lessons learned at SDGM could function as a useful platform to establish this. In doing so, one
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should remain aware of cultural differences across sites as well as continents when duplicating
critical control management.
After awareness is created in line management through the supervisor and subsequently
manager level questions, workplace inspections can be tailored to the operational level to start
monitoring critical controls on a more frequent basis. Any process like safety observations should
be considered above and beyond the standard. Implementing such a system should remain last
priority. However, integration of critical control branding into operator processes can be run
simultaneously, again pointing to the need for an overall corporate managed strategy that focuses
on visibility and awareness.
8.6. Predictive Risk
Being able to predict risk is of the goals set out by AngloGold Ashanti for critical control manage-
ment. However making any useful prediction with regards to the hazards faced in a mine requires
many factors to be taken into account. The division between planned and unplanned work is but
one of the possibilities for expanding the current system to gain more control over operational
safety. Other data that could possibly be used to predict risk exposure in a mine is for example:
• Operator Demographics
• Operator Experience and Education
• Prevailing weather data
• Production data
• Maintenance Scheduling
Combining the factors above could lead to the identification of more-than-average likely tasks
resulting in injuries. If an inexperience operator has to perform unplanned maintenance at the
end of shift, the likelihood for an injury can be estimated based on previous, similar cases found
within the data. As found in Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model, it is often a combination of such factors
that allow an operator to be put into a situation where the probability of making a mistake is
significantly higher. Another example of this could be an inexperienced hauling truck driver that
has to make up for decreasing production figures by rushing his task.
Faced with inclement weather, end of shift time and a lack of experience with affected roadways,
it is not unlikely for such a situation to translate into a Material Unwanted Event. Combining
the data sources mentioned above is not unfeasible using current technology. This could for
instance be achieved through methods described by Aidman et al. (2015) combined with hot-spot
mapping as described in Section 8.2. Together such an approach could present the next step in
building resilient systems for organizations where high reliability is required. Ultimately however,
removing employees from the hazards is what will truly prevent fatalities. Companies are already
implementing remote hauling trucks, as discussed extensively by Parreira (2013). That may not
solve all high-hazard issues, but it will remove some.
8.7. Results and Benefits of Agile Approach
After the framework for design of the CCMS had been set up during the literature study, the
scope changed when interviewing the aforementioned officials. At that stage, preliminary plans
for the addition of a new process were already in motion. By being able to quickly re-adjust
deliverables through Agile, all stages of the project were still finished on time and to the approval
of stakeholders.
Another potential issue that was avoided through the use of Agile was invalid verification of
critical controls. During systems design, neither the questions to validate critical controls had
been set-up nor had the frequency of these assessments been determined. Through re-scoping the
project by adding in Performance Standard impmlementation on-site, the verification questions
had already been developed for further use during this study. Subsequently, the nature of these
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questions was assessed to determine their applicable frequency, to the approval of stakeholders at
SDGM and elsewhere in the company.
Finally, re-scoping of system validation had to be carried out as the operational processes could
not be implemented before departure back to the Netherlands. Due to the very limited amount of
data gathered, two other case studies were developed instead. Although these did not measure
critical controls directly, a wider time frame was covered with a more representative data set.
Additionally, incident data was demonstrated to have significant potential as a lagging indicator
for critical control performance.

9
Conclusions
The purpose of this research was to support decision-making on operational safety through man-
agement of critical controls with the creation of an simple, robust, and scalable system. The main
research question focused on identifying in what way such a system could be successfully imple-
mented in an AngloGold Ashanti operation, while remaining scalable to other operations. A system
was designed that allows the integration of multiple data acquisition processes for critical control
monitoring. Patterns in the data generated are made comprehensible in a Business Intelligence
(BI) environment for support of stakeholder decision-making. One of the data acquisition processes
feeding into the management system was created through non-invasive process optimization to
assess critical control performance at the operational level. Case studies on underground fire and
ground control demonstrate the viability for integration of incident data into the larger system.
Together, critical control management was demonstrated to support decision-making on operational
safety at every level in the company hierarchy.
An extensive assessment of the entire organizational hierarchy was conducted to identify
company-wide requirements for critical controls. By interviewing a range of employees from senior
management officials to process plant operators as described in Chapter 4, a comprehensive view
was gathered on the organizational requirements for successful adaptation by stakeholders in the
company. As a secondary objective the interviews were utilized to re-familiarize company personnel
with critical control thinking and gain broad-based support for implementation. Main outcomes of
the requirements centred on keeping the system simple ("KISS"), weaving critical controls into
the business, observing cultural differences, assuring data integrity and minimizing impact on
business. By adhering to these requirements, key elements for successful implementation were
both identified and applied, thus answering the first research sub-question.
A design for Critical Control Management System was developed that considers multiple critical
control monitoring processes. Combining elements of safety science, risk management and IT, a
modular platform was created that allows integration of multiple different sources for data analytics.
It considers the inclusion of data feeds that were out-of-scope such as maintenance and production
data. The system is able to extract data in real time, potentially enabling decision-making during
work shifts. The design adheres to the organizational requirements set forth and can be scaled
to other AngloGold Ashanti operations. Combining these two elements means solving the issue
posed by the second research sub-question as to how scalability can be included into systems design.
Integration of critical controls was carried out to demonstrate their inclusion into operator pro-
cesses. Before integration, a strategy was developed in order to minimize interruption to business
and maximize operational support. In order to aid further implementation, adoption of unpublished
company Performance Standards was carried out. Because the addition of a new process was
considered deviation of scope, all operator processes were assessed on their potential suitability for
critical control integration. The process of monthly workplace inspections was selected and mapped
to prepare it for data acquisition. A solution was formulated that uses an intermediary data entry
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step to reduce licensing cost and provide opportunity for assessment of data integrity. The work-
place inspections were assessed for potential inclusion of critical control validation elements, which
was subsequently carried out. After integration of critical control elements, process optimization
was carried out through removal and adjustment of all other inspection items. This resulted in an
overall reduction of workload and thus widespread operational support. Through assessment of
operator processes for suitability to critical control integration, no single process was identified.
Instead, the criteria for integration of critical controls into operational processes was defined. This
provided company stakeholders with a tool to identify what use is desired out of integration, and to
select an operational process accordingly. As such, the third research sub-question is answered.
Through assessment of two case studies on underground fire and ground control, the bow-tie
models of these hazards has been validated. The case study on underground fire is built around a
single, reactive critical control and shows that the cost-effectiveness of such a control changes over
time without influence on the system itself. This demonstrates inherent vulnerability of reactive
mitigation in a high-pressure, dynamic environment such as an underground mine. The second
case study assesses ground control as a hazard and the potential sources that could lead to a loss of
control event. Using incident categories generated out of a five year time span, dominant pathways
to loss of control events are validated. Controls on these pathways are generally correct but miss a
human component, both in incident causation as well as prevention. The same is true for the case
study on underground fire. The fourth research sub-question posed the issue of measuring critical
control performance. As both case studies demonstrate, small changes can be made to include
incident data into critical control management to increase effectiveness of the system.
With the results generated during this study, the research questions listed in the Introduction
could be answered. The main research question was:
How can an effective Critical Control Management System be implemented in AngloGold Ashanti
operations to mitigate fatal incidents?
Through the steps taken in this study, an effective Critical Control Management System was
implemented in an AngloGold Ashanti operation. This was accomplished by using a flexible
method for development of the system, while ensuring output was tailored to the organization in a
least-invasive manner.
10
Recommendations
Develop BI suite
The dashboards available for stakeholders are currently still in development. To tailor these
dashboards requires sole input of a business intelligence developer or person versed in the OLAP
environment of PowerBI. In order to streamline development of these dashboards, corporate
requirements should be developed first. When these are available, data presentation needs be
adapted to support stakeholder reporting, insight and decision-making.
Start branding of critical controls
Improving the visibility of critical controls organization-wide needs to be a priority for the global
safety team. Non-invasive techniques to generate awareness will work best and require integration
into current processes. Many operator level procedures have the potential for adapting critical
controls and will generate awareness amongst front-line personnel. Criteria for selection should be
based on pro-active, institutionalized processes like JHA’s.
Integrate incident data
Viability for the inclusion of incident data in critical control management has been demonstrated.
Adoption of data into the system requires simple management-of-change processes. Assuring data
integrity should be based on developing the understanding of safety personnel as these assess both
Major Hazard Standards and controls. Comprehension should focus on hazards first and controls
second.
Prepare other operations
Implementation of critical control management at SDGM rested on the adaptive capacities of an
experienced safety department with good understanding. Other operations will likely neither have
the adaptive capacity nor the required level of understanding. Additionally, line management
is ultimately accountable for critical controls and their drive in the operation, while the safety
department merely facilitates this process. Implementation should therefore not be left to the
operations themselves. Before additional capacity is made available, the general manager and
safety department head should be made stakeholders of the project. Secondly, implementation
plans need to be prepared behorehand in collaboration with site officials and with approval of the
general manager. Finally, a specialist with knowledge on critical controls should support roll-out of
operational processes and develop understanding among employees on-site.
Add other sustainability disciplines
Environment, health, security and community are currently following safety closely in development
of bow-tie models to mitigate Material Unwanted Events. Critical controls within these disciplines
should be included one discipline at a time, preferably environment and health first. Both of these
disciplines have potential for current operations and their possible incidents. In specific cases
where a mine-site suffers from excessive intrusions of illegal miners, security should be prioritized.
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Collaborate with software developer
In the current situation, not all processes are functioning as designed due to limitations in the
software packages used. Imperfections in systems integrity will certainly hamper introduction
of critical controls in other sites. Goals for collaboration should centre on translating needs to
a simple set of requirements and establishing a short-term time horizon for further updating of
processes. These can established through the development of use-cases that demonstrate which
functional needs are necessary to create a fully functioning system.
Assess integration ofmaintenance data
After incident data, the next frontier for a complete critical control management system lies in
adapting maintenance data of these controls into the overarching system. Data on maintenance sits
within one application, so integration should focus on extracting data and subsequently building
from there. Once it can be integrated in the BI environment, utilization solely rests on definition of
useful parameters for end users.
Determine feasibility of using a dedicated infrastructure
While asset integrity data is already generated through Planned Maintenance, there is significant
technical and economical potential for critical control data to be routed through the same platform.
Not only would this simplify the system in use, it would also cut down on associated licensing costs
of secondary systems. Feasibility of use should focus on determining what development would cost
for extensive action management of a diverse suite of audits, as well applicability to handheld
devices. As this process would have to be replicated at each operation for both the current and
potential systems infrastructure, early adaption can potentially reduce costs extensively.
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A
Sample Performance Standard
Figure A.1: First section of Peformance Standard on Bunding/Self-Adsorbment of Hazardous Materials
109
110 A. Sample Performance Standard
Figure A.2: Second section of Peformance Standard on Bunding/Self-Adsorbment of Hazardous Materials
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Figure A.3: Third section of Peformance Standard on Bunding/Self-Adsorbment of Hazardous Materials

B
Critical Control Elements
Non-applicable Elements
As will become clear when examining the mapping tool applied to the workplace inspections, some
technical level questions could not be fitted or were simply not appropriate. In this section, a short
outline will be given around these elements and the reason why they were not applicable. These
elements are:
• CSE-M.02 - Multi-Gas Measurements system
• ELE-M.01 - Isolation, lock out and tag process
• ESG-M.03 - Emergency stop button and/or lanyard
• ESG-M.05 - Emergency stop button and/or lanyard
• PRE-M.01 - Pressure release valves
• PRE-M.02 - Blow-down valves
The multi-gas measurement systems audit is conducted through a bump test. This goes beyond the
skill of a standard safety representative, as well as sitting within the strategy of the maintenance
department. Essentially, this performance standard element is already answered, but not within
the scope of the systems applied.
Although several significant pieces of electrical equipment are utilized, the applicable signage
is already installed. While there is sense in checking that the signage remains in place, this is
already covered by yearly audits specified through statutory requirements.
The two elements applicable to emergency stop buttons and/or lanyard were included in an
early stage before validation of the critical control elements was conducted. In the first instance, by
auditing the systems in place the question is intrinsically answered. However, as stated in section
5.2.2, this is a systems question designed for higher level assessment. As such, this element will
be slated when reviewed. In the second instance, all lanyards are designed and required to cover
the entire length of the applicable machinery, thus making the question an arduous yet ultimately
irrelevant process.
The final two elements of pressure release and blow-down valves are checked within the strategy
of the maintenance department, again demonstrating the need for inclusion of this strategy within
the overarching Critical Control Management System.
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114 B. Critical Control Elements
Table B.1: First section of the mapping tool used to identify and categorize critical control elements in workplace inspections
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Table B.2: Second section of the mapping tool used to identify and categorize critical control elements in workplace
inspections
116 B. Critical Control Elements
Table B.3: Third section of the mapping tool used to identify and categorize critical control elements in workplace inspections
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Table B.4: First section of Monthly workplace inspection questions on critical controls
Table B.5: Second section of Monthly workplace inspection questions on critical controls

C
Case Study bow-tie models
Figure C.1: First section of the pro-active side of the SDGM bow-tie model for Ground Control
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120 C. Case Study bow-tie models
Figure C.2: Second section of the pro-active side of the SDGM bow-tie model for Ground Control
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Figure C.3: Complete section of the reactive side of the SDGM bow-tie model for Underground Fire

D
Interview data
In this Appendix, the function titles of AngloGold Ashanti officials interviewed as well as their
base of operations can be examined for reference to the creation of organizational requirements.
In Table D.1, the functions and base of operations of the employees interviewed can be viewed in
alphabetical order.
Table D.1: List of function titles and base of operations of employees interviewed
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